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Historians have traditionally emphasized the sharp differences between Herbert Hoover’s 
vision of an associational state and the activism of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. This 
dissertation highlights an important area of continuity between the economic policies espoused by 
Hoover—during his tenures as Secretary of Commerce and President—and Roosevelt, focusing on 
federal efforts to promote the nascent aviation industry from the end of World War I until the 
passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938. These efforts were successful, and offer a unique arena 
in which to document the concrete gains wrought by Hoover’s associationalist ideology and 
Roosevelt’s New Deal. Moreover, both Hoover’s corporatist policies and New Deal efforts to create 
aviation infrastructure—largely through the auspices of public works agencies like the Public Works 
Administration and Works Progress Administration—form a striking example of the government’s 
ability to successfully foster the development of a new industry, even in the midst of the Great 
Depression. Significantly, both men’s efforts represented an alternative to nationalization, the path 
taken by virtually every European nation during the era. This period thus offers the opportunity to 
examine how both presidents’ aviation policies cohere with their larger visions of government’s 
proper relationship to the economy, to compare and contrast associationalism and New Deal, and to 
elucidate aviation’s role in promoting American economic development. 
During these years government actions expanded from having literally no engagement with 
commercial aviation to subsidizing airmail routes, creating a regulatory infrastructure to promote 
safe operations by licensing pilots, inspecting aircraft, approving manufacturing operations, and 
aggressively promoting flying to the American people. Contextualized by the American public’s 
well-documented enthusiasm for flying—particularly after Charles Lindbergh’s famous New York-
to-Paris flight in 1927—these federal actions created America’s modern air transport network, 
culminating in the passage of the seminal Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the construction and 
improvement of almost a thousand airports around the country, and the growth of a core group of 
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Between the world wars, American aeronautics experienced a radical transformation. These 
years witnessed the most dynamic developmental period in the nation’s aeronautical history, a period 
that saw aviation grow from infancy to maturation in less than 20 years. In the years immediately 
following the Great War the lone barnstormer represented the exemplar of American aeronautics, 
flying from town to town and offering rides to locals, many of whom had never before seen an 
airplane. By the eve of the Second World War, however, Americans could take advantage of the 
world’s most extensive air transport network, travel coast-to-coast in less than 24 hours in safety and 
relative comfort, and arrive and depart from airports much like those we frequent today.  
The rapidity of that development speaks to the comprehensive manner in which Americans 
embraced aviation. According to historian Joseph Corn, this was the period during which Americans 
became truly “air-minded,” that is, “having enthusiasm for airplanes, believing in their potential to 
better human life, and supporting aviation development.”1 Commentators often refer to this period as 
the “Golden Age of Flight,” an allusion to the romance and achievement of the era. The Smithsonian 
National Air and Space Museum, the foremost custodian of American aeronautical history, 
highlights this period with its own gallery. Its introductory placard suggests that we remember this 
period as being “golden,” because “of the many advances in aviation technology, the many record 
flights, and the intense interest of the public in aviation events.”2  
Each of those elements speaks to the depth of American engagement with aeronautical 
development. During the interwar period planes transformed from fabric-covered biplanes that 
                                            
1 Joseph Corn, The Winged Gospel: America’s Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 12.  
2 “Introductory Panel,” “Golden Age of Flight” Gallery, Smithsonian National Air and 





struggled to reach 100 miles per hour to sleek, low-winged metal monoplanes with enclosed cockpits 
and retractable landing gear able to travel more than four times that speed. These years witnessed the 
invention of engine cowlings, instrument flight, wing de-icing equipment, air traffic control, airmail, 
and widespread commercial passenger service. At the same time aerial heroes like Charles 
Lindbergh, Amelia Earhart, Howard Hughes, and Wiley Post rose to national prominence on the 
strength of their record-breaking efforts. Lindbergh, in particular, captured the heart of the nation 
and, for a time, defined the American hero. Public interest in aviation peaked during this era. More 
than a hundred thousand spectators turned out to watch national air races, Americans clambered to 
get a glimpse of their flying heroes, and coverage of all things aeronautical dominated newspapers, 
periodicals, newsreels, and movies.  
Federal aviation policy forms an important but under-explored part of that larger context. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Great War, the federal government had virtually no engagement with 
aviation. In 1918 the Air Service began a trial airmail run from Washington, D.C. to New York, later 
turning airmail operations over to the U.S. Post Office. For the next seven years the Post Office 
expanded that service, eventually establishing a network that stretched from coast to coast. 
Additionally, federal funds created the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in 
1915, a scientific body that would ultimately make great strides in promoting safety and efficiency in 
the air. Those operations, however, serve to highlight the limits, rather then the extent, of federal 
aviation policy. The government had no power to license pilots, no regulatory mechanism to deem 
aircraft airworthy, no legislation to guide private and commercial operations, and no central 
authority to coordinate federal action.  
By the end of the 1930s the situation had changed radically. A series of legislative actions 





Civil Aeronautics Administration tasked to oversee private and commercial aviation. The 
Administration licensed pilots, approved the airworthiness of aircraft, investigated crashes, oversaw 
navigation aids, ran the nation’s air traffic control network, and determined routes and rates for 
commercial carriers. In short, the CAA created an independent federal agency with power over all 
aspects of non-military aviation.  
 
The development of federal policy between the world wars is the subject of this dissertation. 
During that era policymakers including Herbert Hoover, William MacCracken, Walter F. Brown, 
Hugo Black, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Hopkins fundamentally altered the course of American 
aeronautics. Their efforts resulted in the creation and sustentation of a coherent federal aviation 
policy that established the conditions for the possibility of commercial growth.  
That policy initially emerged from Hoover’s associationalist ideology. From the early 1920s 
Hoover, first as Commerce Secretary and later as President, recognized aviation’s ability to change 
the economic, social, and political outlines of the country and used his power and influence to 
construct a coherent national policy. With the help of allies like MacCracken and Brown, Hoover 
worked diligently to promote aeronautical growth by placing the power of the federal government 
behind the regulation and promotion of American flying. Central to this effort was the seminal Air 
Commerce Act of 1926. This legislation—primarily the work of MacCracken—created the 
regulatory apparatus that would guide American aviation until the passage of the Civil Aeronautics 
Act in 1938. The Air Commerce Act created a Bureau of Aeronautics within the Commerce 
Department, and for the first time gave the federal government the power to regulate the industry in 
the interests of safety and efficiency. Simultaneously, the 1925 Contract Air Mail Act—the so-called 





privatized Post Office airmail contracts and offered commercial carriers the potential for stable 
profits.3 Later modified by Postmaster General Walter Brown in order to promote commercial 
growth and encourage the expansion of passenger service, the Kelly Act for the first time created a 
solvent American air transport industry. 
 Federal support for aeronautical growth continued under the Democratic auspices of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s Presidency. Though controversy plagued commercial aviation in the early 1930s, 
eventually leading to a contentious Senate Special Committee investigation, virtually all interested 
parties agreed that aviation had value to the nation. Even Hugo Black—a vocal opponent of Walter 
Brown’s policies and the man behind the Senate investigation—publicly stated his commitment to 
promoting aeronautical growth. Though the 1934 Senate Special Committee ultimately resulted in 
President Roosevelt temporarily cancelling all private airmail contracts and Congresses’ passage of a 
new Air Mail Act superseding Brown’s policies, the uproar ultimately had little long-term effect on 
the industry. Indeed, in many ways the disruption served to highlight the pervasive influence of 
Hoover’s fundamental vision. 
Roosevelt himself demonstrated a consistent focus on promoting aeronautical growth. His 
early engagement with the airmail controversy in 1934 signaled his willingness to involve himself 
with the machinations of airmail policy. Subsequently, Roosevelt pushed for the creation of the 
Federal Aviation Commission, a bipartisan committee tasked to investigate all aspects of American 
aeronautics with the goal of offering concrete recommendations for how the federal government 
could continue to support the industry’s development. It appears that the Commission’s findings 
played an important role in pushing Roosevelt to support the creation of new aviation legislation. 
                                            
3 At the time, airlines could not profit from flying passengers alone. Government airmail 
contracts offered the promise of steady income that would allow nascent commercial 





The President, in fact, played a key role in supporting the creation and passage of the 1938 Civil 
Aeronautics Act, legislation that in many ways codified Hoover’s vision and created the regulatory 
framework that would guide American flying until deregulation at the end of the 1970s. Roosevelt 
worked diligently behind the scenes to ensure that the bill conformed to his ideas, and demonstrated 
a willingness to use the power and influence of his office to secure its passage. Significantly, 
Roosevelt’s actions demonstrate remarkable coherence with those of his predecessor. Roosevelt 
embraced policies creating continuity between his administration and Hoover’s, building upon the 
Republican’s foundational model but giving the federal government even more power to shape 
aeronautical development.  
Simultaneously, Roosevelt supported a separate set of policies that ultimately had at least as 
significant an effect on American aviation. Largely ignored by scholars of both aviation and the New 
Deal, Roosevelt’s support for public works spending led to the construction of almost five hundred 
airports across the country, and the improvement of a similar number. Under the auspices of 
organizations like the Civil Works Agency, Public Works Administration, and Works Progress 
Administration, New Deal public works agencies funded foundational infrastructure improvements 
that created the conditions for the possibility of commercial success. Most significantly, Harry 
Hopkins’ Works Progress Administration spent tens of millions of dollars on aviation-related 
projects around the country. Much more than make-work endeavors, these projects represented a 
concerted effort to promote the development of aviation infrastructure. In this sense airways and 
airports represent a permanent physical legacy of the New Deal’s success. Roosevelt’s public works 
policy highlights the sophistication with which the New Deal sought to promote economic 
development, and belies the image of public works agencies privileging short-term employment to 





Collectively, these actions highlight the activist role taken by the federal government in regards 
to commercial aviation. Hoover, Roosevelt, and other policymakers utilized federal power to foster 
the growth of a specific commercial interest—with successful results. As such, federal aviation 
policy during this period serves as an important example of the government’s willingness and ability 
to positively affect the commercial sector. More specifically, it offers a largely unexplored arena in 
which to examine concrete gains wrought by Hoover’s associationalist ideology and the New Deal. 
Those gains are even more intriguing when considering that aviation achieved financial viability 
during the Great Depression, an unlikely time for commercial growth, and a time of fundamental 
redefinition of government’s proper role. This period thus offers the opportunity to examine the 
connections between federal aviation policy and larger conceptions of government’s proper 
relationship to the economy, and to elucidate aviation’s significance in the larger narrative of 
American economic development. 
By the eve of World War II, federal efforts had resulted in the creation of a mature air 
transportation network. Taking place in a larger context of dynamic technological development and 
public fascination with flying, these federal policies created the world’s largest and most efficient 
commercial aviation industry. This dissertation represents an effort to explore federal engagement 
with aviation policy. As such, it will define the motivations behind the creation of a coherent vision 
for aeronautics’ place in America’s future, determine the limits of that vision, trace its development 
through Hoover and Roosevelt’s presidencies, delineate if and how it changed, describe the 
intersection of federal policy with aviation’s cultural prevalence, and ascertain the legacy of these 
federal policies. Though the contemporary air transportation network may appear quite different 
from its interwar progenitor, that period continues to hold the key to unlocking the narrative of 






It is hard to overstate the primitive nature of American commercial aviation during the period 
immediately following World War I. While 1914 witnessed the short-lived launch of America’s—
and the world’s—first scheduled airline service, by the closing months of the war the United States 
lacked any stable passenger or cargo service. 4 This soon changed, however, under the joint auspices 
of the Post Office and the U.S. Army. During the war, Second Assistant Postmaster General Otto 
Praeger consistently pushed for the Post Office to support the development of regularly scheduled 
airmail service. Recognizing aviation’s potential to revolutionize commercial transportation, Praeger 
identified a number of potential test routes, finally settling on a short run from Washington, D.C. to 
New York, with a stop in Philadelphia. Lacking any infrastructure, including pilots, planes, or 
mechanics, Praeger turned to the army to supply the needed manpower and material. The army 
inaugurated service on May 15, 1918, running the service for a year before turning operations over 
to the Post Office, which by that time had hired pilots, purchased aircraft, and initiated plans to 
expand operations. During the following six years, the Post Office extended the airmail map across 
the country, inaugurating coast-to-coast service and creating a truly national network before handing 
over routes to private contractors in 1925.5  
                                            
4 The St. Petersburg to Tampa Airboat Line. The fledgling passenger service ferried 
passengers across Tampa Bay, saving a long train journey around the Bay’s shoreline. 
The airline operated for four months with great success, but floundered following the end 
of the tourist season. See: Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr., “The St. Petersburg-Tampa Airboat 
Line,” The Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 1 (July, 1979), 72-77, and “The 
World’s First Scheduled Airline” Panel, “The Early Years of Air Transportation” 
Section, “America by Air” Exhibit, Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, 
Washington, D.C. 
5 For information on the origins and development of U.S. Post Office airmail service, see: 
William M. Leary, Aerial Pioneers: The U.S. Airmail Service, 1918-1927 (Washington, 





In 1918, however, preparations for inaugurating airmail service demonstrated just how far 
American commercial aviation would have to develop. Difficulties presented themselves even before 
the first flight. Most significantly, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. lacked suitable 
airports. There was literally no ground-based infrastructure from which to operate the airmail 
service. Under Praeger’s direction the Post Office and Army worked together to identify suitable 
landing fields. In Washington, they settled on the Polo Grounds—not an airport in any formal sense, 
but a flat, grassy field large enough to allow aircraft to take off and land. In Philadelphia, officials 
chose a small field near Bustleton, again a venue lacking any formal infrastructure, but a location 
with easy road access to downtown. New York offered the greatest challenge, and also the most 
creative solution. There, after rejecting a number of possible sites including parks and gardens, 
officials turned to Belmont Park. Belmont housed one of the most active racetracks in the country, 
which on its face made it an odd choice for an airmail terminal. The racetrack, however, had a large, 
flat infield section that would allow safe aircraft operation. Additionally, the complex had improved 
road access and was close enough to the city to make operations viable. Remarkably, airmail planes 
often took off and landed during races, biplanes racing thoroughbreds down the backstretch.6 
Similar difficulties arose in regard to pilots and aircraft. Although the United States was 
formally at war in Europe in the spring of 1918, the Army had a pitifully small number of trained 
pilots. As a result, the pilots assigned to airmail operations lacked adequate training and experience. 
Of the six pilots initially assigned to fly the mail, two lacked experience flying cross-country, and 
                                                                                                                                  
History of Commercial Aviation in America (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979), 
13-29.  





three had been flying for fewer than four months. Only one pilot, Lieutenant Paul Culver, had what 
any informed observer would term adequate training for the job.7  
The airmail service’s aircraft exhibited analogous limitations. Praeger had identified the Curtis 
JN-4—an army training aircraft known as the “Jenny”—as a viable plane for the job. The Post 
Office contracted with Curtis to retrofit the Jennies with a mail compartment in what would 
normally serve as the craft’s second cockpit. Though Praeger mandated that the airmail service’s 
Jennies receive more powerful engines, their cargo capacity was nonetheless limited to the weight of 
a flight trainee: 160 pounds. The planes were also saddled with numerous other limitations—a lack 
of instrumentation, leaking fuel tanks, unreliable engines—all of which represented the norm rather 
than the exception for the day.8  
In spite of these challenges, the inaugural airmail flight from Washington, D.C. on May 15 
began auspiciously. President Woodrow Wilson attended the event, along with his wife and, notably, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Roosevelt. According to The Washington Post, this 
inaugural flight represented “one of the epoch making events in the [history of] the United States 
postal service,”9 a sentiment echoed by The New York Times. The latter publication reported that 
“the day will go down in history as marking the advent of a new epoch . . . the forerunner of a 
network of aerial mail lines which will cover the entire world.”10 This official recognition boded 
well for the new service, and Army and Post Office officials did their best not to disappoint.  
Despite some initial problems starting the plane’s engine—it later emerged that the ground 
crew had forgotten to fuel it—the flight departed to great fanfare. The pilot, Lieutenant George 
                                            
7 Ibid, 30-34. 
8 Ibid, 33-50. 
9 “Aero Mail A Success,” The Washington Post, May 16, 1918.  





Boyle, took off smoothly and proceeded on his way—in exactly the wrong direction. Boyle, lacking 
experience in cross-country navigation, used a road map to guide his way to Philadelphia. 
Apparently, however, he lacked a strong sense of direction and followed his chosen railroad-line 
guide south from the city rather than north. Failing to realize his error, Boyle flew for almost an hour 
before landing in Waldorf, Maryland—25 miles south of the capital.11  
Boyle’s blunder notwithstanding, the service achieved great success during its first months of 
service. These early days of operations, however, only further served to demonstrate the primitive 
conditions facing air transport operations. Pilots had to deal with notoriously unreliable compasses—
one of the contributing factors in Boyle’s misadventures. Incongruously, the compass represented 
the only instrument in these early aircraft, yet pilots found that it would often spin aimlessly or 
provide demonstrably false readings. Ironically, Captain Benjamin Lipsner, the operations officer for 
the service, identified the Jennies’ control stick as a contributing factor in these problems. 
Apparently the stick, made of metal, would cause the compass “to go into a crazy little spin” when 
pilots pushed it forward toward the instrument panel. Even after mechanics switched the metal 
control stick for a wooden one, Lipsner reported that pilots could seldom rely on their compasses. 
Instead, “smoking chimneys, railroad tracks, creeks, rivers, and similarly outstanding landmarks,” 
offered the most reliable navigational aids.12  
                                            
11 Unfortunately, Boyle’s tribulations were far from finished. Two days later Boyle again 
lost his way trying to reach Philadelphia. According to historian William Leary, Boyle’s 
superiors carefully briefed him to keep the Chesapeake Bay’s shoreline on his left as he 
traveled north. Unfortunately, Boyle interpreted these instructions a bit too literally, 
keeping the shoreline on his left even after crossing the Susquehanna river and traveling 
south down Maryland’s eastern shore. After more then three hours, Boyle reached the 
end of his fuel supply—and the end of the shoreline while coming face-to-face with the 
Atlantic Ocean. See: Leary, Aerial Pioneers, 40. 
12 Benjamin B. Lipsner, The Airmail: From Jennies to Jets (New York: Wilcox & Follett 





Pilots also had to contend with myriad other navigational problems. During this period there 
were no aerial navigation maps, meaning that pilots utilized ordinary road maps—hardly the most 
reliable when operating cross-country. In addition, navigation aids such as radios or even beacon 
lights were nonexistent. Two years later, as the Post Office attempted to prove the viability of cross-
country service, it employed a veritable army of volunteers across the western half of the country to 
light bonfires to help guide airmail pilots flying at night. Responding to these prevailing conditions, 
pilots quickly found the most effective strategy to be to memorize all aspects of their specific airmail 
route. In fact, pilots frequently created detailed notebooks containing prominent landmarks, areas 
with tricky wind conditions, and potential emergency landing fields. Adding to their difficulties, 
poor weather conditions often forced pilots to fly at extremely low altitudes. Lacking adequate 
instrumentation, pilots could not fly in clouds for risk of losing control of their aircraft. At times this 
led to harrowing tales as pilots flew just above—and at times below—the treetops. During the early 
years of airmail service several pilots reported near collisions with trains while following railroad 
tracks at extremely low altitude in bad weather.13  
The primitive nature of these early operations, however, offered pilots options that would have 
been unthinkable even a few short years later. Pilots who lost their way or ran out of gas often 
resorted to landing in convenient fields, walking to the nearest house, and asking the owner for aid. 
Major Rueben Fleet, the air officer in charge of the Army’s trial airmail service, resorted to just this 
tactic while attempting to deliver an aircraft to Philadelphia for the inaugural airmail flight. Fleet lost 
his way on the flight from New York and landed to ask directions from a farmer. Resuming his 
journey, Fleet again became confused and set down on a golf course to ask for directions, damaging 
                                            
13 See: Leary, Aerial Pioneers, 30-221; Lipsner, The Airmail, 1-212, and David 
Courtwright, Sky as Frontier: Adventure, Aviation, and Empire (College Station: Texas 





his aircraft in the process. After making the necessary repairs and turning the aircraft over to a more 
experienced pilot, darkness set in, causing Fleet to ask passing motorists for assistance. After 
persuading several to stop and light the “runway” with their headlights, the aircraft took off and 
made it safely to the airmail field at Bustleton.14  
Circumstances like these defined the primitive nature of early air transport operations. Pilots 
had to fly by the proverbial seat of their pants, trusting instinct and experience to get them through 
difficult situations. Unreliable equipment and unproven operating procedures combined to make 
flying regularly scheduled routes an iffy proposition at best. In these conditions, comfortable, safe 
and reliable passenger service was only a dream. When early airmail carriers did consent to carry 
passengers, the hapless travelers often found themselves sitting atop mail sacks in open cockpit 
biplanes. In the late 1920s government airmail subsidies made mail far more valuable to carriers than 
passengers, resulting in many passengers being unceremoniously denied their ticketed seat when 
mail volume proved too great to fit both correspondence and passenger. Adding to these difficulties, 
until 1926 the government had no power to license pilots, inspect aircraft, and assure that aircraft 
manufacturers conformed to basic safety standards. Collectively, these circumstances highlight the 
fact that before 1925, American commercial aviation remained very much in its infancy. 
By 1939, however, the industry had experienced fundamental changes. Federal regulation, 
technological development, and commercial growth combined to create a mature commercial 
network. Passengers could choose to fly a number of established airlines—many of which are still in 
operation today.15 Those airlines utilized modern terminal buildings—at least in large cities—with 
regular ticketing and baggage procedures. The Douglas DC-3 ruled the skies, a twin-engined aircraft 
                                            
14 Leary, Aerial Pioneers, 35.  





that could comfortably seat more than 20 passengers. The DC-3 had engine cowlings, retractable 
landing gear, de-icing equipment in its wings, a full slate of navigational and communication 
equipment, and the ability to cruise at more than twice the top speed of the early airmail craft. 
Passengers could travel from coast to coast in less then 36 hours on regularly scheduled passenger 
routes. Those routes included radio communications with ground-based dispatchers, radio-based 
navigational aids, and emergency landing fields if something should go wrong. A national air traffic 
control system guided aircraft in the skies, maintaining spacing between flights and guiding aircraft 
to crowded airports in bad weather. If money and time allowed, Americans could board a Pan 
American Airways Clipper flying boat and fly to Europe, Hawaii, or even Hong Kong while 
enjoying gourmet food, the attentions of a highly trained cabin crew, and comfortable sleeping 
berths.16  
Americans who took to the air could rest assured in the knowledge that the government policed 
the aviation industry through the auspices of a dedicated organization, the Civil Aviation Authority. 
Federal officials licensed all pilots for private, multi-engine, instrument, and commercial flying. 
They inspected manufacturers and awarded airworthiness certificates for all new or significantly 
modified airframes. Federal employees operated the air traffic control system, and the government 
released continuing funds for technological research into new communication, engine, and airframe 
technologies. Additionally, the federal government continued to fund a massive program of aviation-
related infrastructure creation. Hundreds of millions of federal dollars paid for airport improvements, 
new fields, and air marking campaigns around the country. As a result, the vast majority of 
                                            
16 See: R.E.G. Davies, A History of the World’s Airlines (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1964), 123-150; Solberg, Conquest of the Skies, 149-172, 206-225, and 





American population centers with more then 5,000 residents had a modern airport, complete with 
lighting, radio communication, a control tower, and multiple concrete or asphalt runways.  
 
Federal efforts to regulate and promote aviation did not emerge in a vacuum, however. In fact, 
they reflected a logical—though still significant—development of pre-existing American 
transportation policy stretching back more than 150 years. Although the federal government played a 
minimal role in crafting transportation policy until the mid-nineteenth century, almost from the 
moment of the United States’ founding, state and local governments began to aggressively promote 
transportation infrastructure. Often haphazard, these efforts aided the creation of toll roads, 
turnpikes, canals, wagon roads, and ferries. As Americans increasingly pushed west, state and local 
support of transportation infrastructure became increasingly important to economic growth, 
particularly after the invention of steam-powered boats.17 Communities desiring to play an active 
role in emerging commercial networks worked diligently to create sufficient infrastructure and make 
themselves attractive to commercial interests.18  
The federal government, however, generally proved loath to involve itself with transportation, 
at least until the midpoint of the nineteenth century. Although early in the century Henry Clay’s 
promotion of the “American System” of internal improvements provided modest support for 
infrastructure development, according to Robert Dilger “prior to 1850, the national government’s 
involvement in transportation policy is best characterized as indirect and limited.”19  
                                            
17 For example, during the 1800s state governments provided approximately 70 percent 
of the $125 million spent on canal construction. See: Robert J. Dilger, American 
Transportation Policy (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 5-6. 
18 Ibid, 5. 





This federal reluctance, however, began to diminish as railroads began to play an increasingly 
important role in American commerce. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the federal 
government embraced several policies focused specifically on promoting the growth of American 
railways. First, in 1838 the government designated all railroads as postal routes, thus offering the 
possibility of subsidy through mail carriage. At the same time, a growing federal consensus that 
railroads offered an effective means to promote interstate commerce resulted in efforts to subsidize 
expansion. Constitutional limitations forbade direct federal subsidies, but lawmakers effectively 
circumvented these constraints by donating nationally owned land to states. States then sold that land 
at auction and gave the proceeds to railways. By the turn of the twentieth century, the federal 
government had provided more than 130 million acres of land for railroad improvements, with states 
contributing almost 50 million more.20  
By the beginning of the twentieth century the federal government also turned its attention to 
roads. Throughout the nineteenth century state and local governments had continued to support road 
development on a limited basis, but by the early 1900s the increasing prevalence of the automobile 
signaled an ever-increasing need for additional infrastructure. Responding to that need, in 1916 the 
federal government passed the Federal Road Act, approving an expenditure of $75 million to 
improve rural postal roads.21 At the same time, states began to increase their regulation and oversight 
of highways. In 1913 New Jersey became the first state to mandate a driver’s license for anyone 
operating a motor vehicle, a requirement gradually adopted by other states in following years.22  
                                            
20 Ibid, 8-9. For more information on federal engagement vis-à-vis railroads see: Gabriel 
Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1965). 
21 The funds were provided to specific states on a 50-50 matching basis, over a period of 
five years. See: Dilger, American Transportation Policy, 11-13. 





At the same time, the federal government began to play a more active role in regulating 
transportation, largely through the auspices of the Constitution’s Interstate Commerce Clause. 
Following the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, the government embraced 
newfound responsibilities to oversee the use of American transportation systems. Largely a reaction 
to the perceived growth of unhealthy monopolies in the railroad industry, the ICC signaled a new 
federal willingness to referee commercial growth and regulate commercial interests in the nation’s 
interest.23 
Collectively, this history demonstrates that by the early years of the twentieth century, the 
federal government embraced an ever-expanding role in the promotion and regulation of American 
transportation. Federal funds—indirect though they may have been—played a crucial role in 
promoting railroad growth, and federal engagement with the regulation of both railroads and 
vehicular travel suggested a growing consensus that lawmakers saw themselves as having at least 
some measure of responsibility over these commercial interests.24 
Commercial aviation, therefore, emerged during a period of growing federal activism with 
regard to transportation. In this context federal efforts to regulate the nascent airline industry and 
promote commercial development through informal subsidization—specifically through the auspices 
of the Post Office—reflect the ongoing emergence of a political consensus. At the same time, 
                                            
23 Dilger, American Transportation Policy, 10-11. 
24 Notably, Gabriel Kolko argues that during the Progressive era this increase in federal 
activity in many cases reflected a desire to regulate for business. Kolko suggests that 
governmental regulatory policies emerged out of a broad consensus shared by lawmakers 
and businessmen alike that emphasized the positive aspects of private economic growth. 
As such, business leaders in many ways defined the agenda for lawmakers, and in fact 
played a key role in delimiting federal policies. For Kolko, this epitomizes the 
conservative nature of the American economic sphere at the turn of the 20th century and 
highlights the lack of a coherent opposing vision. See: Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of 






however, aviation’s fragile nature, its relative danger, and its association with daring and glamour 
indicate that federal efforts to shape the industry’s growth do differ in significant respects from other 
forms of transportation. Most significantly, these factors suggest that policymakers like Herbert 
Hoover, Walter Brown and William MacCracken were remarkably prescient in their recognition of 
aviation’s potential for future growth, safety, and profitability. These men’s vision emerged very 
early in aviation’s commercial development—far earlier in fact than comparable federal engagement 
with railroads or automobiles—and highlights their particular focus on an exciting but unproven 
technology.  
The relative positions of railroads and aviation make clear the remarkable disparity in their 
influence in 1920s and 1930s America. The early 1900s still represented the zenith of America’s 
railroad age. As late as 1932 there were more than 20,000 locomotives in service across the country, 
railroad stations dominated the American urban landscape, and taking the train remained 
synonymous with long distance transport of people and cargo. In contrast, Washington Airport, one 
of the busiest in the country at the time, saw only about 250 passengers a day walk through its 
terminal.25 In fact, according to historians Mark Rose, Bruce Seely and Paul Barrett, “even in 1940, 
airplanes presented no serious challenge to long-distance railroads, or even buses.”26 In this 
environment, policymakers’ identification of aviation’s potential is even more significant.   
                                            
25 William Manchester, The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 
1932-1972 (New York: Bantam Books, 1974), 8. 
26 Mark Rose, Bruce Seely, and Paul Barrett, The Best Transportation System in the 
World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines, and American Public Policy in the Twentieth Century 
(Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2006), 36. In fact, this disparity goes a long 
way towards explaining why railroads offered virtually no opposition to federal efforts to 
support aeronautical growth. Aviation remained so fragile in the years before World War 
II, and passenger numbers and cargo volumes so small, that airlines presented little or no 
direct competition for railroads during the period. At the same time, during the 1920s the 






While the American air transport network experienced fundamental changes during that 
twenty-year period, aviation remained at the center of the American consciousness throughout the 
era. As the introductory panel to the National Air and Space Museum’s “Golden Age of Flight” 
exhibit relates to visitors, the American public consistently demonstrated an “intense interest” in all 
things aeronautical. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, this interest seems to have primarily 
been focused on the Barnstormers—individuals and groups of pilots traveling across the country to 
give rides, perform air shows, and hopefully gain a modest living from their piloting skill. Aviation 
historian Martin Caidin describes how these men and women “hopped and struggled across the face 
of America from one pea patch to another, in the process caroming from cloud to cloud, dashing 
down valleys, and much too often barely evading mountains obscured within clouds and fog.” In 
many ways these flyers personified American values of independence, individualism, daring, and 
self-sufficiency. Through their actions they introduced “millions of people” to flying, in the process 
bringing an “unexpected respectability” to American aeronautics.27 
As aviation grew, Americans increasingly focused their interest on air races and record-setting 
flights. As early as 1920, more than forty thousand spectators braved a cold November day on Long 
Island to witness America’s first major air race, the Pulitzer Trophy.28 The public’s focus on races, 
                                                                                                                                  
railways into a relatively small number of regional systems. The fight to maintain their 
autonomy formed the central thrust of railroad lobbying efforts during the era, obscuring 
other issues. Finally, in the years before World War II, trucks represented a much more 
established, and much more dangerous threat than air transport. As a result “few [in the 
railroad industry] took notice as new technological possibilities . . . began to alter . . . 
every aspect of the nation’s transportation system.” Ibid, 28-29. 
27 Martin Caidin, Barnstorming (New York: Bantam Books, 1991), 5-6.  
28 Pulitzer Trophy races occurred annually between 1920 and 1925. These races were 
wildly popular, but quickly became an inter-service rivalry between the Army and Navy, 





long distance flights and emerging aerial heroes grew exponentially in the following years. In 1932 
more than fifty-five thousand Americans attended the National Air Races in Cleveland, Ohio, and 
numbers continued to increase throughout the Depression years.29  
The American media readily acknowledged this phenomenon, coming to equate the National 
Air Races with the country’s most prestigious sporting events. In 1934 Newsweek opened its 
coverage with an article entitled “AIR RACES: Cleveland Skies Hum With Aviation’s Big Event.” 
Attempting to contextualize the event’s significance, the magazine related,  “just as baseball fans 
have the World Series, racing fans the Kentucky Derby, and speed drivers the Indianapolis races, so 
United States fliers have their annual meet—the National Air Races.” Continuing its coverage, the 
article reported that “tens of thousands” of rabid enthusiasts “braved traffic snarls” to view the 
event.30 According to historian Don Vorderman, the number of attendees that year topped the sixty 
thousand mark.31  
American passions for air racing peaked in the latter half of the 1930s. As household names 
like Roscoe Turner—who adopted a pet lion, Gilmore, as his mascot—Jimmy Doolittle, and 
Jacqueline Cochran came to dominate the proceedings, Americans demonstrated ever more 
enthusiasm for both the pilots and the races in which they took part. By 1937 this led to “well over 
                                                                                                                                  
entrants ultimately doomed the Pulitzer races to failure, as they quickly became a 
military-only affair. For more information see: Don Vorderman, The Great Air Races 
(New York: Bantam Books, 1991). 
29 Vorderman, The Great Air Races, 52, 160. Following the demise of the Pulitzer Trophy 
races in 1925, Americans turned to the excitement offered by the National Air Races. 
First held in 1929, the event ran annually for the next 10 years. Usually held in 
Cleveland—aside from several years when the venue switched to Los Angeles—the 
National Air Races included closed course racing around low-level pylons, and a cross-
country time trial called the Bendix Trophy.  
30 “AIR RACES: Cleveland Skies Hum With Aviation’s ‘Big Event,’” Newsweek 
September 8, 1934, 23. 





one hundred thousand spectators” attending the National Races. The next year, approximately forty 
thousand die-hard fans traveled to the Los Angeles airport in the middle of the night to witness the 
staggered start of the cross-country Bendix Trophy race—between 1:45 and 3:45 in the morning.32  
The American media displayed at least as strong an interest in aviation during the period. Both 
Time and Newsweek offered readers a specific aviation section every week.33 Usually around two 
pages, these sections included a number of articles on a wide variety of aviation-related topics. 
Commercial aviation, safety, air races, record-setting flights and technological innovations all 
received significant coverage, and both publications made an effort to keep their readers fully up-to-
date with the latest aviation news. Life magazine offered its readers fewer articles, but provided a 
rich tapestry of photos of planes, flights and notable flying personalities. Monthly magazines like 
Reader’s Digest and The Saturday Evening Post contained articles about flying in almost every 
issue, and the latter publication’s short fiction section featured a number of aviation-related stories.34 
More intellectually focused magazines like The Nation also included a significant number of articles 
                                            
32 Ibid, 205, 211.  
33 Newsweek entitled this section “Aviation,” while Time utilized the term “Aeronautics.” After 
1934 Time moved to a more inclusive “Transport” section that nonetheless remained dominated 
by coverage of aviation and related topics.  
34 More than 20 during the 1930s alone. Many of these short stories, book excerpts, and 
nonfiction accounts represented the work of actual pilots. Numerous writers took to the 
skies during the period, and literary figures like Ernest J. Gann provided Americans with 
compelling and thoughtful stories about myriad aspects of flying. Their inclusion in 
periodicals like The Saturday Evening Post, moreover, suggests that this genre—and 





related to aviation,35 though these pieces usually focused on more complex issues like commercial 
development or the government’s role in regulating air commerce.36  
Within this larger context, Charles Lindbergh deserves special attention. Lindbergh’s famous 
New York-to-Paris flight in 1927 galvanized an American public already interested in aviation-
related matters and thrust aeronautics to the center of American consciousness. According to 
historian Joseph Corn, “literally overnight,” Lindbergh’s name “became synonymous with 
aviation.”37 More significantly, the pilot’s exploit had an immediate effect on aviation’s commercial 
standing. The Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum’s recently opened exhibit,38 “America 
by Air,” refers specifically to a “Lindbergh boom” following his successful trans-Atlantic passage. 
“Interest in flying skyrocketed,” the exhibit script informs visitors, and “aviation stocks rose in 
value.”39  
After his flight to Paris Lindbergh continued to play an active role in American flying. He 
undertook several publicity tours following his return from Europe, flying around the country to 
raise awareness for American aeronautics and satisfy Americans’ desire to see their hero. Lindbergh 
also immersed himself in the air transport industry, serving as a consultant to Transcontinental Air 
Transport—the forerunner of TWA—and later working for Pan American Airways.  
                                            
35 More than 40 during the period. The Nation’s coverage generally focused on 
substantive aeronautical issues such as safety, regulation, commercial progress, and 
industrial growth. Representative articles include “Is it Safe to Fly” (October 22, 1930), 
and “The Air Disasters” (April 22, 1936).  
36 Other publications like The Commonweal also presented aeronautical coverage. Like 
The Nation, however, the Catholic magazine’s articles generally focused on safety and 
related concerns, though some issues did include articles like “Tomorrow in Aviation” 
(March 5, 1930), which offered insight into the rapidly changing aeronautical landscape.  
37 Corn, The Winged Gospel, 17. 
38 In the fall of 2007. 
39 “Who Was Lindbergh?” Panel, “Airline Expansion and Innovation” Section, “America 





Lindbergh’s public stature and his continued engagement with aeronautics served to maintain 
aviation at the forefront of American media consciousness. Lindbergh’s influence was so strong, in 
fact, that by 1930 The Nation proclaimed, “from the day that Lindbergh landed in Paris, our 
journalists have eagerly picked up and published, often at great length, every scrap of news that they 
could get from above ground level.”40 Time named the pilot its “Man of the Year” for 1927, and he 
appeared on the cover again in 1932. Lindbergh’s sustained popularity reflected his status as a 
genuine American hero, but it also highlights the American public’s continuing fascination with 
flying—an interest no doubt heightened by Lindbergh’s continuing involvement. In this sense 
Lindbergh’s popularity with the American public and media represents both a cause and an effect of 
American aeronautical consciousness. Regardless, it is clear that after 1927 Americans’ obsession 
with aviation experienced a precipitous increase. 
Aviation’s cultural prevalence formed a powerful context that facilitated the development of 
federal policy. Media coverage combined with air races and a succession of record-setting flights to 
keep aviation at the forefront of American consciousness. Lindbergh’s 1927 flight forms the most 
significant of a range of events that served to highlight Americans’ excitement about flying, and 
their desire to sustain the technological and commercial development of the industry. As such, any 
thorough examination of federal policy must be undertaken against a backdrop of aviation’s 
pervasive presence in American life.  
 
Women and African Americans, however, for the most part failed to find a place in aviation’s 
increasing centrality to Americans’ lives. Famous aviatrixes like Amelia Earhart and Jacqueline 
Cochran found a ready audience for their aerial exploits, but these accomplishments did not translate 
                                            





into engagement with commercial flying.41 In fact, in the years before World War II women were 
virtually excluded from airline cockpits. Instead, they found themselves serving as stewardesses—a 
desirable job at the time, but a position that quickly established firm gender roles sharply 
differentiating service in the cabin from that in the cockpit.42 According to historian Suzanne Kolm, 
this pattern was initially established largely through the actions of one woman: Ellen Church. In 
1930, Church had applied for a position as a pilot with Boeing Air Transport, but was refused 
consideration because of her gender. Undeterred, Church suggested to BAT’s traffic manager that 
she could still be of service to the airline. Citing her status as a registered nurse, she successfully 
found employment as the first formally recognized cabin attendant.43  
Church’s pioneering efforts, Kolm suggests, established a paradigm for women’s roles vis-à-
vis commercial flying that lasted until the 1970s, a paradigm with significant implications for both 
parties. Her research demonstrates that female cabin attendants found that their distinctive status 
“brought benefits that had specific value and meaning to them.” Airlines, however, viewed these 
women’s status more cynically. According to Kolm “the gender of the nurses [serving as cabin 
attendants] was valued by airlines because they hoped that the presence of women would tame the 
                                            
41 For more information see: Susan Butler, East to the Dawn: The Life of Amelia Earhart 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1997); Doris L. Rich, Amelia Earhart: A Biography 
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian University Press, 1989); Jacqueline Cochran, The Stars 
at Noon (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1954), and Doris L. Rich, Jackie Cochran: 
Pilot in the Fastest Lane (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007).  
42 Notably, Joseph Corn argues that women played a key role in selling aviation to the 
American public by reducing its perceived danger. In his opinion, “prejudice begat 
opportunity . . . Because they appeared to the public as less capable than they really were, 
women fliers became marvelous advertisements for the ease of piloting and the safety of 
flying.” At the same time, however, those overarching prejudices simultaneously 
circumscribed women’s aerial opportunities. Specifically, Corn relates that airline 
cockpits remained strictly off limits for women. See; Corn, The Winged Gospel, 71-90. 
43 Suzanne L. Kolm, “‘Who Says It’s a Man’s World?’: Women’s Work and Travel in the 
First Decades of Flight,” in Dominic Pisano, ed., The Airplane in American Culture (Ann 





image of flight.”44 In other words, during an era in which airlines struggled to prove the safety and 
reliability of their operations to the American public, commercial carriers hoped that trained female 
nurses would provide a comforting presence to passengers, and foster an image of safety and 
responsibility.45 This role offered women the potential for professional employment, significant 
responsibility, and high standing with the public, but also sharply differentiated their role from that 
of the flight crew. As a result, women like Amelia Earhart could enjoy tremendous public acclaim, 
but she and her peers could never realize the goal of flying commercial aircraft. 
The choice of female cabin attendants also held important implications for African Americans’ 
relationship with the emerging air transport industry. Though blacks dominated the ranks of Pullman 
porters for railroads, that status did not translate to service on aircraft. Connecting the gendered and 
racial implications of women’s service as stewardesses, Kolm argues that “the feminine presence” of 
cabin attendants “helped highlight the masculine competence of the cockpit crew, just as the white 
skin of the cabin crew helped to distinguish air travel from the rival Pullman service.”46 Hiring white 
women, in this view, created a visible reminder of the radical difference embodied by the new 
transportation form. 
African Americans’ exclusion from the ranks of cabin attendants reflects a more general trend 
of exclusion from commercial aviation. Though the interwar era did witness the emergence of 
                                            
44 Ibid, 147, 149. 
45 It should also be noted that in an era when aircraft cabins were not pressurized and 
aircraft flew at relatively low altitudes with significant turbulence, the presence of a 
trained medical professional held significant value. Airsickness, inner-ear difficulties, and 
even physical injuries from severe turbulence were common during this era, and airlines 
recognized the desirability of employing cabin attendants with the personal and 
professional skills needed to deal with these types of situations. For more information on 
the passenger experience see: Daniel L. Rust, Flying Across America: The Airline 
Passenger Experience (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009).  





several notable black fliers—most notably Bessie Coleman and William J. Powell—blacks found 
few possibilities in the emerging commercial industry. Instead, it appears that African Americans 
increasingly viewed aviation through one of two lenses. According to Jill Snider, on one hand blacks 
“focused primarily on the military menace of the airplane,” viewing the new technology as a further 
instrument of white oppression. This view informed Marcus Garvey and his many followers, who 
strove to distance themselves from the new and potentially dangerous implications of aeronautics. 
On the other hand, a larger proportion of American blacks “emphasized the economic opportunity 
offered by the nascent aviation industry, and . . . touted the possibilities for social change.”47 For this 
latter group, however, the interwar period would encompass extremely limited gains. Commercial 
aviation in particular remained almost exclusively the purview of whites.  
The interstate nature of commercial flying, however, had interesting implications for the racial 
politics of the day. Historian Catherine Barnes documents that almost without exception, airlines did 
not segregate their aircraft, even when flying from Southern terminals. That fact, however, probably 
reflected the small number of black passengers, rather than any coherent push for equality, and no 
Southern state, in fact, went so far as to demand segregated seating aboard aircraft.48 Airports, 
though, were segregated throughout the South. “Most common in dining facilities in air terminals, 
then in rest rooms, and lastly in waiting areas,” segregation was widespread, though more common 
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ed., The Airplane in American Culture, 115. 
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in the deep South.49 Regardless, these conditions again reflected African Americans limited ability to 
share in the possibilities offered by the emerging air transport industry, relegating both the 
commercial and cultural implications of the emerging technology primarily to whites. 
 
 Issues relating to gender and race notwithstanding, Americans’ enthusiasm for aeronautics has 
transcended the interwar period. That continued popularity, however, has not resulted in concomitant 
historical scholarship. Although books about aviation abound—from popular histories of specific 
planes and famous pilots to thematic works detailing subjects like barnstorming and air racing—
scholarly interest in American aviation has been remarkably sparse. 50 The development of federal 
                                            
49 Catherine A. Barnes, Journey From Jim Crow: The Desegregation of Southern Transit 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 14, 137. Airport segregation also suggests 
some of the limits of the New Deal state. Though more than 100 Southern airports 
received public works funding from the Roosevelt administration, those funds had no 
effect on racial policy. It appears that this was largely a reflection of the type of work 
these funds supported, as federal expenditures were not, for the most part, utilized for 
terminals themselves, instead funding infrastructure like runways, hardstands, lighting, 
and drainage. Regardless, it remains significant that airport-related public work 
expenditures had no effect on prevailing racial practices.  
50 Numerically, books written for a popular audience dominate the field of aviation 
literature. Series like the Smithsonian History of Flight and Bantam Air and Space 
provide the most prominent examples of a whole genre of aeronautical literature. Written 
primarily for aviation enthusiasts, these works chiefly rely on interviews and anecdotal 
evidence to examine specific planes, pilots, or themes. Martin Caidin is perhaps the most 
well known writer in this genre with more than thirty publications to his credit on 
subjects ranging from the P-38 fighter plane to a history of Alaskan Bush pilots. Within 
the realm of popular literature there also exist a significant number of works devoted to 
military aviation. Many of these focus on World War II, but biographies and books about 
particular aircraft also predominate. See, for example: Walter J. Boyne, Beyond the Wild 
Blue: A History of the U.S. Air Force (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997) and Clash 
of Wings: World War II in the Air (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); Bernard C. 
Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force 
(Washington, D.C.: The United States Air Force, 1997); Eric Bergerud, Fire in the Sky: 
The Air War in the South Pacific (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000); James J. Hudson, 
Hostile Skies: A Combat History of the America Air Service in World War I (Syracuse: 





policy, in particular, has been largely overlooked until very recently. This dearth suggests the need 
for further investigation—specifically an attempt to offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
development of federal aviation policy under Hoover and Roosevelt.  
Existing aviation-related historical scholarship naturally separates into several distinct thematic 
units. First, a number of scholars provide narrative histories of aeronautical development. Henry 
Lass Smith’s Airways: The History of Commercial Aviation in the United States offers the 
foundational work in this genre. Originally published in 1942, Smith’s work provides a 
comprehensive overview of the interwar period. His analysis, however, demonstrates the limitations 
of the time during which he wrote. Smith’s scholarship relies on interviews and media sources, as he 
lacked access to both public and private archival documents. Additionally, Smith’s ambivalent take 
on Hoover’s aviation policy—particularly the actions of Walter F. Brown—reflects the prevailing 
influence of New Deal politics and assumptions that the preceding Republican administrations had 
mismanaged the economy. Despite these drawbacks, however, Smith offers an insightful analysis, in 
fact one that, until recent years, served as the authoritative source on American commercial aviation.  
Indeed, Smith’s research colors several notable works appearing in his wake. Noted British 
aviation historian R. E. G. Davies’ Airlines of the United States Since 1914 and A History of the 
World’s Airlines provide unmatched accounts of commercial development in the U.S. and the world, 
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respectively. Both works are enormous achievements, offering readers encyclopedic information on 
virtually every airline in history. That scope, however, means that Davies has little time for analysis, 
and seems to have taken Smith’s findings at face value with regard to American federal policy. 
Similarly, Carl Solberg’s Conquest of the Skies: A History of Commercial Aviation in America in 
many ways rehashes Smith’s analysis of the interwar period. Published in 1979, Solberg’s work 
certainly goes beyond the earlier monograph, but he adds no additional primary source research and 
his conclusions thus vary little from Smith’s. 
In recent years other scholars have authored narrative histories that touch to varying degrees on 
interwar commercial flying. While a number of authors focus on specific airlines or aircraft 
manufacturers, few attempt to provide a broader perspective. 51  Most notably Roger Bilstein’s 
seminal work, Flight In America: From the Wrights to the Astronauts, provides readers with a 
remarkably comprehensive overview of all aspects of American aviation from its origins to the end 
of the twentieth century. Though not focused specifically on commercial flying, Bilstein nonetheless 
offers insight into the technological and commercial development of the interwar years. His work, 
however, barely touches on federal policy, concerning itself primarily with a descriptive overview of 
aeronautical development.52 
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The relationship between aviation and American culture forms the second prominent scholarly 
theme. All works in this genre reflect the powerful influence of Joseph Corn’s seminal work, The 
Winged Gospel: America’s Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950. Originally published as a series of 
articles, Corn’s monograph focuses on Americans’ longstanding connection to what Corn terms the 
“prophetic creed of flight.” Couching his analysis in theological language, Corn argues that 
Americans have historically experienced a unique relationship with aeronautics. Connecting aviation 
to Americans’ focus on technological prowess and national development, Corn argues that the 
United States embraced aviation as a “gospel” because it held untold promises for the country’s 
future. For Corn, aviation’s “prophesies” included the potential to bring peace, foster social equality, 
usher in a new global community, and even promote heath and wellness. Though Corn makes no 
attempt to detail federal aviation policy, American passions for aviation during the interwar period 
form a central facet of his argument. Highlighting the 1920s and ‘30s as the highpoint of Americans’ 
embrace of the “winged gospel,” Corn suggests rapid technological development and the prevalence 
of aerial heroes like Charles Lindbergh and Amelia Earhart made all things seem possible. Even 
during the Depression aviation held hope for the nation, as continued technological and commercial 
progress highlighted promising future possibilities.  
Subsequent cultural studies have built upon Corn’s foundational thesis. In Sky As Frontier: 
Adventure, Aviation and Empire, David Courtwright utilizes the metaphor of a frontier—defined as 
“a shifting zone of interaction between indigenous and nonindigenous population”—to contextualize 
a narrative history of American aviation.53 He suggests that early aviators, like settlers in the 
historical American frontier, were predominantly male, and that their daredevil attitudes mirrored 
those of earlier frontiersmen. The sky, Courtwright suggests, exemplified an area of impermanent 
                                            





settlement, particularly considering the unreliability of early aircraft. However, like other frontiers, 
the sky gradually became more densely settled, safer, and filled with populations more 
representative of the general American populace. As it matured flying became safer, more 
democratic, and ultimately less exciting and distinctive.  
As in Corn’s work, the interwar period figures prominently in Courtwright’s analysis. 
Specifically, the latter argues that Lindbergh’s fight across the Atlantic fundamentally altered 
America’s view of aviation. In his words, Americans had formerly viewed flying as “dangerous and 
expensive,” but after Lindbergh’s success—and concomitant developments in safety and other 
technologies—“attitudes shifted toward hopeful ambivalence.”54 Though Courtwright considers the 
development of federal policy only briefly, his thesis suggests that governmental regulation played a 
key role in this transformation.55 
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and culture, though the majority of these works touch only briefly—if at all—on the 
United States. Most prominently, Robert Wohl’s series Aviation and the Western 
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Dominick Pisano and Roger Launius and Janet Daly Bednarek offer insight into some 
broader aviation-related themes. Both The Airplane in American Culture and 
Reconsidering a Century of Flight (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
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Moving from culture to politics, several scholars offer specific analyses focused on the 
structural elements of federal policy. In this genre, two monographs deserve particular mention: 
Nick Kommon’s Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Aviation Policy Under the Air Commerce Act, 1926-
1938, and F. Robert van der Linden’s Airlines and Airmail: The Post Office and the Birth of the 
Commercial Aviation Industry.
56
 Kommons’ work offers a comprehensive narrative history 
describing the creation and implementation of the initial period of formal federal regulation over 
aviation. Specifically, Kommons traces the political machinations that led to the creation of the 1926 
Air Commerce Act, and the Commerce Department’s efforts to promote both safety and regulation 
as it oversaw the creation of a national air transport network. Within this context, Kommons focuses 
prominently on figures such as Herbert Hoover,57 William MacCracken, Clyde Kelly, and Walter F. 
Brown while detailing their efforts to promote American aeronautical development through federal 
oversight. Bonfires to Beacons evidences impressive archival research, and Kommons’ efforts result 
in a detailed and comprehensive treatment of the Air Commerce Act. That focus, however, also 
limits the works’ larger value, as it adheres tightly to the promise embodied in its title.  
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of American aeronautical development.  
57 David Lee’s excellent essay, “Herbert Hoover and Commercial Aviation Policy,” 
which appears in Roger Launius and Janet Daly Bednarek’s edited collection, 
Reconsidering a Century of Flight, provides additional insight into Hoover’s motivations 
both as Secretary of Commerce and as President. Lee suggests that Hoover’s 
associationalist economic philosophy guided his aviation policy, and that his intense 
interest in new technologies like aviation and radio led him to take an active role in 





In Airlines and Airmail, van der Linden’s analysis moves beyond specific legislation to make a 
larger argument regarding the foundations of the modern American airline industry. Focusing on 
Post Office airmail policy, van der Linden persuasively argues that informal airmail subsidies 
formed the core of a range of federal initiatives that created the foundations for American 
commercial aviation during the 1920s. Leading this charge, he relates, were Progressive Republicans 
like Clyde Kelly, Herbert Hoover, and Walter Brown, who applied Theodore Roosevelt’s concept of 
“New Nationalism” to use the power of the federal government to support the creation of a group of 
“good” aviation “trusts.” With federal guidance, these “trusts”—large airline holding corporations 
that included airframe and engine manufacturers and airlines—were able to create a new industry 
while avoiding unnecessary predation and inefficiency. van der Linden argues that this Progressive 
Republican vision held sway until 1934, when Hugo Black and Franklin Roosevelt—adherents of 
Woodrow Wilson’s “New Freedom” and thus the idea that any form of economic concentration was 
harmful—undid the prevailing policies and ushered in a new era of federal oversight. Ultimately, 
Airlines and Airmail makes a compelling case for the Post Office’s central role in creating American 
commercial aviation. Unfortunately, however, van der Linden’s focus on the distinctions between 
Republican and Democratic Progressive attitudes toward business obscure and oversimplify a much 
more complex political context.  
Surprisingly, historians detailing both Hoover and Roosevelt’s political histories pay scant 
attention to aviation policy.58 Joan Hoff Wilson’s influential biography, Herbert Hoover, Forgotten 
Progressive, briefly touches upon aviation. Like David Lee, Wilson connects Hoover’s interest in 
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promoting aeronautical development to his larger associationalist economic philosophy.59 Ellis 
Hawley’s scholarship also addresses aeronautics, albeit briefly. Several of his essays, most 
significantly “Three Facets of the Hooverian Associationalism: Lumber, Aviation, and Movies, 
1921-1930,” published in Thomas McGraw’s Regulation in Perspective, offer limited insight into 
Hoover’s aviation policy. Here Hawley focuses primarily on Hoover’s efforts to promote safety 
regulation through the Commerce Department, again highlighting the central role Hoover’s 
associationalist philosophy played in guiding his actions. In his seminal work, The New Deal and 
The Problem of Monopoly, Hawley again addresses aeronautics, focusing on industry leaders’ 
attempts to define aviation as a special case warranting federal assistance. Hawley emphasizes that 
Republicans in the Hooverian mold argued that aeronautical development was vital to national 
defense. Aviation’s pioneering status, these lawmakers held, mandated federal support, a fact 
codified in legislation from 1925, 1926, and 1930.60 Hawley argues that Democratic efforts to 
modify this system were largely unsuccessful, leading to the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 
confirming aviation’s status as a “natural monopoly” warranting continued governmental support.  
These brief treatments offer limited insight into the development of federal policy, but 
ultimately raise more questions than they answer. Wilson’s analysis provides a cursory overview of 
Hoover’s aviation policy and lacks engagement with archival sources. Hawley’s scholarship 
provides more depth, but fails to adequately account for the complex motivations behind federal 
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voluntary cooperation between government and business. Historian Joan Hoff Wilson 
suggests that this philosophy emerged from a progressive, pragmatic, utopian view of the 
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promoting connections between business and government Hoover’s ideology emphasized 
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support for aeronautics. More surprisingly, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly almost 
totally ignores Roosevelt’s engagement with the issue.61 All of these works, moreover, fail to 
adequately account for the extent to which federal actions successfully promoted aviation’s 
commercial development. Scholars of the New Deal, in particular, generally fail to recognize the 
concrete gains brought about by public works agencies. New Deal public works, in fact, created one 
of the most significant commercial success stories emerging from the period—the almost total 
revamping of American aviation infrastructure. Agencies like the PWA and WPA certainly put 
Americans to work, but at least with regard to aviation, this was a means to a larger end.  
Despite their contributions, all of these scholars provide an incomplete, and in some ways 
misleading view of aviation during this period. Governmental actions occurred in an environment 
dominated by popular enthusiasm for aviation; thus, examination of specific elements within this 
larger context cannot adequately explain the motivations for, and implications of, aeronautical 
development. Further, aviation owed its development to a number of separate, yet interrelated 
governmental policies that are not individually sufficient to explain its dynamic growth. All of these 
policies, moreover, drew inspiration and support from an American public and media entranced with 
Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight, the national air races, and myriad record-setting aerial endeavors. As 
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such, only a comprehensive analysis can adequately explain the machinations of federal aviation 
policy. 
 
These complexities highlight the foundational nature of interwar aviation policy. Decisions 
made during the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations had long-lasting implications for the 
continued development of commercial aviation in the United States. Increased federal regulation, 
airmail contracts, and support for aviation infrastructure—like airports, lighted airways, and radio 
transmitters—created the conditions for the possibility of aviation’s growth into a dominant force in 
the transportation of both people and cargo. In addition, these governmental actions supported the 
growth of the airlines—Pan American, United, American, and TWA, in particular—that dominated 
commercial aviation until deregulation in the 1970s and beyond. Indeed, without this depth and 
breadth of federal support there is a distinct possibility that aviation would never have achieved its 
contemporary prominence in the commercial sector. In a very real sense, the organization, 
infrastructure, and oversight of modern commercial aviation is a legacy of policy decisions from the 
period between Lindbergh’s flight and World War II.  
That fact necessitates a reevaluation of federal aviation policy during the interwar years. Only 
by examining the development of federal policy and the connections between that policy and 
aviation’s cultural influence can we fully appreciate the origins of today’s air transport network. 
Federal actions moved beyond airmail subsidies and beyond regulation to encompass a broad-based 
and comprehensive project specifically designed to foster the growth and development of 
commercial flying. From the early 1920s until the period immediately before World War II, 
policymakers like Herbert Hoover, William MacCracken, Walter Brown, Franklin Roosevelt, and 





remained remarkably consistent throughout the period, and evidenced noteworthy continuity through 
both Republican and Democratic administrations. Though historians have suggested that the airmail 
scandal of 1934 represented a sharp break with Hoover’s associationalist policies—at least until 
1938—in fact, Roosevelt, Hugo Black and others shared many of the same foundational assumptions 
about aviation’s value to the nation. Indeed, in many ways Roosevelt expanded federal engagement 
with aviation through his commitment to utilizing public works agencies to support aviation 
infrastructure development. Collectively, these federal policies created the foundation for today’s air 
transportation network and played a significant role in shaping the contours of modern America.  
An investigation of interwar federal airmail policy also suggests the ongoing necessity of 
reexamining both Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt’s legacies. Hoover’s foundational 
contributions to American aeronautical development emphasize the need to acknowledge the ability 
of his associational philosophy to successfully foster commercial growth. With regard to aviation, 
Hoover must appear as a visionary reformer who played a pivotal role in supporting economic 
development. This analysis builds upon the work of scholars like Joan Hoff Wilson who look 
beyond Hoover’s Depression-era leadership and instead seek to assess Hoover through a broader 
lens. 
Similarly, Roosevelt’s engagement with American aviation suggests the continuing need to 
reconsider the New Deal’s legacy. FDR’s connections to American aeronautics—particularly though 
New Deal public works agencies—confirm the necessity of moving beyond discussions of the New 
Deal’s ability to pull the United States out of the Depression. Roosevelt’s aviation-related actions 
demonstrate the presence of important elements of continuity between his economic policies and 
those of his predecessor. Simultaneously, they also highlight FDR’s willingness to radically expand 





economy. Like Jason Scott Smith’s work, this analysis emphasizes the New Deal’s productive 
capacity—its ability to create infrastructure with the potential to radically alter the American 
landscape. The New Deal certainly put Americans to work, but with regard to aviation it also 
promoted the creation of airways and airports that endured far beyond the New Deal era.  
 
In the endeavor to offer a comprehensive analysis of federal aviation policy between 1920 and 
the onset of World War II, this dissertation will begin by exploring the origins of Herbert Hoover’s 
drive to support aeronautical development. Almost from the moment he took office as Commerce 
Secretary, Hoover began to apply his associationalist ideology to aviation. He maintained that focus 
through his Presidential administration, consistently working to foster technological development 
and commercial growth. Hoover’s efforts, supported by key allies like William MacCracken and 
Harry New, created a vision for aviation’s place in America’s future that persisted until the late 
1970s. 
Publically, however, Hoover’s policies drew the ire of both Congressional Democrats and 
select airline executives—parties that did not share in Hoover’s associationalist vision. Largely as a 
result of policies enacted by Hoover’s Postmaster, Walter F. Brown, this opposition grew steadily 
after 1930 and eventually resulted in the creation of a Senate Special Committee to investigate 
supposed collusion and fraud in the air transport industry. Led by Alabama Senator Hugo Black, the 
Senate investigation resulted in the cancellation of Post Office airmail contracts in early 1934 and a 
reorganization of the industry. Black’s actions, however, appear to have emerged from a genuine 
desire to support aeronautical growth, though the Democratic Senator’s differing economic ideology 





The Black Committee’s investigation, and the subsequent cancellation of airmail contracts 
offer the first glimpse of Franklin Roosevelt’s commitment to promoting American aviation. 
Although his decision to have the U.S. Army fly the mail as Black worked to reorganize the Post 
Office’s bidding process led to the deaths of 12 Army pilots and resulted in a public-relations 
disaster, FDR’s increasing engagement with aeronautics signaled his willingness to take up Hoover’s 
mantle. Subsequently, Roosevelt pushed for the creation of an investigatory commission tasked to 
gather information on all aspects of American aviation in the hopes of further defining federal 
policy. The commission’s findings offered a concrete model for federal action, and appear to have 
motivated Roosevelt’s central engagement with the crafting and passage of the seminal 1938 Civil 
Aeronautics Act. Throughout, it appears that Roosevelt’s actions demonstrate remarkable continuity 
with those of his predecessor, notwithstanding their differing political philosophies.  
Roosevelt’s dedication to public works also highlights his commitment to promoting American 
aviation.  An examination of the motivations behind aviation-related public works policy, and 
investigations of several representative Works Progress Administration (WPA) projects suggest that 
Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, and other New Dealers shared a genuine desire to use public works to 
promote long-lasting commercial growth. Those efforts echo the larger findings of historian Jason 
Scott Smith and suggest that, for aviation, public works offered a new and dynamic way to deploy 
federal power to support economic growth.62 
Finally, this dissertation will reflect on the lasting effects those federal policies have 
engendered. A brief examination of American commercial aviation in the years after World War II 
highlights the seminal role pre-war actions played in creating the foundations of dynamic growth. 
The consensus created by the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act created the conditions for the 
                                            





possibility of American airlines spanning continents and oceans, embracing jet propulsion, and 
democratizing air travel to the extent that a majority of Americans could—and often did—fly. 
Deregulation shattered that consensus, and ushered in a new and much more contentious era for 
commercial flying. Airlines created hub and spoke systems, competition intensified, and many 
airlines went out of business. Simultaneously, a wave of new issues rose to the fore, from concerns 
over noise and pollution to security threats. Collectively, these conditions have radically altered our 
contemporary view of air travel. The same conditions, however, serve to highlight the lasting 
significance of the interwar period. Americans still fondly reflect on the era, a fact embodied in the 
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum’s “Golden Age of Flight” exhibit. Regardless of our 









 Chapter 2—Herbert Hoover and the Origins of American Aviation Policy 
 
In July of 1921, only a few months after assuming the post of Commerce Secretary, Herbert 
Hoover organized an informal Conference on Aviation. Calling representatives from the Society of 
Automotive Engineers, the Aero Club of America, the National Aircraft Underwriters Association, 
and the Manufacturers Aircraft Association to his office in Washington, D.C., Hoover hoped to 
clarify the Commerce Department’s relationship with the emerging air transport industry. In his 
notes for the “meeting of the air craft men,” Hoover revealed his already firm grasp of the central 
issues shaping the development of aeronautics in the United States.63  Stating that the “development 
of civil aviation depends . . . on the establishment of some sort of federal governmental agency 
which shall immediately codify and present rules for interstate flying and map out air lines and so 
on,” Hoover presciently articulated the pressing need for uniform regulation. Hoover also saw the 
necessity of federal oversight of licensing, commenting on his desire to see the “ immediate 
development of an inspection service and . . . some pilot license system.” Hoover believed that such 
a system would “protect the public against incidents and prevent civil aviation from getting into bad 
repute because of its development as a stunt or sight seeing character under operators who may or 
may not be technically competent to have charge of flights.”64 
Hoover’s recommendations stemmed from his impressive grasp of the state of American civil 
aviation. Almost from the moment that he assumed his position as Commerce Secretary, Hoover 
established close connections with parties interested in the development of American aeronautics. In 
fact, his notes for the Conference on Aviation include references to recent talks with “four or five of 
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the air craft manufacturers”65 on a recent tour of navy facilities. During the remainder of his time as 
Secretary of Commerce, and later during his Presidency, Hoover consistently supported the 
development of American aviation—most specifically through efforts to foster the rational growth of 
a self-sustaining national air transport network. That support ultimately yielded positive results, with 
the creation of a mature commercial aviation network standing as one of the most significant yet 
overlooked legacies of Hoover’s political career.   
Hoover’s efforts clearly reflected the influence of his commitment to what historians have 
termed the associational state. Joan Hoff Wilson has argued that Hoover’s economic ideology 
emerged from a pragmatic, progressive utopianism most clearly defined as a type of liberal 
corporatism. Wilson contends that Hoover’s efforts at both the Commerce Department and in the 
White House reflected a firm dedication to administrative reorganization, decentralization, and the 
desire for voluntary cooperation between government and business. In this effort, Hoover believed 
that the government’s proper role was to provide information, coordinate activities and supply 
guidance, but not act as a coercive force or involve itself in production or distribution. Ideally, the 
government would serve as a facilitator, helping Americans pursue their own self-interest in a 
cooperative and productive manner.66 Hoover’s commitment to making government the ally of 
business was particularly strong in the field of emerging technologies—most notably radio and 
aviation.67 For these nascent industries, federal support for research, cooperative organization, and 
regulation had the utmost potential to help stimulate growth.  
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Aviation represents the most significant—and successful—example of Hoover’s 
implementation of associationalist ideology.  His focus on associationalism provided Hoover the 
means through which to support the development of a nascent industry, protecting it from the harsh 
realities of the truly free market while avoiding the specter of nationalization. Politically, the latter 
path would have been untenable in the United States, but, economically, the creation of a national 
carrier represented a rational option at the time. This, in fact, was the avenue through which 
European commercial aviation developed during the era, and by the early 1930s virtually every 
European nation had a nationalized airline. These nations discovered that in the European context—
embracing myriad international routes and direct competition from other nations’ carriers—airlines 
could simply not compete without direct governmental subsidies for technological development, 
manufacturing, and operations.68  
The American context obviously encompassed important distinctions, but it remains significant 
that Hoover eschewed any push for nationalization and instead applied his associational ideology to 
support aeronautical development. It was clear that in the 1920s American commercial aviation had 
little hope of surviving without some form of federal support, and Hoover’s policies offered 
financial assistance in a politically tenable package. As both Commerce Secretary and President, 
Hoover consistently strove to use federal power to facilitate rational, structured growth without 
resort to public ownership.  
                                                                                                                                  
Aviation, and Movies, 1921-1930,” published in Thomas McGraw’s Regulation in 
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In this effort, Hoover embraced several specific policies. He focused on creating legislation to 
regulate the industry and improve safety, pushed for the utilization of federal funds to create and 
improve infrastructure such as navigational aids and radio communications, and authorized federal 
support for research into new technologies. Hoover also worked diligently to publicize aviation to 
the American people. Finally, he worked with the Post Office to establish a system of informal 
subsidies to help fund the emerging airmail network—in so doing creating the conditions for the 
possibility of solvency for private air carriers. Collectively, Hoover’s actions created a coherent 
vision for federal aviation policy and reflected a keen understanding of both the political and 
economic landscape in the early 1920s. That vision led to the origins of commercial air transport in 
the United States and persevered through Franklin Roosevelt’s Democratic administrations. In fact, 
Hoover’s basic template came to serve as the basis for the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act, legislation 
that guided the continuing growth of commercial aviation until the end of the 1970s. 
A number of crucial allies supported Hoover in this effort. Specifically, Hoover’s relationships 
with members of the Commerce Department and his focus on utilizing airmail routes to encourage 
private growth created opportunities for other federal officials who shared his vision. Postmaster 
Generals Harry S. New and Walter F. Brown consistently pursued postal support for private air 
carriers, and Brown’s efforts went so far as to result in allegations of collusion with the industry.69 
Hoover’s support for the creation of an Aeronautics Division within the Department of Commerce 
created the foundation for federal regulation and oversight. Assistant Secretary William MacCracken 
and Clarence Young of the Aeronautics division worked tirelessly to regulate and promote 
aeronautics. These men’s actions formed the core of a range of federal initiatives that legitimized 
                                            






commercial flying and laid the foundation for a mature aviation industry in the United States. 
Without their efforts it is unlikely that Americans would have had access to a national air transport 
network before the Second World War.   
 
During this era, aviation’s cultural prevalence formed a powerful context within which Hoover 
and his allies sought to promote commercial growth. In the early 1920s, aviation came to form an 
increasingly significant cultural presence in American lives, largely through the activities of 
barnstormers, air shows, and pilots’ establishment of ever-increasing speed, altitude, and endurance 
records.  These activities facilitated a widespread fascination with flying, but led to a majority of 
Americans perceiving aviation to be an exciting and dangerous form of entertainment—not a 
commercial reality.70 As such, American enthusiasm for aviation created conditions ripe for the 
possibility of commercial growth by raising awareness among lawmakers and public officials, but 
also highlighted the commercial industry’s nascent status. Indeed, even to refer to an “industry” 
during this period is a bit of a misnomer.  Although numerous airframe manufacturers and fledgling 
commercial operations existed in the years following World War I, these disparate corporate entities 
had little direction or financial success.  
 Although the pre-war period witnessed the creation of early “flying circuses” and air shows, in 
the years following World War I Americans truly began to become “air minded.” In the wake of the 
Armistice, the government sold thousands of war-surplus aircraft at clearance prices. These planes—
mostly Army JN-4 “Jenny” trainers—allowed unprecedented numbers of Americans to take to the 
skies for the first time. Led by military pilots discharged at the cessation of hostilities, a new army of 
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so-called “barnstormers” began to migrate across the country. Lured by the freedom flying offered 
and the commercial possibilities of selling rides to their fellow countrymen, these pilots crisscrossed 
the country in the years after World War I. They introduced untold Americans to aviation for the 
first time, and at the same time created a rapidly growing pool of men and women with aviation 
experience.  
Barnstormers’ activities, however, took place in an environment totally free from federal 
oversight, and with virtually no aviation-related infrastructure. Airports were almost non-existent at 
the time, and there were no mechanisms for licensing pilots, certifying the safety of aircraft, or 
regulating commercial activities. As a result, although flying captured many Americans’ 
imaginations as they saw barnstormers or took short rides, aviation remained something of a 
sideshow—an exciting yet dangerous pastime.  
Barnstormers’—and indeed almost all pilots’—utilization of war surplus aircraft combined 
with irregular maintenance, little or no pilot training, and no formal mechanisms to assess the 
airworthiness of aircraft to result in a dismal safety record. Crashes were common, often injuring or 
killing pilots as well as their passengers and even spectators on the ground. Indeed, by the mid 1920s 
many localities began prohibiting flying circuses from performing within city or town limits to 
protect against death and injury. Adding to pilots’ difficulties, their basic aircraft lacked instruments 
to allow flight in bad weather and most pilots lacked any training in instrument flying. There were 
no formal airways, and pilots often struggled to navigate across the country using road maps and 
attempting to follow railroad tracks. Air traffic control was nonexistent even where municipalities or 
the military had established primitive airports, and, in any event, pilots did not have the ability to 





no mechanisms to assess the safety and quality of new aircraft, resulting in a trial and error approach 
that often didn’t reveal flaws in design or manufacturing until after the sale of aircraft to consumers. 
In spite of these difficulties, in the years immediately after World War I, both the government 
and private interests engaged in limited attempts to organize commercial flying ventures. The 
Army’s inaugural airmail line from Washington, D.C. to New York offers the most significant 
example, and even achieved modest success. The operation demonstrated the ability of aircraft to 
perform a commercial function on a regular schedule with minimal delays. In August of 1918 the 
Army turned the airmail route over to the Post Office Department. The Post Office immediately 
began plans to expand the airmail network west from New York, establishing stops in Cleveland and 
Chicago in 1919 and completing a transcontinental line to San Francisco by September of 1920. 71  
The same period also witnessed several private corporations’ inauguration of commercial 
ventures. As early as 1914, the St. Petersburg-Tampa Airboat Line promised twice-daily flights 
across Tampa bay, saving passengers a lengthy rail journey. The service continued for four months, 
ultimately carrying over 1,200 passengers.72 In 1919 Edward Hubbard organized a mail service from 
Seattle to Vancouver. Hubbard launched a daily service in October of 1920 with limited commercial 
success. Aeromarine West Indies Airways operated a similar service between Miami and Nassau 
beginning in November 1919. The latter carrier serviced wealthy vacationers, but also carried thirsty 
passengers eager to escape Prohibition to less restrictive locales.73  
These private ventures demonstrated the commercial possibilities aviation offered, but saw 
limited financial success. In addition, it is of no small significance that all three employed the use of 
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seaplanes, thus avoiding the problems associated with a lack of airport infrastructure. They also 
eschewed flying at night or in bad weather—a realistic acknowledgment of their planes’ and pilots’ 
limitations, but a policy that sharply limited their operations’ commercial potential. Regardless, it 
quickly became clear to prospective airline operators that flying passengers was simply not 
profitable. Hubbard’s and Aeromarine’s postwar efforts were only kept afloat by securing 
government airmail contracts for international routes, and in subsequent years dozens of attempts to 
open passenger service in the U.S. ended in commercial failure. It would not be until the passage of 
the 1925 Contract Airmail Act that the government offered up national airmail routes to private 
corporations. These airmail contracts offered the possibility of profitability through government 
subsidies, and came to represent a cornerstone of federal aviation policy.74  
Aircraft manufacturers also struggled during these early years. Although firms like Curtis had 
rapidly expanded their operations during the war to fill military contracts, the vast majority of 
manufacturers were small, informal operations. For example, Boeing, which ultimately grew to 
become the largest manufacturer of commercial aircraft in the world, used a barn as their production 
center during the early 1920s. William Boeing, the company’s founder, headed a total staff of less 
than a dozen employees who designed, built, and tested airframes entirely by hand. During this 
period, aircraft were constructed largely of wooden frames covered with fabric, making aircraft 
construction more akin to carpentry than industrial design. Aerodynamics was a trial and error 
process, governed by the slide-rule and the knowledge gained by test flights. Corporations like 
Boeing, Douglas, and Beechcraft struggled to find buyers for their products—large orders were still 
measured in the single digits until well into the latter half of the decade. Early airlines often operated 
                                            





with a total inventory of four or five aircraft, hardly enough demand to stimulate the expansion of 
production facilities.  
Collectively, these conditions created a divergence in American cultural perceptions of 
aviation. First and foremost, Americans viewed aviation as an exciting but dangerous form of 
entertainment. David Courtwright argues that barnstorming, in fact, played a central role in 
marginalizing aviation’s commercial appeal. Referring to barnstormers’ “plane-swapping . . . death-
dive acts,” he suggests that these aerial performers “reinforced every stereotype of flying as a 
dangerous and disreputable sideshow.” Those perceptions, moreover, were “magnified by the 
newsreels [and] tabloids that specialized in spectacles and disaster,” and movies like “Wings” and 
“Hell’s Angels” that focused on the violence and death associated with military flying.75 As late as 
1930 The Nation ran a cover story entitled “Is it Safe to Fly?”76 Though the article stressed that 
flying was becoming safer by the year, its prominence suggests that Americans continued to worry 
about traveling via aircraft. Even more forceful was an article published in the July 1934 edition of 
Reader’s Digest. Unequivocally titled “Flying is Still Dangerous,” the articles urged readers to look 
beyond the dramatic gains in speed brought about by air travel and “look at the price [flying exacted] 
. . . in human lives.”77 As these articles suggest, Americans struggled to embrace aviation’s 
commercial possibilities. 
Simultaneously, however, the possibilities that aviation offered inspired utopian hopes. 
According to historian Joseph Corn, the rapid advance of aeronautical technology led to ever greater 
aerial feats, galvanizing the American public and leading to dreams that the airplane could help to 
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cure society’s ills and usher in a new “air age.” In his words, “the gospel of aviation held out a 
glorious promise, that of a great new day in human affairs once airplanes brought about a true air 
age.” This age promised the end of poverty, world peace, and even embraced hopes for immortality. 
Utopian visions “were both an expression and a cause of the great popular enthusiasm shown for 
aviation” and suggested that at least some Americans embraced hopes that aviation would quickly 
become a foundational element of Americans’ lives.78  
These divergent visions, it appears, coexisted uneasily during the interwar era. While virtually 
all Americans embraced the excitement aviation embodied, there remained a sharp cultural divide 
between hopeful and fearful visions of aviation’s social and economic possibilities. This context 
profoundly shaped federal efforts to promote aviation, and helps explain policymakers’ consistent 
focus on emphasizing safety and reliability. As flying became safer, aircraft more reliable, and 
federal regulation stricter, Americans increasingly moved to accept aviation’s commercial 
possibilities. Simultaneously, however, prominent deaths at national air races, the disappearance of 
pilots like Amelia Earhart on long-distance flights, and airline crashes—such as the one resulting in 
the death of Nevada Senator Bronson Cutting—continued to highlight aviation’s danger. While the 
pendulum steadily swung in the direction of aviation’s positive associations as the era progressed, 
policymakers remained cognizant of the need to focus on issues related to safety.  
 
Within the prevailing cultural, economic, and developmental context facing aviation in the 
early 1920s, Hoover’s actions seem even more remarkable. In a period during which there was no 
established “industry” as such for either airlines or aviation manufacturers, and most Americans still 
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associated flying with dangerous entertainment, the Commerce Secretary worked to bring disparate 
interests together to work out the best path for future growth. Not only did Hoover facilitate the 
creation of a coherent industry, he also had the foresight to identify the pressing need for 
governmental guidance.  
Hoover’s focus on aviation policy began almost as soon as President Warren Harding 
appointed him Commerce Secretary in March of 1921. In April he helped to organize a Committee 
on Air Navigation, bringing together representatives from the Smithsonian Institution, Army, Navy, 
Commerce Department, Post Office and civilians. The Committee’s purpose was to “draft a national 
aviation policy” consistent with military, commercial, and private interests. Representatives 
proposed a program “based on national defense almost wholly” while addressing issues of 
legislation, oversight, aerial navigation, and promotion. Arguing “commercial flying will not be 
important for some years,” the Committee suggested that “when it really becomes important it will 
secure civilian control.” In the meantime, however, representatives concluded, “the Army and Navy 
may bear the brunt of aviation at present.”79 
In spite of their pessimistic assessment of contemporary commercial aviation, the Committee 
did make a number of specific recommendations designed to promote commercial growth. Arguing 
that progress depended on the establishment of federal legislation and appropriations, representatives 
agreed on four specific recommendations: continuation of separate War, Navy and Post Office air 
services, the creation of a Department of Aeronautics in the Department of Commerce to regulate air 
navigation and “carry out policies which may be adopted to encourage civil and commercial 
aviation,” a continuation of War Department efforts to establish air routes, and continued support for 
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scientific research carried out by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA).80 
While these recommendations emphasized the military’s role in promoting American aeronautical 
development, representatives nonetheless exhibited prescient insight regarding the current state of 
U.S. aeronautics. They correctly identified an urgent need for legislative oversight, highlighted the 
value of formal airways, and focused on the necessity of further research. In addition, the Committee 
displayed a ready willingness to use the power of the federal government to support the growth of 
civil and commercial aviation. The prescience of their conclusions would be borne out in the years to 
come, and it appears that Secretary Hoover took these early lessons to heart.  
Hoover also established contacts with many members of the emerging aviation industry in the 
immediate wake of assuming his post as Commerce Secretary. In March 1921 Hoover corresponded 
with Charles Walcott, Chairman of the NACA, regarding the Advisory Committee’s annual report 
and the potential for short-term Congressional legislation pursuant to aeronautics.81 The NACA 
report, like Hoover’s later Committee on Air Navigation, argued for the necessity of federal 
legislation to regulate the emerging aviation industry. NACA officials worried that in the absence of 
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federal legislation, “independent and generally conflicting legislation by the various states will be 
enacted which will greatly hamper the development of aviation.” The report went on to suggest that 
governmental support for commercial aviation would offer a two-fold benefit to the nation. First, 
supporting the “development of aviation as the backbone of military preparedness would be much 
less [costly] than the waste that would result from unprepared entry into war.” Secondly, the 
Committee argued that support for commercial aviation “would, in itself, in time of peace yield 
adequate return in promoting and strengthening our means of transportation, advancing the progress 
of civilization, and increasing the national wealth.”82 Admittedly, the NACA mission was to help 
foster aviation’s development, but its recommendations echoed a growing consensus regarding 
aviation’s place in America’s future. The connection between commercial development and military 
preparedness in particular would come to dominate discussions of federal policy in years to come.  
Hoover’s apparent interest in commercial aviation drew the attention of industry leaders. As 
early as June of 1921 the President of Aeromarine Airways wrote the Secretary to note his gratitude 
that Hoover was taking “an active interest in the development of civilian aviation and the Federal 
Regulation of Aerial Routes.”83 This correspondence formed the beginning of a series of 
communications between Hoover and airline executives, manufacturers, and members of leading 
aviation organizations. In fact, the manufacturers and airlines themselves played a key role in 
pushing for greater federal oversight over aviation, correctly indentifying the need for federal 
leadership in promoting safety and standardizing licensing. Hoover’s decision to appoint an Aviation 
Consulting Commission in June of 1921 emerged in large part from industry efforts. More than fifty 
executives representing nascent airlines, aircraft and engine manufacturers and pilots petitioned the 
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President for greater federal leadership in aeronautical development. Hoover worked closely with 
these executives, eventually calling many of them to Washington, D.C. for the previously mentioned 
July Conference.  
Emerging connections between Hoover and members of the aviation industry signaled the 
beginning of a continuing relationship between governmental officials and industry executives that 
would prove foundational to aviation’s commercial development. Cooperation between government 
and business was nothing new for Hoover, and the Secretary’s support for emerging industries 
formed a key aspect of his associationalist ideology. Indeed, his focus on information gathering, 
cooperative planning, and, ultimately, the creation of business-friendly regulation vis-à-vis aviation 
offers the clearest example of associationalisms’ ability to successfully promote a commercial 
interest.  
Even Hoover, however, was at times surprised at the extent to which industry officials pushed 
for federal action. In a 1921 letter to New York Congressman Frederick Hicks, Hoover remarked 
that aviation was “the only industry that favors having itself regulated by the federal government.”84 
While certainly unusual, the aviation industry’s desire for federal regulation represented a rational 
response to conditions aircraft manufacturers and airlines faced in the early 1920s. Aviation historian 
Nick Kommons refers to this period in aviation’s commercial development as suffering from the 
“chaos of laissez faire.” Indeed, commercial aeronautics ironically found its potential for growth 
limited by a lack of federal oversight. The industry’s small size meant that there was as yet virtually 
no competition between airlines. In addition, both manufacturers and airlines struggled against 
cultural perceptions associating aviation with danger and entertainment, and, in any event, only the 
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province of the rich. Further, a lack of formal regulation meant an uncertain future for manufacturers 
and carriers alike. Manufacturers hoped that airworthiness certificates would weed out unsafe 
designs and instill public trust in certified aircraft. Airline executives worried a dearth of federal 
regulation over licensing, operations, navigation, and airports would result in a hodgepodge of state 
and local statutes, complicating operations and hindering expansion.85 Finally, commercial interests 
desired that the federal government take the lead in establishing a national network of airways. The 
military and Post Office had already begun by constructing a limited number of airfields and 
experimenting with signing and lighting air routes, but much more work would be needed to create 
the foundations for a viable commercial system. These conditions pushed aviation executives to 
lobby forcefully for federal intervention. They believed that only the power of the federal 
government could rescue the industry from chaos and provide the necessary leadership to see the 
industry to maturity.  
 
Federal leadership necessitated both the willingness and ability to organize a coherent national 
aviation policy. Hoover’s actions in the early 1920s demonstrate his understanding of the issues 
involved, but at that time there remained insufficient support for federal action. While legislators—
including Senator Morris Sheppard (D-Texas), Congressman Murray Hulbert (D-New York), 
Congressman Norman Gould (R-New York), and Senator Harry New (R-Indiana)—introduced 
several bills to Congress favoring some level of federal aviation legislation during those years, none 
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gained traction.86 Further, while Hoover himself worked actively to support American aeronautics, 
any federal action necessitated the creation of a legal framework.  
In fact, two separate aspects of federal engagement would be necessary to create a viable 
private commercial air transport industry. First, airlines’ ability to achieve solvency increasingly 
appeared to necessitate federal assistance. Most obviously, this could be facilitated through airmail 
subsidies—in many ways the same policy that helped underwrite railroad expansion in the previous 
century. Secondly, federal officials and airline executives alike recognized the need for some form of 
overarching federal oversight. Most specifically, both sides looked to the government to certify and 
police airline safety. Ultimately, these goals would be realized through the passage of two 
foundational pieces of legislation—the 1925 Contract Airmail Act, or “Kelly Bill,” and the 1926 Air 
Commerce Act.  
Before 1925, however, several obstacles stood in the way of these bills. It appears that 
lawmakers’ inability to pass legislation before that time reflected the influence of a related set of 
factors. Americans’ cultural association of flying with danger continued to limit aviation’s 
commercial potential. David Courtwright argues that well into the 1920s, a majority of Americans’ 
viewed flying as a pursuit dominated by “spectacles and disasters,” hardly a firm basis for stable 
commercial service.87 Additionally, the persistent inability of American airlines to remain solvent 
meant that Americans lacked examples of successful commercial ventures to combat that cultural 
perception. As Nick Kommons argues, in the absence of public pressure, Congress had no popular 
mandate to act. Instead, impetus came from a special interest group—the aviation industry itself—
                                            
86 Significantly, New later served as Postmaster General under Hoover and played a key 
role in promoting commercial aviation through airmail contracts. For further information, 
see Kommons, Bonfires to Beacons, 35-64. 





that did not carry the weight of the American public. Although pressure for federal action built 
steadily within that group, it had little effect until 1925.  
Contemporary commercial aviation also had yet to demonstrate the ability to undertake safe 
and reliable transport operations. Though the Army and the Post Office inaugurated airmail service 
in 1918, those efforts grew slowly and took time to influence lawmakers and the American public 
alike. By the mid 1920s, however, the Post Office’s transcontinental airmail service conclusively 
demonstrated that aircraft could be used to transport mail reliably, day and night, and in all types of 
weather.88 That example did much to establish public confidence in commercial flying and offered 
concrete evidence for those wishing to establish aviation-related legislation.   
By 1925, in fact, both legislators and commercial interests looked forward to the transfer of 
Post Office airmail routes to private interests. The Post Office airmail service had never been 
intended as a permanent solution. It was, in effect, a trial run to demonstrate the viability of such a 
model. Having accomplished their goal, Post Office officials—most notably Second Assistant 
Postmaster General Paul Henderson—looked to transfer airmail routes to nascent airlines. According 
to Kommons, Henderson was an ardent cheerleader for privatizing these routes. Establishing close 
connections with business interests, Henderson focused on preparing airline executives for the 
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takeover. He did his job well, attracting more than 2,000 inquires from aspiring airmail carriers, and 
drawing interest from no less a figure than Henry Ford.89 
Henderson’s efforts, both overseeing Post Office airmail service and promoting eventual 
privatization, played a key role in making aviation legislation palatable to Congress. Support from 
business leaders like Henry Ford did much to dispel worries about aviation’s danger,90 and the Post 
Office’s excellent record of regular service offered a concrete example that aircraft could be 
effective in transporting cargo quickly and reliably. Simultaneously, Hoover’s work behind the 
scenes to create and sustain close relationships between federal officials and aviation executives 
allayed worries about safety. As early as 1921 Hoover had made clear his desire to establish safety 
regulations in order to “prevent civil aviation from getting into bad repute because of its 
development as a stunt,” and his continuing push for federal oversight helped establish confidence in 
aviation’s ultimate commercial viability.91  
These efforts culminated in the passage of seminal new legislation. In February of 1925, 
Pennsylvania Congressman Clyde Kelly—Chairman of the House Post Office Committee—
introduced a bill establishing the commercial foundation for private airlines. Kelly’s bill formally 
authorized the transfer of airmail routes from the Post Office to private contractors, creating the 
potential for government-guaranteed profits for contract mail carriers. The bill authorized a special 
ten-cent-per-ounce airmail rate, and promised airmail carriers 80 percent of operating revenues. 
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These provisions opened new financial possibilities for commercial aviation, offering consistent 
revenues and federal support for the continued expansion of the airmail network.  
Kelly’s bill sailed through Congress, and in February 1925 President Calvin Coolidge signed it 
into law. The bill’s passage signaled a new era for American commercial aviation, but its general 
popularity obscured the need for further clarification of the government’s responsibility to 
commercial aeronautics. It allayed aviation industry fears by providing a stable basis for growth in 
the form of government contracts. It also circumvented initial Congressional worries about 
governmental subsidization of the industry by guaranteeing airmail carriers revenues from postal 
receipts, rather than from general tax revenues.92 The bill’s passage, however, ultimately served as 
the beginning, rather then the end of the debate concerning the federal government’s proper 
relationship to this emerging commercial concern.  
Significantly, the Kelly Bill made no mention of federal regulation; its focus was purely the 
privatization of airmail contracts. As such, its passage focused Congressional attention on the need 
for a federally enforced regulatory framework—in effect mandating some form of federal oversight 
lest private airmail carriers operate in an environment totally free from supervision. In that sense the 
Kelly Bill created the conditions for the possibility of additional federal engagement; its passage 
represented a tacit admission that Hoover’s desire for federal safety and licensing guidelines 
necessitated immediate legislative action, as private carriers would now be entrusted with the safety 
of the U.S. mail.  
Congressional Representatives and officials at the Department of Commerce agreed on the 
government’s need to codify both fiscal and regulatory policy, but disagreed sharply regarding the 
                                            
92 F. Robert van der Linden, Airlines and Airmail: The Post Office and the Birth of the 





proper extent of federal power. For instance, there was pressure from members of Congress, state 
governors, and local and municipal officials to allow individual states and municipalities to license 
pilots and develop air traffic rules—a situation that flew in the face of Hoover’s efforts to promote a 
national basis for stable growth.93 Additionally, although the Kelly Bill avoided a direct 
governmental subsidy for airmail carriers from tax revenue, it still provided for federal fiscal support 
of a specific industry. This was nothing new for the government, and, in fact, virtually everyone in 
Congress and Commerce supported some measure of federal economic support. There was 
significant discord, however, concerning the definition of “subsidy,” and exactly what form federal 
aid should take. Despite its easy passage, the Kelly Bill served to encourage, rather than close, 
debate on this topic, an issue that would continue to dog commercial aviation for the next decade.94 
Despite these continuing concerns, the Kelly Bill’s passage represented an important first step 
in federal willingness to take ownership of aeronautical development. Simultaneously, however, it 
highlighted the immediate need for legislation establishing federal regulatory oversight. That 
legislation, ultimately passed as the 1926 Air Commerce Act, formed the second pillar of the federal 
government’s willingness to engage commercial aviation. As previously stated, Hoover had been 
lobbying for the creation of such a bill since at least 1921. Little support existed for new legislation, 
however, while aviation remained on the margins of American commercial development. The Kelly 
Bill’s passage thrust issues of safety and oversight into sharp relief and created an immediate 
impetus for Congressional action. 
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Simultaneously, President Calvin Coolidge authorized the creation of an investigatory 
commission made up of governmental, military, and private interests to determine whether and how 
the federal government should respond to aviation’s new commercial potential.95 Coolidge tasked 
the Morrow Board—named after its Chairman, Dwight W. Morrow—to investigate all aspects of 
American aviation and return with recommendations for federal action. In December 1925 it did just 
that, advocating the creation of a bureau of air navigation within the Commerce Department, and 
advising the government to progressively extend airmail service across the country. The Morrow 
Board’s report, Kommons relates, resulted in “legislators scurry[ing] to get in on the act,” prompted 
by the clear Presidential mandate to pass new legislation.96  
Presidential support combined with the mandate set forth by the Kelly Bill to hasten the 
passage of a new law. Not surprisingly, the forthcoming bill bore the unmistakable stamp of 
Hoover’s influence. Though Hoover did not write the bill himself, his influence and that of a key 
ally—Chicago lawyer William MacCracken—played crucial roles in shaping the forthcoming 
legislation.97 The final bill clearly reflected Hoover’s focus on safety, promotion, and infrastructure 
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development.98 It created a Bureau of Air Commerce within the Commerce Department and 
authorized federal oversight of licensing, safety, airway construction and research.  
Together, the Air Commerce Act and the Kelly Bill created the legislative foundations of 
federal engagement with American aeronautics. Hoover’s fingerprints were clearly in evidence in 
both bills, though he was not personally responsible for either. It remained to be seen, however, 
exactly how each law would operate in practice—in fact, in many ways each new bill raised more 
questions than it answered. Significant uncertainties remained regarding the nature of federal airmail 
subsidies, and the form, extent, and execution of federal oversight. Fundamentally, the new laws 
represented the beginning, rather than the culmination of the Commerce Secretary’s engagement 
with aviation. They created the framework within which Hoover operated for the duration of his time 
as Secretary of Commerce, and later as President. In both of those positions Hoover utilized his 
power and influence to further a powerful vision of aviation’s value to America. That vision 
reflected his earlier desire to see aviation establish a secure commercial footing, but moved beyond 
those initial aspirations to encompass a much more comprehensive desire to see aviation play a 
central role in America’s continuing development.  
 
Beginning in 1925 Hoover redoubled his efforts to shape aeronautical development. Consistent 
with his earlier efforts and guided by his associational ideology, Hoover worked closely with airline 
executives, engine and airframe manufacturers, aviation interest groups,99 federal officials, and the 
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military to answer a series of foundational questions. Specifically, Hoover strove to define the 
federal government’s responsibility to the aviation industry in the fields of regulation, infrastructure, 
oversight and research. In addition, Hoover also attempted to delineate the relationship between civil 
and military aviation. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Hoover strove to clarify the role of 
government “subsidies” in aeronautical development. Hoover’s efforts reflected his continuing focus 
on commercial aviation, but also did much to codify federal aviation policy at a crucial moment in 
the industry’s history. These efforts represent the most successful example of associationalism 
working in practice, as Hoover’s efforts ultimately fostered relationships and policies that led to the 
maturation of American commercial aviation. 
Between 1925 and 1927 Hoover clearly defined his aviation policy in a series of press releases 
and speeches. That policy highlighted his commitment to associationalism and his focus on 
establishing close relationships between business—particularly emerging industries—and 
government. Hoover’s efforts focused on the promotion of a central set of ideas. First, Hoover 
continued to emphasize aviation’s need for federal assistance and oversight. Hoover believed that 
commercial growth had to take place in a structured environment. In his mind, federal oversight of 
licensing and safety were necessary preconditions for commercial growth. In addition, he argued 
stridently that the government had an obligation to provide lighted airways, emergency fields, and 
navigational aids for commercial networks. Second, Hoover worked to craft an aviation policy that 
provided some level of governmental fiscal support while steering clear of direct subsidies or overt 
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nationalization. Finally, Hoover emphasized the connections between civil and military aviation. For 
him, the development of commercial aviation represented a positive end in itself, but Hoover also 
believed that a mature aviation industry would help aid military preparedness. He consistently 
focused on these points while refining his vision for the future of aviation, attempting to sell it both 
to Congress and the American people.  
In a September 1925 press release, Hoover articulated aviation’s pressing need for federal 
assistance. He began by asserting that the Commerce Department “has been confident for the last 
two years that the development of the flying art has reached a point . . . near the possibility of self 
supporting application.” That confidence, however, did not allay Hoover’s conviction “that we can 
not have the successful development of commercial aviation until . . . government services are 
provided.” With that in mind Hoover related that he and others in the Commerce Department “have 
advocated the creation of a Bureau of Civil Aviation that the Government might undertake to give 
services to commercial aviation.”100 This early call for a separate agency within the Commerce 
Department to oversee American aviation clearly foreshadowed the subsequent establishment of the 
Bureau of Air Commerce.  
Hoover’s reference to “government services” signaled his belief that the time was right for the 
federal government to take an active role in aviation’s development. By the early 1920s there existed 
several successful aircraft manufacturers, including Curtis, Boeing, Douglas, and Ford. Engine 
producers such as Wright and Pratt & Whitney also demonstrated the potential for further growth, 
and nascent airlines showed that they could safely—if not profitably—fly established routes. Hoover 
believed this emerging industry possessed the potential for tremendous growth, and the ability to 
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transform American commerce. Its ability to do so, however, was sharply limited by a lack of 
regulation, oversight, and infrastructure. In addition, Hoover believed that the American public 
needed to be educated about commercial aviation. At this time a majority of Americans perceived 
aviation as both dangerous and expensive—attributes sure to limit a public embrace of mainstream 
commercial service. First with airmail, and later with passengers, these prevailing ideas would need 
to change in order for flying to play a widespread commercial role.  At this crucial juncture, Hoover 
believed that the federal government could play a vital role in aiding the development of a nascent 
industry with great future potential.  
Hoover’s conclusion reflected the results of an earlier fact-finding effort.  Leaning on his 
background as an engineer, in May of 1925 Hoover authorized a comprehensive study of 
transportation networks. Citing the lack of federal funds with which to organize such an endeavor, 
Hoover brought together members of the American Engineering Council, the aviation industry, 
“other technical bodies” and representatives from the Commerce Department to create a voluntary 
technical commission tasked to address the question. Hoover hoped that they would consider the 
state of aviation both in America and abroad in addition to “economics of our own ground 
transportation.” The goal was to ascertain what “the possibilities are for lifting a sufficient amount of 
the existing traffic into the air to make it self-supporting.”101 Both the role and composition of this 
commission clearly reflected Hoover’s economic ideology. He hoped to use the power of the 
Commerce Department to aid the development of a productive new technology, but shied away from 
coercive tactics. Instead, he worked to establish close connections between the government, 
business, and interest groups.  
                                            





The Commission’s findings formed the basis for Hoover’s September recommendations. In 
making his case for federal action, Hoover drew heavily on the government’s relationship with the 
shipping industry. Historically, the federal government oversaw maritime safety and navigation, 
provided buoys, lighthouses and similar infrastructure, and undertook scientific research related to 
ocean currents, meteorology and other relevant matters. Hoover argued that there existed a 
“complete analogy” between federal maritime policies and the contemporary state of aviation. In the 
September press release he argued “before we can expect to develop commercial aviation, we must 
study the air routes from the point of view of the best channels through the air and in their relation to 
atmospheric conditions; we must provide for charting the airways; for lighting and marking them; 
for warnings of weather disturbances . . . we must provide a body of law comparable to our merchant 
marine law.” Without those services, Hoover believed that “aviation can only develop in a primitive 
way.” 102  
Hoover frequently returned to this analogy when promoting his aviation policy. A year later, in 
a September 1926 speech to the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce, Hoover responded to 
suggestions that “private enterprise should undertake the establishment of the airways with their own 
services of lighting and mapping, emergency fields, and inspection of planes,” as did railways, 
without federal support.  This line of argument exemplifies much of the criticism levied against 
Hoover’s policies—specifically that they encouraged too much federal expenditure and too much 
support for a specific industry.103 Hoover’s response is instructive. He countered by arguing that 
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aviation had much more in common with shipping than with railroads. For him, federal support for 
infrastructure was “but a parallel to the service we have performed for navigation for 125 years.” 
More importantly, however, Hoover argued that railroad infrastructure differed from that of both 
aviation and shipping in critical ways. In his words “there is a vital difference [between aviation] and 
the railways, for it cannot be expected that any one private concern will undertake to provide these 
services [beacons, emergency fields, etc.], because the moment they are provided they would be 
open to all competitors without payment.”104 In other words, railways owned their specific 
transportation routes, and thus directly benefited from any outlay for infrastructure. Air and 
waterways, in contrast, were open to all, and therefore the government had a responsibility to make 
passage safe without unduly burdening any specific commercial operator.  
Significantly, however, Hoover believed that the government had no responsibility to 
undertake the construction of airports. Continuing his analogy between shipping and air commerce, 
Hoover believed “the provision and warehouse for shipping has always been the function of state 
and local governments. Likewise, the provision for airports must be the responsibility of local 
governments.”105 This statement exemplifies Hoover’s commitment to what historian Janet Daly 
Bednarek terms the “dock” concept.106 For both shipping and aviation, Hoover believed that the 
government should be responsible for safety, navigation, communication, and emergency 
contingencies, but this responsibility ended at the “dock” or airport. Hoover reiterated and further 
clarified his position in 1927, arguing that airports “should be provided by the principal 
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municipalities of the country in the same way coast cities provide docking facilities for home or 
foreign ocean trade.”107 In the case of aviation, however, this policy would lead to trouble in 
subsequent years when radio communication made air traffic control possible. In fact, decades 
would pass before federal, state and local governments worked out the proper lines of authority.  
Regardless of those looming difficulties, it remained unclear exactly what form federal 
regulation would take. William MacCracken would ultimately work out the details following the 
establishment of the Bureau of Air Commerce, but in the interim Hoover marshaled several powerful 
arguments in support of regulation. First, Hoover claimed that government safety regulation was 
vital for commercial growth. In his opinion, an examination of “the accidents in the United States” 
highlighted the “need of government inspection.”108 In fact, Hoover went so far as to argue that 
government oversight was a necessary precondition for aeronautical development. Speaking to the 
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce he related his conviction that “we will not have a development 
of passenger service . . . unless there be . . . the rigorous inspection of planes and the licensing of 
pilots, based on competency, by some central authority.” In light of the interstate nature of air 
commerce, Hoover went on to argue, “that authority must be the Federal Government.”109 
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Significantly, Hoover’s push for federal regulation predated the development of much of the 
modern regulatory state. In the 1920s the federal government had little authority to police public 
safety in particular industries, nor willingness to intervene actively in the commercial sphere.110 
Though the Progressive Era had created a new appreciation for government’s ability to safeguard the 
lives of its citizens, that realization sparked little in the way of formal legislation. The 1906 Pure 
Food and Drug Act stands as the most significant regulatory bill of this period, but in many ways 
represents the exception that proves the rule. As such, Hoover’s actions are even more noteworthy, 
particularly in regard to small and relatively underdeveloped transportation technology. 
Hoover buttressed his push for federal regulation with a pair of supporting arguments. First, he 
argued that “rigorous inspection” was necessary in order to protect human life.111 While not an earth-
shattering observation, Hoover’s commitment to safety reflected a rational desire to protect his 
fellow countrymen. His second line of argument, however, was much more enlightening. Looking 
once more to aviation’s commercial future, Hoover maintained that clear safety standards were 
central to “establishing public confidence in aviation as a method of passenger transport.”112 Hoover 
made this same point even more strongly a year later, arguing “public confidence in aerial navigation 
can only be established by the assurance that there is rigorous inspection of planes and competent 
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personnel.”113 Here Hoover moves beyond a push for safety on its own merits. Instead, his 
statements reveal an awareness of aviation’s limited contemporary appeal. A strong focus on safety 
reflected the Commerce Secretary’s efforts to move aviation from the margins of American 
commerce to the center, the success of which depended in large part on establishing public 
confidence in commercial flying.  
Hoover’s arguments represented a desire to end Americans’ association of aviation with danger 
and daring, and instead usher it into the commercial mainstream. Even into the 1930s, Americans 
expressed worry about the safety of air travel. A number of significant accidents—most prominently, 
famed Notre Dame football coach Knute Rockne’s death in a 1931 crash—continued to highlight the 
dangers of flying. Media sources reflected these worries. For example, a 1930 article from The 
Nation argued that even more than auto or train travel, Americans continued to associate flying with 
the potential for a violent death.  “There is something so appalling,” the article expressed, “in being 
burned to death in a crash that the public will not embark on airliners in any great numbers until 
accidents are practically eliminated.”114 
To raise public confidence, Hoover pushed for federal oversight of airways. As previously 
mentioned, Hoover believed that construction and maintenance of airways, like waterways, should 
be the province of the federal government. These airways were significant for several reasons. First, 
their construction reflected Hoover’s focus on safety. Established airways with lighted beacons, 
intermediate and emergency landing fields, and radio navigational aids would do much to facilitate 
safe, scheduled air transport service. In 1927 Hoover told The New York Times that the government 
was in the process of “providing the emergency landing fields where needed, surveying and mapping 
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the air routes, licensing pilots . . . supplying air charts to pilots and other air personnel, and 
producing lighthouses for the air in the same way as it does to safeguard maritime navigation.”115 
These improvements would, he believed, provide a solid foundation for commercial development. 
Second, lighted airways had the potential to revolutionize air commerce by allowing for night 
operations. Noting “any study of increased speed in the great distances in our country brings up the 
question at once of night movement; and necessarily lighted airways,”116 Hoover identified one of 
the most significant advantages made possible by air transport: speed. Hoover presciently realized 
that America’s size highlighted the value of air transport’s speed advantage over movement by rail, 
road, or water. That advantage could only be realized, however, if planes could fly at night as well as 
during the day. Hoover had already witnessed the organization of a limited network of lighted 
airways by the Post Office department. The Post Office’s efforts to light their trans-continental route 
from New York to San Francisco demonstrated the viability of such a system, and also served as an 
example of its value. Hoover hoped to expand the Post Office’s system into a national network 
utilized by mail, cargo, and passenger-carrying aircraft alike. Clearly, Hoover believed that only the 
federal government could successfully create such a network.  
Hoover’s support for federal regulation reflected his belief that air transport had the potential to 
revolutionize American commerce. In his opinion the development of a viable air transport network 
had numerous economic advantages. Most significantly, Hoover emphasized the benefits of “the 
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development of a new and speedier form of transportation.”117 Simply put, Hoover believed that 
governmental support for aviation was warranted on the basis of the improved speed and efficiency 
the new technology offered. Contending that “the economic importance of higher speed . . . is 
considerable,” Hoover argued that many industries would be willing to pay a premium for the speed 
aviation offered.118 The existence of a new, speedy transport option would provide revenues for the 
nascent air transport industry, while at the same time promoting more general economic advantage.  
Hoover, in fact, explicitly linked the growth of air transport to national economic development. 
Arguing in 1926 that “this new undertaking by the government [oversight over aviation] could . . . be 
well justified solely on the ground of developing a new form of transportation,” Hoover tied 
aviation’s progress to America’s. He went on to state, “through economics in time and motion” 
aviation had the potential to “add effectively to national productivity and wealth.”119 In this context, 
aviation represented much more than a new and exciting technology. With these statements Hoover 
demonstrated his belief in aviation’s potential to fundamentally alter the American commercial 
landscape, as well as his commitment to using the power of the federal government to aid aviation’s 
growth.  
It is even more significant that the Commerce Secretary espoused these beliefs as early as 
1926. Before Charles Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight, commercial aviation remained in the margins 
of American consciousness. Though air racing, flying circuses, and record-setting flights continued 
to enthrall the public, it was not at all clear how those pursuits would translate into commercial 
success. After 1927, however, Lindbergh’s efforts pushed flying to the center of Americans’ cultural 
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awareness and dramatically increased commercial fortunes. Lindbergh’s flight, historian Joseph 
Corn argues, “represented a high-water mark for aviation enthusiasm and was in itself a major 
stimulus to airmindedness.”120 As such, Lindbergh’s actions in many ways provided the impetus for 
Americans to turn away from aviation’s more negative cultural connotations and open themselves to 
its commercial possibilities.121 
Contemporary reactions to Lindbergh’s accomplishment offer compelling evidence of the 
pilot’s profound influence on American aviation. President Calvin Coolidge sent him a personal note 
of congratulations and dispatched a U.S. Navy cruiser to transport Lindbergh back across the 
Atlantic. In Washington, D.C., the President awarded him the Distinguished Flying Cross. 
According to The New York Times, “the enthusiasm of fellow aviators . . . knew no bounds” when 
word of Lindbergh’s success reached the United States.122 No less a figure then Orville Wright 
commented, “the flight [was] beyond all expectation . . . we hardly dreamed that some day [such a 
flight] could be accomplished.”123 The American public also gave Lindbergh their rapt attention. 
Upon his arrival in New York hundreds of thousands of well-wishers let out a “frenzied outburst of 
whole-hearted affection,” and listened with bated breath to his short speech.124 
The intense public response to Lindbergh’s achievement had concrete implications for 
aviation’s commercial growth. First and foremost, Lindbergh’s flight dramatically heightened 
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Americans’ interest in flying. Naturally, this positively affected commercial aviation. Looking back 
in March of 1930, a Time article acknowledged this transition stating, “when Lindbergh got down in 
Paris (1927), U.S. aviation stocks [went] up.”125 Simultaneously, Lindbergh almost immediately 
began to use his newfound fame to promote commercial flying. He became the public face of 
Transcontinental Air Transport—the forerunner of TWA—and later worked as a consultant for Pan 
American Airways. Lindbergh also flew The Spirit of St. Louis on goodwill tours through the U.S. 
and Latin American, in the process promoting aviation’s commercial potential.126 These actions 
played a key role in transforming Americans’ perceptions vis-à-vis aviation, hastening the public’s 
willingness to embrace flying’s commercial future.  
In 1926, however, hopes for commercial success largely remained the province of dreamers. 
While many in the aviation industry foresaw, or hoped to foresee, aviation playing a prominent role 
in America’s future, few lawmakers and policymakers shared this belief in a new and still unproven 
technology. Before Lindbergh, before the establishment of mainstream passenger service, and before 
private contractors took over major airmail routes, Hoover clearly articulated aviation’s potential to 
transform American commerce.  
Hoover placed great emphasis on government’s role in bringing about that commercial future, 
but argued that federal investment need not be excessive. In fact, he made aviation seem like a 
bargain. In 1925 Hoover argued that providing aviation with the same level of services—airways, 
safety regulation, etc.—as the government provided for shipping would “not be an extravagant 
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sum.”127  In fact, he articulated two interrelated points regarding federal expenditures on aviation. 
First, he asserted that Federal oversight of regulation and infrastructure development represented “a 
most constructive drive for immediate economy.”128 With this statement Hoover responded to 
criticisms that the expansion of federal responsibility would result in an unacceptable burden to 
American taxpayers. In Hoover’s mind, supporting aviation’s growth would be at worst revenue 
neutral, and would hopefully enrich the government’s coffers. He based this judgment on several 
related factors. Promoting commercial development would result in significant savings on military 
expenditures, as private industry would be given new motives for technological development. 
Additionally, the transfer of airmail from public—Post Office—to private responsibility would result 
in significant savings. Thus, even with increased federal responsibility for licensing, safety, and 
infrastructure, in the end Hoover believed his policy would offer a “relief, not an additional burden” 
to American taxpayers.”129 In fact, he went so far as to claim that “the cost of successfully 
establishing commercial aviation under the proposals I have . . . made should in fact result in actual 
saving to the Government.”130 
Second, Hoover argued placing responsibility for aviation oversight under the auspices of the 
Commerce Department presented possibilities for further savings. Offering his opinion that “the 
installation of this service to commercial aviation under the direction of the Department of 
Commerce makes possible this undertaking at much less expense than could have been done under 
any other department,” Hoover highlighted the department’s history of maritime regulation. He went 
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on to state that savings could be realized “because we are simply extending our already established 
navigation bureaus further inland, and with comparatively little addition to staff and equipment.”131 
Hoover’s statement prefigured the organization that the new Bureau of Air Commerce would 
eventually take within the department. In general, MacCracken and his staff would utilize existing 
Commerce Department Bureaus to fulfill many of their regulatory functions. Hoover’s statements 
certainly oversimplified the issue, but the Commerce Secretary was fundamentally correct to state 
that Commerce oversight would involve comparatively little new infrastructure within the 
department itself.  
All of Hoover’s financial arguments, however, must be seen in the larger context of his efforts 
to promote commercial aviation without resort to either a direct subsidy or nationalization. Hoover’s 
support for close cooperation between the government and private interests, and federal support for 
research, infrastructure, and regulation emerged naturally from his progressive economic ideology. 
He drew the line, however, at explicitly subsidizing industrial growth. Significantly, this policy 
stood in sharp contrast to European governments that overwhelmingly subsidized the growth of 
commercial carriers in the decades after the First World War. In fact, Hoover spent significant time 
and effort attempting to differentiate between American and European aviation.  
As early as 1925 Hoover stridently argued that circumstances differed sharply between the 
U.S. and Europe. His technical commission from May of that year spent much of its time delineating 
the development of European airlines and attempting to determine the extent of European 
governmental support for those commercial interests. In his September 1925 press release, Hoover 
commented on those findings, concluding that none of the European airlines “paid operating 
expenses.” Continuing, he stated, “in every case they are supported by subsidies of different 
                                            





governments, the volume of subsidies varying from 50 per cent to 95 per cent of the total cost.” Such 
significant subsidization, Hoover suggested, resulted from a dual set of goals. First, it appeared 
“obvious that these governments lay great weight upon the importance of this service from a military 
point of view.” Secondly, however, it seemed likely that “some portion of the impulse for their 
subsidies may be credited to a desire to build up a new industry and to stimulate a new form of 
transportation.”132 Regardless of the rationale behind these policies, however, Hoover considered 
such actions unacceptable in America. 
 
 This European context speaks powerfully to the unique path taken by American aviation. In 
Europe, a number of airlines emerged immediately in the wake of the First World War. As aviation 
historian R.E.G. Davies suggests, in spite of all the shortages experienced by combatant nations, 
most European nations possessed a surfeit of aircraft. Davies relates that “ either in a conscious 
attempt to put idle machines to useful work, or by turning to advantage the convenient supply of 
cheap vehicles, the first airlines were born.”133 As early as January of 1919, the German government 
authorized civil airline operations, and the first German airline took to the sky the next month. The 
first French carrier followed in March, and the British in August. By 1920, a majority of European 
nations had regularly scheduled national and international routes, including a much-utilized cross-
channel run.134 This growth continued and, in fact, accelerated into the early 1920s as European 
nations created a comprehensive network of air transport in Britain and on the Continent.135  
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As Hoover suggested, however, this growth was largely underwritten by government subsidies. 
In the cases of Germany and France, local, state, and national subsidization assisted the growth of 
airlines virtually from their inception. As Davies argues, both Germany and France realized “that to 
promote a new transport medium money had to be spent on research, manufacture, development, and 
operation.” Almost unilaterally, that money came from each country’s government. Britain initially 
eschewed government subsidies for aviation, but ironically came to form the exception that proved 
the rule for the European context. British airlines did not receive subsidies for the first few years of 
their operation, and as a result stagnated during a period of rapid growth for their French and 
German counterparts. This fact became obvious to the British government when British carriers 
found themselves unable to compete on the lucrative London to Paris run. The French government, 
recognizing the prestige of this important route, heavily subsidized national efforts to cross the 
channel by air. As a result, British carriers quickly found themselves marginalized in cross-channel 
operations, eventually resulting in the two largest—Handley Page and Instone Air Lines—
suspending operations. In the wake of this embarrassment, in March of 1921 the British government 
authorized government appropriations to support air commerce. In Davies’ words, this reversal of 
policy “marked . . . the recognition by a government of the United Kingdom that in an environment 
of cut-throat competition a new industry must be helped if it is to have a reasonable chance of 
reaching maturity.”136 This recognition signaled that even the European nation with the most 
traditionally liberal economic philosophy saw subsidy as the path to success for aviation. 
European subsidization of the airline industry played a key role in spurring aeronautical growth 
in the years after World War I. Those same policies, moreover, pushed European governments down 
a path that eventually led to nationalized airlines. Britain began this trend with the consolidation of a 
                                            





number of smaller carriers into the overseas line Imperial Airways in 1924. Germany established 
Deutsche Luft Hansa for national and international routes in 1926, the French created Air France in 
1933, and the British moved to create British Airways in 1935.137 These nationalized carriers 
received substantial governmental support for research, manufacturing, and infrastructure. More 
significantly, European governments moved aggressively to subsidize operating costs. Whether this 
resulted from a desire to use air commerce to bolster national defense, or because of European 
governments’ desire to support an emerging industry, the net result was, by the mid 1920s, the 
creation of a comprehensive air transport network across the continent with links to many imperial 
destinations.  
It seems likely that these European carriers could not have survived without subsidization. 
Certainly, without governmental funds they would not have prospered as they did. In fact, the state 
of American commercial aviation during the early 1920s serves to confirm the difficulties airlines 
faced without such support. Clearly, commercial carriers struggled in the United States in the years 
after World War I. It was not until the privatization of government airmail contracts after the passage 
of the Kelly Bill in 1925 that air transport operators began to realize steady income. In fact, before 
that time the only successful large-scale American air carrier was the U.S. Post Office—ironically 
operating an airmail network subsidized by the federal government.  
Despite aviation’s lack of commercial success in America before 1925, U.S. policymakers 
considered a direct federal subsidy for the aviation industry to be unacceptable. Hoover represented 
one of the loudest voices arguing that aviation did not need federal subsidies to achieve success. For 
him, the idea of a formal subsidy ran counter to the core of his economic philosophy. Additionally, a 
conservative focus on promoting the free market during the 1920s mitigated against such direct 
                                            





federal intervention in the economy—direct subsidization was philosophically and politically 
unacceptable. Speaking to a New York Times reporter in 1927, Hoover codified his view, stating 
unequivocally, “we will have no subsidy in the United States.”138 He modified that position 
somewhat in practice, however, by utilizing “informal” subsidies—derived from airmail receipts 
rather than taxes—to promote commercial growth. This policy represented a natural outgrowth of 
Hoover associationalist ideology, but also reflected airlines’ continuing need for financial support. 
Publicly, however, Hoover maintained that American commercial aviation did not need 
subsidization to achieve commercial success. He based that contention on several related arguments. 
First, he focused on the differences between the U.S. and Europe. Stating, “our geographic, 
economic and political setting is different from that of Europe,” Hoover argued that America 
represented a much more promising environment for aeronautical growth. Specifically, he related, 
“our distances are greater, our country is an economic and political unit . . . with us we have an area 
2,000 miles wide and 3,000 miles long undisturbed by national boundaries and of course the flow of 
trade is far more localized within smaller areas of individual nations.” Hoover also suggested that the 
United States had “a very much larger activity of transportation of goods, of express, of mails and 
passengers than any country in Europe.”139 Simply, Hoover argued that the U.S. context offered 
greater commercial possibilities for airlines. America’s size and economic scope meant greater need 
for more—and more efficient—transportation networks. As such, he believed that there was much 
more potential for air commerce in the U.S. than in Europe. 
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Hoover also suggested that the contemporary paucity of American air commerce was 
misleading. Hoover readily admitted that “outside of the Postal Service, we have had . . . little 
systematic commercial aviation.” That fact, however, did not mean a lack of future potential. 
Countering criticisms “that but little progress had been made toward [the] commercial success of 
aviation,” Hoover suggested that a narrow focus on the Post Office’s efforts obscured that larger 
context. In his opinion, “our Postal service cannot be altogether representative of commercial 
possibilities because that service cannot avail itself of the revenue from passengers and express and 
necessarily could not bring to bear the energetic recruiting of business as would be the case in 
private enterprise.”140 With this statement Hoover correctly differentiated the goals of the Post 
Office’s airmail operations from those of private commercial carriers.  
It is curious, however, that he appears to have overlooked private carriers’ inability to achieve 
commercial success. Significantly, the Post Office’s efforts did not represent an explicit barrier to 
private enterprise. In other words, while the Post Office’s efforts certainly were not representative of 
commercial possibilities, the dearth of private airlines in the U.S. at the time actually was. Hoover’s 
acquiescence to informal subsidization and his focus on promoting airmail represented a tacit 
admission that airlines could not yet achieve profitability through passenger service alone. It was not 
until Hoover appointed Walter F. Brown as Postmaster General that the federal government would 
embrace a specific set of policies designed to promote passenger-carrying operations.141 
Nonetheless, Hoover stridently argued that American aviation contained great potential for 
growth in the immediate future. In 1925 he expressed his confidence that with the creation of 
mechanisms for federal oversight and regulation and a push for municipalities to construct airports 
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“we can secure definite commercial service without any subsidies at all.”142 A year later Hoover 
appeared even more confident, expressing his belief that “within another year we shall see privately 
operated air transportations upon our principal national airways.” Elaborating on his confidence in 
the success of those future operations, Hoover went on to voice his “high hopes . . . of a very much 
larger revenue from express and passengers than are enjoyed by the European air lines.”143  
The private takeover of airmail routes by 1927 largely confirmed Hoover’s first statement. 
Ironically, however, the success of those private operations would largely be assured through 
government airmail payments—what amounted to an informal subsidy. Further, the eventual growth 
of passenger service in the United States arose out of a controversial set of federal policies explicitly 
utilizing the enticement of airmail subsidies to rationalize the development of the airline industry and 
promote the growth of carriers focused on passenger operations. Those policies would result in a 
Senate investigation, widespread accusations of governmental collusion with private industry, and 
outrage over what many lawmakers perceived to be the utilization of federal monies to subsidize an 
industry.  
The final element of Hoover’s aviation policy associated commercial development with 
national defense. As Commerce Secretary he argued, “there is a dual objective in our Governmental 
interest in commercial aviation, that is, national defense . . . and the development of a new and 
speedier form of transportation.”144 In his mind these goals were complementary. In fact, Hoover 
argued that increased preparedness would emerge as a natural byproduct of commercial policy. This 
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did not mean “that the actual commercial plane will be much used in actual battle,”145 however. In 
1925, he argued that the promotion of commercial aviation would provide three concrete benefits to 
American national defense.146 In his words, “the buildup of the manufacturing industry behind such 
aviation is of the most vital importance, and we must develop the airways across our own country so 
that they may be used for purposes of defense. Beyond this of course the commercial growth of the 
industry will give impulse in the development of the art. All of these factors will contribute to the 
defense arms of the government.”147 
These three factors represented a natural outgrowth of Hoover’s emerging commercial policy. 
Hoover’s support for private airlines would, in his mind, naturally result in the manufacture of more 
aircraft. This would, in turn, provide more capacity that could, in the event of war, be converted to 
military production. Additionally, the development of commercial airlines would push the private 
sector to develop larger and more efficient aircraft as airlines competed for passengers and profits; 
these advances in aeronautical technology would serve as an additional source of research and 
development for the military. Hoover also saw federal efforts to construct a lighted airway network 
across the country as performing an important military function. Much as later policymakers saw the 
Interstate Highway System as promoting both commercial and military goals, Hoover foresaw 
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national airways providing crucial infrastructure in times of war. Finally, increased aircraft 
production would result in more efficient manufacturing techniques that would benefit both private 
industry and the government.  
By 1927 Hoover foresaw even more overlap between commercial and military development. In 
that year he argued “that the development of commercial aviation will prove a military asset of the 
first rank,” because “it will mean the training of a great source of wonderful aviators whose service 
will be available in the moment of emergency, the assembling of a great reserve in equipment and 
the fostering of the manufacturing industry as essential in the hour of need.”148 While this statement 
echoes many of the themes Hoover articulated in 1925, it also moved beyond them. In addition to 
trumpeting the benefits of a mature manufacturing industry, here Hoover suggests that airliners 
could serve as valuable reserve equipment. Presumably he is suggesting that airliners could be 
converted to military transports during wartime—foreshadowing the activities of the Military Airlift 
Transport Command (MATC), which did exactly that during the Second World War. Additionally, 
the Commerce Secretary highlighted the military value a cadre of well-trained airline pilots would 
embody. The MATC proved the value of this resource during World War II, in many cases drafting 
airline pilots to fly their same commercial planes on new routes in support of the war effort.149  
Hoover also highlighted the cost savings that could be realized from the confluence of 
commercial and military goals. In 1925 he stated, “the cost of successfully establishing commercial 
aviation . . . should in fact result in actual saving to the government.” Hoover based this claim 
primarily on the fact that his policies would “relieve the government of the indirect expenditure 
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necessary to maintain a reserve of manufacturing equipment for defense purposes.” 150 In the next 
few years Hoover would also argue that the expansion of commercial aviation would absolve the 
military of expenses associated with constructing emergency landing fields around the country, and 
provide supplemental infrastructure in the form of municipal airports and lighted airways. While the 
government would still foot the bill for much of that construction, Hoover remained adamant that 
savings would ultimately result. By 1927 he confidently concluded that his aviation policy would 
“save huge sums which otherwise would have to be appropriated for a purely military or naval 
service.”151  
Hoover’s efforts to tie aviation’s commercial development to military preparedness appear to 
have served him well. This theme appeared prominently in Hoover’s public statements concerning 
aviation, and his consistent focus on national defense seems to have made his policy palatable to a 
wider audience. In fact, Hoover demonstrated a remarkable ability to construct a visionary aviation 
policy while still appealing to moderate and conservative policymakers. His support for military 
preparedness and focus on establishing American commercial aviation without a direct subsidy 
widened the appeal of his policies and, in many ways, created the conditions for the possibility of 
their success. It is not clear to what extent Hoover personally valued commercial aviation’s 
contributions to national defense, but it is clear that his consistent denial of a need for federal 
subsidies cohered with his personal economic philosophy. 
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It is important to recognize that while Hoover was the guiding force behind American aviation 
policy in the early 1920s, he was not alone in supporting aeronautical growth. Other individuals in 
both the Post Office and Commerce Departments lent their voices to the push for a national aviation 
policy. William MacCracken, the first head of the Aeronautics Branch of the Department of 
Commerce, Congressman Clyde Kelly, Postmaster General Harry S. New, and Second Assistant 
Postmaster Generals Paul Henderson and Irving Glover, among others, consistently worked to 
develop American commercial aviation. That support, however, almost overwhelmingly reflected 
Hoover’s vision, and in many cases these men explicitly tied their policies to Hoover’s. 
Other than Hoover, William MacCracken ranks as the most influential figure in 1920s aviation 
policy. A Chicago-based lawyer, MacCracken was the driving force behind the organization and 
implementation of the 1926 Air Commerce Act. This piece of legislation created the Bureau of Air 
Commerce within the Commerce Department and authorized federal oversight of licensing, safety, 
airway construction, and research. The Act represented the culmination of more then five years of 
pressure for federal action from a select group of lawmakers and industry officials, and in many 
ways stood as the codification of Hoover’s vision. MacCracken, a longtime aviation enthusiast, 
wrote much of the bill, and after its passage Hoover tapped him to become the first head of the 
newly created Aeronautics Bureau. His centrality to this history Nick Kommons to contend, “it is 
difficult to single out any personality . . . that left a greater imprint on Federal civil aviation 
policy.”152 
MacCracken’s vision, though, profoundly reflected Hoover’s leadership. According to 
Kommons, MacCracken, like Hoover, “believed that the Federal Government must regulate all 
                                            





phases of aviation.”153 For both men this meant federal construction and oversight of lighted 
airways, safety and licensing, and general promotion of the commercial industry. Also in line with 
Hoover’s vision, MacCracken’s bill placed responsibility for airport construction in the hands of 
local authorities. The lawyer strongly opposed subsidies, arguing that they represented a barrier to 
commercial development. Although it seems that MacCracken’s personal interest in aviation played 
at least some part in leading him to many of these conclusions, the continuity between his views and 
those of the Commerce Secretary are remarkable.  
After taking the reigns of the newly established Bureau of Air Commerce, MacCracken 
quickly moved to implement Hoover’s vision. In doing so he also embraced what in many ways 
stood as the most important responsibility of the Bureau—the promotion of commercial aviation. As 
Kommons shows, MacCracken believed that his primary responsibility “was to foster the 
development of the industry.”154 This meant promoting regulatory oversight and infrastructure 
development, but also serving as a cheerleader for aeronautics. Both MacCracken and Hoover 
realized that public acceptance of air transport represented perhaps the most important key to its 
ultimate success, and in his new role MacCracken worked tirelessly to sell it to the public through 
speeches, informational sessions, and advertising campaigns.  
In support of this effort, MacCracken gave a number of speeches that clarified his views on 
aviation policy. One of the most revealing was a February 1929 speech entitled “Government 
Regulation of Commercial Aviation.” In it, MacCracken echoes many of Hoover’s themes from a 
few years earlier. MacCracken began by drawing a sharp distinction between American and 
European commercial aviation. Like Hoover, MacCracken went to great lengths to explain that “the 
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attitude of this government, or the policy of this government, is decidedly different in this field than 
of any European nation.” That difference hinged on the issue of subsidies. MacCracken argued that 
“if commercial aviation is going to develop on a sound basis it has got to earn its own way, that it 
should perform an economic service that is worth what it costs.”155  
He went on to emphasize the Commerce Department’s work in establishing “lighting devices” 
on the nations’ airways and “encouraging municipalities in the establishing of airports.” According 
to MacCracken, though the Commerce Department could not expend federal funds on airport 
construction, Commerce employees “are permitted to send men around to advise in matters of 
selection and construction and improvement of the airport.”  Additionally, the Department 
established a rating system for airports, using those rankings as an inducement for airports to 
improve their facilities and make themselves more attractive for commercial service. “The 
municipalities,” MacCracken related, “are taking a great deal of interest in this work.” As a result, 
“in the past three years new airports have been established by something over 500 municipalities.”156 
The Assistant Secretary also commented on his efforts to promote safety, arguing that making 
air transport safer represented a primary focus of federal regulation. In support of that point he 
related to the audience that the Bureau’s efforts to license pilots, regulate aircraft production, and 
establish airworthiness standards had resulted in a significant reduction in insurance premiums for 
air travel. According to his figures, Bureau of Air Commerce policies had, since regulation went into 
                                            
155 “Government Regulation of Commercial Aviation,” Speech by William MacCracken, 
February 19, 1929, Box 25, MacCracken Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, 
West Branch, Iowa. 





effect on January 1, 1927, resulted in a 40 percent reduction in “aircraft coverage” while at the same 
time broadening its scope.157  
MacCracken also highlighted his role in promoting the industry. Telling the audience of 
“another part of the work we are doing,” MacCracken stated he thought listeners would “be 
interested in knowing what we are doing in the way of encouraging aviation.”158 To that end, 
MacCracken detailed Bureau efforts to educate local governments about aviation, improve airports, 
and promote awareness of regulation among the American public.  
Significantly, the Commerce Department’s efforts to promote flying to the American public 
received a tremendous boost from public excitement over Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight. Kommons 
points to the dramatic increase in applications for pilot licenses following Lindbergh’s achievement 
as concrete evidence of the American public’s growing enthusiasm for flying. According to his 
research, between the Bureau’s creation in May of 1926 and December of 1928, more than 17,000 
Americans applied for licenses. Significantly, Kommons relates that more than 80 percent of those 
applications occurred in the wake of Lindbergh’s flight.159 
Finally, MacCracken, like Hoover, emphasized how the development of air commerce would 
benefit military preparedness. He began by differentiating U.S. policy from that of European nations. 
The latter, MacCracken argued, created regulations and infrastructure “for political and military 
purposes rather then for commercial purposes. Their plans are made so that their aviation resources 
may be quickly convertible to military use.” No such plans existed in the U.S., however. Instead, 
MacCracken suggested that military preparedness would improve as a natural consequence of 
commercial growth. He related that while the primary goal of Bureau policy was to make aviation 
                                            
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid.  





“safe and reliable in peace time,” the development of the industry was also “important in times of 
war, so we have a mutual [goal] between the military services and the civilian department.”160 Like 
Hoover, MacCracken focused on how the development of a coherent commercial industry would 
provide infrastructure, planes, pilots, and research and development that would serve the nation well 
in the event of war.  
MacCracken’s public stance echoed Hoover’s almost exactly. Certainly, this is to be expected 
considering Hoover’s authority over MacCracken while serving as Commerce Secretary. Regardless, 
however, it appears that both men shared a similar vision for aviation’s commercial future. During 
his tenure as Director, MacCracken continued to work for those goals, in large part realizing 
Hoover’s vision. In addition, MacCracken demonstrated his willingness to publicly acknowledge 
Hoover’s pivotal role in creating a coherent aviation policy. In a December 1930 speech, 
MacCracken lauded Hoover’s efforts, stating “[Commerce Department] policy, inaugurated nearly 
ten years ago by President Herbert Hoover when he became Secretary of Commerce, has been of 
inestimable benefit to all concerned.”161 This statement accurately encompasses Hoover’s 
contributions, and also highlights the continuity between Hoover and MacCracken’s views. 
Hoover’s influence was not limited to the Commerce Department. In his study of the Post 
Office’s role in creating the modern airline industry, Robert van der Linden acknowledges the 
Commerce Secretary’s central role in establishing a coherent aviation policy. Commenting on 
Hoover’s efforts to secure Congressional support, van der Linden relates that Hoover took “the lead 
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in the search for appropriate [aviation] legislation.”162 Additionally, van der Linden articulates 
Hoover’s tireless efforts to unite members of the aviation industry behind his ideas. In his analysis, 
“Hoover was able to take the lead and forge a new consensus concerning his vision of the role that 
aviation might play in the future.”163  
That consensus extended to the Post Office. Van der Linden’s scholarship demonstrates that 
Hoover’s views had a pervasive influence on the development of airmail policy in the early 1920s, a 
fact clearly reflected in the public statements of Post Office officials. In particular, Postmaster 
General Harry S. New emerged as a vocal proponent of Hoover’s policies. In the mid 1920s, New 
articulated a hopeful vision for the future of commercial aviation in the United States, grounding that 
vision in calls for federal regulation, infrastructure development, and the promotion of commercial 
activity without resort to formal subsidies. Although his perspective was understandably shaped by 
his position in the Post Office, New’s position on these issues came to echo Hoover’s almost 
exactly.164 
An examination of New’s 1925 testimony before the Congressional Air Service Board165 offers 
a comprehensive summary of his views. Called before the board to explain what the Federal 
government should do to regulate air navigation and promote the industry, New proceeded to outline 
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his hopes for aviation’s commercial future. He began by stating that, “our first need is for a 
continuing national program for the promotion of aeronautics.” New argued that such a program 
should take a holistic view of American aviation in order to promote military and civilian goals. 
Within that program, however, New argued that commercial aviation represented “the cornerstone of 
the whole structure.”166   
In New’s view the promotion of commercial aviation would also serve military ends. 
Expressing his “belief that successful commercial aviation and national security go hand in hand,” 
he echoed Hoover’s belief in the informal role commercial aeronautics played in military 
preparedness. Like Hoover, New did not believe that civil aviation should form an explicit reserve 
force for the military. Instead, the development of commercial flying would promote increased 
manufacturing, infrastructure development, pilot training, and technological research that would aid 
both civil and military flying.  
New’s fervent support for commercial aviation, however, did not blind him to the challenges 
American carriers faced in the immediate future. New readily admitted to the Board that he didn’t 
know what the future would hold for commercial flying. However, for him this suggested a greater, 
rather than a lesser need for a coherent Federal policy. In his words, “the possibilities [for aviation] 
are so great that it becomes a matter of first national importance to ascertain for ourselves . . . what 
they are.” In order to do so, the Postmaster General believed that Government needed to take a 
leading role, something it had not done to date. New argued “there are many things” the Federal 
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Government could and should do “that are absolute prerequisites to the success of commercial 
aeronautics, not one of which is receiving a particle of attention at the present time.”167 
The lack of a federal agency responsible for regulation and oversight of aviation was 
particularly worrying for New. He reported that the Post Office was “deluged with letters from 
chambers of commerce, boards of trade and city authorities” relating to “the establishment of 
airways, landing fields, and things of like character.”168 New expressed consternation that there was 
no place to send these letters; no authority to whom to appeal. He emphasized that the Post Office’s 
role in serving airmail routes ill prepared the Department for questions of aviation policy, and 
pushed for the creation of a separate regulatory organization. 
In New’s opinion, the Commerce Department was the “natural” place for such an agency. He 
commented that Commerce “could and should do all these things,”169 but enabling legislation would 
be necessary for the creation of a new office. New’s statement suggests he, like Hoover and 
MacCracken, believed federal oversight represented a necessary step in the growth of commercial 
aviation. Further, New’s hopes for Congressional legislation prefigured the passage of the Air 
Commerce Act by over a year. New’s position undoubtedly reflected Hoover’s growing influence 
over commercial aviation policy. Further, the Postmaster General’s position also had to take into 
account the implications of the Kelly Bill’s imminent privatization of airmail contracts. Nonetheless, 
New’s support for Commerce oversight, and his push for regulatory legislation, suggest significant 
uniformity in opinion between the Postmaster General and the Commerce Secretary.  
That uniformity also extended to the issue of subsidy. Though New had overseen the creation 
of an airmail network run explicitly by the U.S. government as a service to the nation, he fervently 
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denied the need for formal subsidization of private commercial carriers. New told the Board that for 
commercial aviation “to be successful it must pay its own way.” Later he did soften that position 
somewhat, arguing that the new technology did need some form of government assistance. He did 
not, however, “favor large Government appropriations for this purpose,”170 and argued that Federal 
support should come predominantly in the form of technological research.  
Finally, New, like Hoover, hoped that the Government would offer its support in creating 
aviation infrastructure. Focusing specifically on airways construction, New argued, “the Department 
of Commerce should be given authority and supplied with the means to provide for lighted airways 
for the use of companies engaged in aerial transportation. In doing this the Government would be 
doing no more, nor as much, for this new form of transportation than it has already previously done 
for the carriers of . . . other character.”171 Although New made a passing reference to railroads 
shortly after this statement, he drew the sharpest comparison between aviation and shipping. New 
focused on the government’s role in creating and maintaining shipping channels, and saw a natural 
correlation with lighted beacons for airways. His oversight of the federal airmail network left him 
with an appreciation of the benefits of such a system, and he stridently supported governmental 
appropriations for that purpose.  
While this testimony represents only a snapshot of New’s views on aviation, it is nonetheless 
instructive to note the striking similarities with Hoover and MacCracken. As Postmaster General, 
New, more than any other federal official, understood the challenges of operating an air commerce 
network. His focus on Federal oversight, airways construction, the need for a federal bureau, the 
connections between civil and military aviation, and opposition to a direct subsidy demonstrate a 
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remarkable coherence with the positions both Hoover and MacCracken espoused. Specifically, it 
suggests that Hoover’s continued focus on developing a coherent aviation policy was well founded. 
Ultimately, New left the Post Office before much of his vision was realized, but his support for 
aviation’s growth did much to foster support for later changes. Specifically, his work laid the 
foundation that Walter Brown would use to revolutionize the air commerce industry.  
Policy statements from William MacCracken and Harry S. New highlight the central role 
Hoover played in the development of commercial aviation. The Commerce Secretary put forward a 
coherent set of policies that came to serve as the foundation of the emerging commercial network. In 
many ways the Kelly Bill and Air Commerce Act profoundly reflected Hoover’s insight and 
leadership. In spite of those gains, Hoover did not lose interest in aeronautics in later years. After 
winning the Presidency in 1928 Hoover sustained his focus on commercial aviation, furthering his 
relationships with legislators and private individuals associated with aviation. He also appears to 
have maintained close contact with the Commerce Department. In August of 1930 the President 
requested a “report on the progress of the commercial aviation industry in the United States during 
the last eighteen months” from Assistant Secretary of Commerce Clarence Young. That report 
offered Hoover a comprehensive overview of U.S. commercial activities, including airmail routes 
and subsidies, infrastructure, technological development, profitability, and suggestions for future 
growth.172 A year later Hoover displayed an even closer connection to the Commerce Department. 
After reviewing a Departmental report on American aeronautics, the President suggested several 
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changes to the document, instructing his Secretary to forward his suggestions to Young.173 
Throughout his Presidency Hoover maintained close contact with the Department and displayed a 
continuing focus on American aeronautical development. 
 During his term in office Hoover also maintained an active correspondence with the 
Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce. Hoover had a personal relationship with the Chamber’s 
General Manager, Luther K. Bell, and granted Bell and members of the Chamber’s Board of 
Directors several audiences at the White House. In March of 1931 a delegation from the Chamber 
called on the President to “discuss matters pertaining to commercial and military aviation in the 
United States.” The delegation presented Hoover with a report on the progress of American 
commercial aviation that offered an overview of the industry’s current state and hopes for the 
future.174 In July of that year Hoover acquiesced to a request from the Chamber to supply a note of 
congratulations to Wiley Post and his navigator, Harold Gatty, after their around-the-world flight, 
and later received the two flyers at the White House.175  
Hoover’s interest also extended to ongoing research efforts. As Commerce Secretary, Hoover 
established an active relationship with the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, a body he 
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saw as key to the continued technological development of American aircraft.176 As President, 
Hoover maintained his relationship with the Advisory Committee. In 1929 Hoover wrote to the 
Commerce Secretary regarding three vacancies on the NACA Board. Hoover hoped that William 
MacCracken, Director of the Aeronautics Branch, might “prepare some suggestions for you to lay 
before me” regarding possible candidates.177 
This continued interest is especially significant considering the burdens Hoover faced while in 
office. The fact that he maintained a focus on the development of this nascent industry during the 
Great Depression speaks to his firm commitment to making aviation a viable commercial 
proposition. In a 1971 oral history interview, Clarence Young remarked that Hoover “never raised a 
question” about his commitment to aeronautical development even in the worst of economic 
times.178 The President’s continued support speaks volumes about how central aviation was to his 
vision for America’s future, and what stock he placed in its commercial success. Unfortunately, 
much of this history has been overshadowed by the consequences of another decision made by the 
President—the appointment of Walter F. Brown as Postmaster General.179  
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In many ways the ultimate success of American commercial aviation stands as one of the most 
lasting legacy of Hoover’s time in public service. During his tenure as Commerce Secretary and as 
President, Hoover consistently emphasized the need for a coherent, forward-thinking national 
aviation policy. In the early 1920s he took the lead in creating that policy, sharply distinguishing the 
U.S. context from that of Europe, emphasizing the need for the federal government to take 
responsibility for constructing infrastructure, focusing on the necessity of legislation to create a 
federal regulatory body, and stressing the need for commercial aviation to succeed without resort to 
direct subsidy. These pillars represent a natural outgrowth of his associationalist economic ideology, 
and aviation offers perhaps the best example of this philosophy working in practice. Between 1921 
and 1932 American commercial aviation matured from a sideshow dominated by a government run 
airmail network to a maturing commercial industry defined by national airlines carrying mail and 
passengers to major population centers across the country. While aviation’s place in American 
society was not assured when Hoover left office, his actions created the conditions for the possibility 
of aviation’s success. 
Ultimately, Hoover’s vision largely came to fruition, though, ironically, after his departure 
from public life. The broad outlines of his policies were codified in the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act, 
which established a paradigm of federal oversight and regulation that lasted until the late 1970s. That 
legislation represented the culmination of almost two decades’ work to make commercial air 
transport a viable economic proposition—work done for the most part by Hoover and his allies. 
Hoover did not play a direct role in that Act’s passage, but his fingerprints were readily visible in its 
pages. The Act created a new federal agency devoted to aviation—the Civil Aeronautics Authority—
and centralized its regulatory and oversight functions over the industry. In addition, the Act provided 





continued growth.180 The CAA served as a confirmation of the federal government’s willingness to 
place its power firmly behind commercial aviation, largely realizing Hoover’s hopes of seventeen 
years before. 
Aviation did not, however, experience smooth sailing after Hoover’s departure from office. In 
fact, the period between 1932 and 1939 represents one of the most contentious in aviation’s history. 
Federal aviation policy came in for significant criticism from both Congress and the American 
people, suffered under the scrutiny of a Senate investigation, and witnessed the cancellation of all 
national airmail contracts. These events appeared to threaten the foundations of Federal aviation 
policy, and yet that policy came through the turmoil essentially unchanged. Two men stand at the 
very center of that controversy: Postmaster General Walter F. Brown and Alabama Senator Hugo 
Black.
                                            






Chapter 3—Brown and Black: Shades of Gray 
 
 Throughout the 1920s American policymakers, led by Herbert Hoover, sought to define the 
American government’s proper relationship to the emerging air transport industry. Hoover, William 
MacCracken, Harry New and others saw aviation as key to America’s future, and sought to aid its 
development through indirect subsidization, infrastructure development, regulation, and promotion. 
These initiatives largely met with success, and by the end of Hoover’s term as president Americans 
could travel the most extensive air transportation network in the world. That success rested upon the 
actions of two government agencies: the Commerce Department and the Post Office Department. 
Commerce took the lead in building aviation infrastructure, establishing a regulatory framework, and 
promoting aviation to the American public. The Post Office’s payment of subsidies to airmail 
carriers and promotion of a national airmail network enabled the growth of nascent airlines and 
provided vital earnings in an era when carrying passengers alone was simply not profitable. 
 The unanimity amongst aeronautical proponents during this period, however, obscured 
growing disagreements about exactly what role the federal government should take with regard to 
commercial aviation. In particular, Democratic lawmakers increasingly criticized the Post Office’s 
payment of subsidies to airmail carriers. Opposition to Post Office policy also focused on the actions 
of Hoover’s Postmaster General, Walter Folger Brown. Following his appointment as Postmaster in 
1929, Brown worked to rationalize the American air transport industry and promote organized 
growth through the granting of airmail contracts. Brown was the driving force behind the passage of 





of the industry. 181 Brown’s actions served to strengthen large airlines at the expense of small 
operators and also promoted the development of large aviation holding companies. By 1932 these 
companies dominated the industry and brought airlines, airframe constructors, and engine 
manufacturers together under large corporate umbrellas.   
 After Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932, airlines excluded from Brown’s network joined 
forces with Democratic lawmakers to call for investigations into supposed fraud and collusion in the 
aviation industry. These calls ultimately resulted in the creation of the Senate Special Committee to 
Investigate Ocean Mail and Air Mail in September of 1933. This Committee, chaired by Alabama 
Senator Hugo Black, found extensive fraud and corruption in both the Post Office and the air 
transport industry. As a result of the investigation, in February of 1934 Roosevelt’s Postmaster 
General, James Farley, cancelled all existing national airmail contracts and directed the Army Air 
Corps to fly the mail. A lack of adequate equipment and preparation combined with horrible weather 
to make that effort a disaster. Between February and June Air Corps pilots experienced 66 accidents, 
resulting in the deaths of 12 pilots. This debacle prompted Roosevelt and Farley to reinstate 
commercial carriers. They did so under a new airmail legislation, authored in large part by Senator 
Hugo Black.182 
 Tellingly, despite the uproar and Black’s key role in crafting new legislation, that reinstatement 
took place under policies broadly similar to those in place before the beginning of the 1933 Senate 
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investigation. The new airmail act broke up aviation holding companies, stripped the Postmaster 
General of the ability to fix airmail rates—that power moved to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC)—and forbade airlines that had held contracts under the old system to bid for 
routes.183 Those stipulations, however, did little to change the federal government’s relationship to 
commercial aviation. The Commerce Department retained responsibility for safety, licensing, 
regulation, and infrastructure development. The Post Office continued to expand the national airmail 
network. Both Commerce and the Post Office retained a commitment to promoting aviation to the 
American public. Most significantly, the federal government continued to support commercial 
growth by granting airmail subsidies, now administered through the ICC rather than the Post Office.  
 The Black Committee Hearings defined the most contentious period for American interwar 
aviation. Hoover’s defeat in the 1932 Presidential election, the Senate investigation, and new 
legislation all threatened to alter the foundations of Hoover’s associationalist aviation policy. 
Ultimately, however, they did not.  Instead, under the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt, James 
Farley, and Hugo Black, this tumultuous period to a great extent served to validate Hoover’s earlier 
vision. If anything, the uproar suggested the need for a more focused and coherent federal policy—
circumstances codified four years later by the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.  
 Black’s investigation, then, provides the clearest lens through which to examine the content 
and context of federal policy debates concerning aviation. The Senate investigation focused attention 
on federal aviation policy for both legislators and the American public, prompting Democrats and 
Republicans, supporters and opponents, to marshal their most powerful arguments concerning 
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American commercial aviation. During the proceedings Black, Farley, and Roosevelt publicly stated 
their views on aviation policy and sought to gain support with both legislators and the public. The 
media offered exhaustive coverage of the Committee’s investigation and the events associated with 
the cancellation of commercial contracts. The Committee itself subpoenaed financial records, 
correspondence, and memoranda from the Post Office and airlines. The investigation also called for 
major players—including Walter Brown, William MacCracken, and leading airline executives—to 
testify before the Committee. As such, an investigation of these events serves to clarify the most 
significant policy debates concerning aviation. It also offers the opportunity to examine the specific 
arguments marshaled by Brown, Black, and their respective supporters.  
 Historians have traditionally interpreted Democratic actions as a repudiation of Hoover’s 
aviation policy.184 They point to Black’s strident denunciation of Brown’s policies and his supposed 
antipathy toward Republican promotion of close connections between government and business. A 
closer examination of these events, however, reveals a different story. Although Black’s rhetoric was 
undoubtedly anti-monopoly and anti-big business, he favored governmental action to support 
aviation. In fact, Black appears to have shared much of Hoover’s vision regarding aviation’s central 
role in America’s future and government’s responsibility to promote aeronautical growth. These 
facts necessitate a reevaluation of the lessons to be drawn from the Senate Special Committee’s 
actions. Ultimately, the Black Committee served to confirm the value of Hoover’s vision and the 
effectiveness of federal policies in the years before 1932.  
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 The origins of the uproar culminating in the 1933 Black Committee investigation began four 
years earlier with Herbert Hoover’s appointment of Walter Folger Brown as Postmaster General. 
Brown took up the reigns laid down by Harry S. New, a strong supporter of Hoover’s aviation policy 
who had consistently used the Post Office’s ability to grant airmail contracts—and thus informal 
subsidies—to aid the growth of commercial carriers and expand the American air transport network. 
Brown built upon New’s actions, in doing so becoming perhaps the most controversial figure in 
interwar aviation policy. 
 Brown hailed from Ohio, and had strong connections to the progressive politics that dominated 
the state as he came of age. He campaigned on behalf of William McKinley during the latter’s 
gubernatorial campaign, helped secure the election of Progressive reformer Samuel Jones as Mayor 
of Toledo, and broke with the Republican Party to become chairman of the newly created Bull 
Moose Party in 1912. After Theodore Roosevelt’s defeat, Brown worked hard to rejoin the 
Republican ranks, and by 1920 found himself in the influential position of helping to secure Warren 
Harding’s nomination to the Republican ticket. Brown served as chairman of a special commission 
charged with reorganizing the executive branch during Harding’s tenure in office, though Harding’s 
early death stymied any hopes for real change. Significantly, during his time in Washington Brown 
met and formed a friendship with Herbert Hoover, then serving as Secretary of Commerce. This 
relationship led Hoover to bring Brown into Commerce as Assistant Secretary in 1927. Brown 
served as Hoover’s campaign manager in the 1928 presidential election, and found himself rewarded 
with the position of Postmaster General in 1929. 185 
                                            





Brown’s political education had prepared him well for his new position. His activity in the 
Ohio Republican Party had made him into a “political animal of great influence,”186 according to 
Robert van der Linden, and Brown quickly demonstrated his ability to put those skills to work in 
Washington. His time in the Commerce Department had acquainted Brown with Hoover’s 
associationalist ideology and the Secretary’s strong focus on promoting aviation. After assuming the 
office of Postmaster General, Brown immediately began to work to rationalize the air transport 
industry while maintaining a focus on promotion. In addition, Brown found himself saddled with a 
massive budget shortfall, a situation that would help guide his policy during the next four years.  
Violating expectations from many in the air transport industry who believed Brown would 
merely serve as a custodian of existing policy, Brown almost immediately began working to 
rationalize the airmail system. He began by pursuing two separate, but related strategies that would 
remain consistent throughout his tenure in office. First, Brown sought to reorganize the Post Office 
rate structure and gradually reduce the subsidy payments to airmail carriers. At the same time, he 
sought to rationalize the airmail map and promote the growth of stable carriers with the potential for 
carrying passengers.  He was, however, limited by the prevailing airmail legislation—the Airmail 
Act of 1926—that allowed for airmail payments on a poundage basis and mandated individual 
contracts at separate rates for all airmail carriers. This prevailing situation had created a haphazard 
system whereby some carriers received large subsidies while others experienced significant losses 
even with federal payments.187  
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Shortly after assuming his new office, Brown made public his desire to revise the rate system. 
In a May 27, 1929 Post Office press release, the Postmaster General argued, “the cost to the 
government represented by payments to contractors for the transportation of air mail must be 
reduced and carrying rates readjusted to a sound basis.” Brown based his judgment on the “disparity 
between the amount earned and expended by the government for air mail and also the wide 
differences in pay to different contractors.” The solution, he suggested, was a policy whereby 
“operators would be paid on a mileage or distance basis” rather than the prevailing system based on 
weight.188 
Simultaneously, Brown initiated a series of meetings between Post Office officials and airline 
executives designed to facilitate the creation of a rational airmail payment and route system that 
would support the continued development of American commercial aviation. The first, on May 27, 
resulted in an agreement that the Post Office should prepare a questionnaire to be sent out to current 
and possible future contractors. This questionnaire aimed to secure “information on operating costs 
and other factors entering into the business on which to base revisions of pay rates to the 
operators.”189 In September Brown again called airline executives to Washington, D.C. to discuss the 
results of the surveys and to negotiate the “extensions of . . . contracts for a period of ten years from 
the date when they began to operate.”190 This latter aspect of the conference focused on establishing 
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greater stability in the airmail system and rewarding so-called “pioneer operators” with guaranteed 
contacts that would encourage further development.191  
Brown’s actions formed a natural outgrowth of his economic and political philosophy. His 
background in Progressive politics and close connections to Herbert Hoover helped Brown to 
embrace a broadly associationalist view with regard to the relationship between government and 
business. In fact, almost immediately upon taking office, Brown and Hoover moved to establish 
greater transparency between governmental agencies and commercial interests with the goal of 
promoting economic growth. In May of 1929 the Post Office proudly announced the creation of the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Airways. The Committee—created at Hoover’s behest—was tasked 
to “hear and determine questions relating to the extension of the civil airways system of the United 
States.” Its membership included prominent members of the Post Office and Commerce 
Departments, including W. Irving Glover, Second Assistant Postmaster General, E. B. Wadsworth, 
Superintendent of the Air Mail Service, William MacCracken, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for 
Aviation, and F. C. Hingsburg, Chief of the Commerce Department Airways Division.192 
The creation of such an organization, Brown argued, represented a crucial step in rationalizing 
American air commerce. “The fast growing business of air transport,” he argued, “with its air mail 
                                            
191 These “pioneer operators” represented early air transport companies that had 
inaugurated commercial service—mostly by acquiring government airmail contracts—
and had gradually grown into stable operators.  These airlines diligently worked to create 
commercial service at a time when the government was just beginning to regulate and 
promote the industry. Their operations thus undertook myriad trial and error efforts to 
find suitable aircraft, train pilots, create maintenance schedules, and pioneer routes. 
Doing so incurred significant costs, and opened the door for later air transport operators 
to begin service much more quickly, easily and cheaply. Thus, Brown desired to reward 
these pioneers for their efforts, and make sure they had continuing access to airmail 
subsidies to protect these companies’ investments and support further growth. For more 
information see: Davies, A History of the World’s Airlines, 123-125. 





nucleus, and the consequent vast numbers of applications for extensions of existing routes and the 
establishment of new ones, have made the organization of a committee to handle the relevant 
problems a necessary expedient.” Brown related that the Committee would hold public meetings 
“from time to time” in order to “entertain suggestions from representatives of commercial 
organizations . . . for the establishment, extension, or modification of the airways system.”193 
Brown’s articulation of the need for the Interdepartmental Committee epitomizes his views 
regarding the government’s responsibility to commercial aviation. He, like Hoover, pushed for 
greater coordination amongst government agencies to maximize aid while minimizing cost. At the 
same time, Brown saw a need for greater communication between governmental agencies and 
commercial interests. In particular, Brown believed that transparency between the Post Office and 
airlines would promote rational reorganization of rates and routes, serving the best interests of the 
government and airlines. Through the Interdepartmental Committee, the series of meetings between 
airline executives and Post Office officials, and, ultimately though new legislation, Brown 
consistently sought to use his power to promote aviation’s growth along rational and fiscally 
responsible lines.  
Brown’s philosophy certainly reflected Hoover’s associationalist influence, but at the same 
time demonstrated the Postmaster General’s firm grasp on the economic and political factors facing 
commercial aviation in 1929. In the years following the passage of the 1925 Kelly Bill, the ever-
expanding U.S. airmail route structure supported the development of numerous commercial air 
carriers. These carriers relied almost wholly on Post Office subsidies for survival, and competition 
for new routes and route extensions was fierce. By the end of the decade, this Darwinian process had 
resulted in the creation of three large aviation holding companies—The Aviation Corporation (of 
                                            





Delaware), North American Aviation, and United Aircraft and Transportation Corporation. These 
three corporations each controlled airlines, airframe manufacturers, engine builders, and financial 
interests in an effort to secure a maximum of control over the expanding air commerce network. By 
1929 these three holding corporations controlled more than ninety percent of airmail revenues.194   
At the same time, however, a growing set of concerns cast doubt on the financial stability of 
the air commerce industry on the eve of the Great Depression. First, airlines, like other publicly 
traded industries, had become overvalued in the years preceding the stock market crash. This was 
particularly worrisome for Brown because airlines were almost totally dependant on federal airmail 
contracts for solvency. In addition, aviation increasingly suffered from overproduction. During the 
1920s, the Post Office offered numerous new airmail routes up for private bids, and airlines and 
aircraft manufacturing firms had grown quickly to keep up with demand. As the creation of new 
routes slowed and aircraft became more advanced and expensive, however, supplies—of both 
aircraft and airlines themselves—quickly grew beyond demand. Finally, the rapid expansion of 
airmail routes promoted a haphazard system of growth for airlines, resulting in a number of 
inefficient and unnecessary routes.  
This last point bears further examination, as it highlights the specific conditions to which 
Brown attempted to respond. Following the passage of the Kelly Bill, the Post Office offered airmail 
routes to private contractors on the basis of a competitive bidding process—that is, the government 
would award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder. From 1925 until 1930, this policy guided 
the growth of the airmail network, and thus nascent airlines’ development. Such a system, however, 
did not fully account for the variables and complexities inherent in an emerging industry like 
                                            






aviation. First, as discussed previously, the Post Office made payments based on a poundage system 
that could result in large inequalities in payment on different routes. Second, flying was still a 
dangerous business, requiring skill and experience in order to meet a set schedule safely and 
reliably.195 Third, aeronautical technology was advancing rapidly during this period, with new 
innovations like improved instruments, radio communication, de-icing equipment and newer and 
faster aircraft constantly raising the bar for performance and safety. Finally, while virtually all 
airlines depended on airmail contracts to remain solvent, passengers began to form an increasingly 
important element of air commerce. Flying passengers, however, required different equipment and 
different skills than did flying mail alone. Most significantly, airlines required larger and more 
comfortable aircraft, a much more expensive proposition than the small, cheap and relatively crude 
planes used to carry mail.  
These factors resulted in a rapidly growing air commerce industry lacking focus and direction. 
For the most part, an airmail contract remained a necessary precondition for commercial success, but 
securing such a contract at the lowest profitable rate often meant eschewing larger, safer aircraft and 
the possibility of passenger service. Larger so-called “pioneer operators” led the way in promoting 
new safety equipment, pilot training and the utilization of larger passenger aircraft, but these same 
carriers suffered from increased overhead as a result, factors that threatened their ability to remain 
                                            
195 Brown worried that the system created by the Kelly Bill would stunt aeronautical 
growth by giving unfair advantage to small and/or unprepared operators not willing or 
able to invest in the training and safety equipment needed to promote safe operations and 
hopefully extend their transport system to carrying passengers. In the words of R.E.G. 
Davies, “any private company with a couple of worn-out aircraft could have put in a low 
tender, aiming only at making a few quick dollars at the expense of the Post Office and 
then pulling out.” (Davies, A History of the World’s Airlines, 124.) Brown believed that 
these types of operations had the potential to cause great harm to American aviation, 
undermining public safety in flying and shutting out the pioneer operators who had 





competitive for airmail contracts. Overproduction of planes and engines and the overvaluation of 
airline stock only further complicated this picture, and by the eve of the Great Depression aviation—
though it had experienced tremendous success since 1925—appeared vulnerable on several fronts.196  
At the same time, aviation appeared poised to reach a new level of maturity and become a 
central part of the American transportation system for both cargo and passengers. As early as May of 
1929 Brown asserted that “the pioneering in the air mail is nearly over so far as experimentation is 
concerned.”197 This statement reflected Brown’s belief that aviation was on the verge of achieving 
commercial stability. In his mind, the immediate future held great promise for aviation, but also 
significant risk. For him, coherent federal action had the potential to create a secure commercial 
future for aviation, but existing policies were not adequate for that task. As such, Brown consistently 
worked to create a policy framework that would promote the rational growth of aviation, as well as 
lay the foundation for its financial stability.  
Central to that framework was a desire to steadily decrease the amount of subsidy paid out to 
airmail carriers. Brown argued that “there is not, in air mail, the fundamental reason for subsidy that 
exists in shipping where foreign competition in ship construction and cost of operation are essential 
factors.” That context, however, did not remove the necessity of government assistance. Brown 
emphasized, “we [in the government] want you [the airlines] to prosper and the service to grow. I 
want to give air mail every encouragement consistent with sound business.” As a result, the 
Postmaster was not “disposed to drive a hard bargain” with those “who have put their money and 
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skill into the flying game.” Throughout his term as Postmaster, Brown consistently worked to lower 
airmail subsidies, but did so in close cooperation with airlines in order to maintain their financial 
health. 198 
In support of that effort, Brown highlighted the government’s ongoing responsibility to 
promote the development of aviation infrastructure. In a January 1930 speech to the Cleveland 
Chamber of Commerce, he argued that the government should “by every reasonable and practical 
method . . . encourage the development of better airplanes, landing fields, weather reporting services 
and aids to aerial navigation.” Reminding the audience that the “United States Government has 
performed a consistently leading part” in the aviation’s development, Brown related how “in 
pioneering operations with the air mail the Post Office Department was actuated by a major purpose 
to encourage the art of flying and the aviation industry.”199  
For Brown, the goal of that federal support was twofold. On the one hand he believed that 
aeronautical development would benefit the country through increased commercial efficiency, 
technological innovation, and the promotion of safer and more effective communication. On the 
other he, like others in the Hoover administration, tied the development of commercial aviation to 
national defense. Brown believed that the creation of a stable air transport industry would result in 
Americans having “no anxiety about being able to defend ourselves in the air if the occasion should 
ever arise.” 200 
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Brown also emphasized the need to rationalize the airmail network. In his mind this meant 
changes to both the rate structure and airmail map. Most pressingly, Brown desired to abolish the 
poundage-based system that perpetuated an unequal payment scale. Brown hoped that a move to a 
space-based system would alleviate these inequalities and promote even more growth while 
simultaneously allowing the Post Office to support the development of passenger service. He 
suggested that a move to such a system  “would enable the Post Office Department to give 
immediate assistance to air passenger carriers on such routes as were deemed essential, by paying for 
carrying the mails a substantial sum.” Further clarifying his ideas, Brown continued: “various 
factors, of course, should determine the amount of weigh-space to be taken . . . the character and 
frequency of the service, the volume of mail flowing, and the financial necessities of the carrier.”201 
In short, Brown wanted to transition to a space-based system in order to use Post Office contracts to 
guide the growth of airlines in specific ways. 
Brown hoped to use several strategies in pursuance of that goal. First, he worked to support the 
continued growth of so-called “pioneer operators.” Brown argued that “with the passenger lines, as 
with the exclusively mail lines, preference . . . should be given to pioneers in the air transport 
industry of good character and financial responsibility.”202 The final part of this statement is of 
particular interest, for it clearly demonstrates Brown’s associationalist thinking. In his opinion, the 
competitive bidding process had the potential to undermine the position of established carriers that 
had worked long and hard to establish reliable service. These pioneers, by and large, had expended 
significant sums in order to train their pilots, purchase the most current instruments and safety 
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equipment, and secure new airframes and engines. Trial and error during early years of operation 
had resulted in airlines learning the hard way what skills and equipment were necessary to establish 
and maintain reliable service. These attributes gave pioneer carriers great potential for further 
growth—particularly into passenger service—but they also raised overhead. Brown hoped to avoid 
new, untested carriers with little experience and limited potential for stable growth underbidding 
these pioneers and stunting the overall growth of the American air transport system. 
To that end, Brown hoped to gain the power to extend original four-year airmail route 
certificates an additional six years. Asserting, “the Postmaster should . . . be authorized by 
negotiation with present air mail contractors to extend air mail contracts to a maximum period of ten 
years from the date of the original award,” Brown hoped to be able to reward successful and stable 
pioneer operators. This policy would allow the Postmaster to guide the growth of the industry—at 
least in the short term—by granting contract extensions without competitive bidding to those 
operators he felt had demonstrated the ability to promote American air commerce.203 This policy 
would significantly reduce open competition, competition Brown believed had the potential to create 
chaos and threaten the future of American air commerce.  
Ultimately, Brown’s efforts resulted in the passage of H.R. 9500, the third amendment to the 
1925 Airmail Act—the so-called Watres Bill. This legislation, largely authored by Brown himself, 
changed the Post Office’s payment system to one based on space available, rather than poundage, 
authorized the Postmaster General to exchange airlines’ original four-year contracts for ten-year 
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route certificates, and enabled the Postmaster General to approve route extensions and 
consolidations in the public interest. Brown initially hoped that the law would allow him to grant 
new contacts without any competitive bidding, but Congressional opposition forced a compromise. 
As a result, the bill restricted bidding on airmail contracts to operators with six months of operating 
experience on routes of four hundred miles or longer, and allowed Brown the freedom to extend and 
consolidate routes at his discretion. The result was a system that embraced many of Brown’s ideas—
granting preference to established operators, giving the Postmaster the freedom to rationalize airmail 
routes through extensions and consolidations, promoting the establishment of passenger service, and 
promoting technological development—while at the same time leaving the door open to new, 
independent operators. 204  
Brown specifically crafted the bill to promote passenger service through the use of larger, more 
technologically advanced aircraft. Airmail carriers would receive bonuses—added as an increase in 
payment-per-mile to the base rate—for carrying radios, flying in the fog or after dark, and utilizing 
multi-engine aircraft. More significantly, Brown explicitly promoted passenger service by offering a 
sliding scale of increased payment for passenger-carrying aircraft. At minimum, planes carrying 
between two and five passengers received an additional 1.5 cents per mile, while, at the other end of 
the spectrum, planes carrying more then 30 passengers received an additional 7.5 cents.205 These 
provisions created a system that embraced Brown’s core philosophy—an effort to create a rational, 
                                            
204 The bill authorized the Post Office to pay a fixed amount per cubic foot of available 
space not to exceed $1.25 per mile; the bill also authorized the Postmaster General to 
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stable air transport network that promoted the public good through the carriage of cargo and 
passengers.  
Almost immediately after President Hoover signed the Watres Act into law, Brown moved to 
take advantage of his new powers. True to his associationalist foundations, he began by calling 
representatives from all of the major airlines to Washington, D.C. in order for them “to acquaint 
themselves with the provisions of the Watres Bill.”206 In fact, this meeting would be the first of the 
so-called “spoils conferences” wherein Brown facilitated the assignment of airmail routes to major 
airlines without competitive bidding. Independent air transport operators—those without federal 
airmail contracts—and Congressional Democrats would later use these conferences as evidence that 
Brown colluded with airlines and engaged in fraud and corruption at taxpayers’ expense. In fact, the 
uproar over these conferences formed the immediate rationale for the creation of Senator Black’s 
Special Committee.  
It is instructive, however, to examine Brown’s rationale for calling these meetings, and the 
response from airlines in attendance. In a May 15, 1930 Post Office memorandum, Irving Glover 
explained the motivations for these meetings. Glover began by expressing Brown’s desire to meet 
with “substantial representatives” from major airlines. Brown, Glover related, hoped to “have a talk 
with them along the lines of just the best way for them to approach the question of giving aid to 
passenger lines.” More specifically, Glover wrote that Brown desired the Post Office and the airlines 
“to come to some understanding so that it will not all be thrown into the pot and the passenger line 
operators left entirely outside due to the fact that the air mail operators would have the inside and 
                                            





have the territory covered.”207 In other words, Brown was worried that competitive bidding would 
allow new and untried operators with low overhead and no potential for carrying passengers to 
undercut the established airlines and take control of the majority of federal airmail subsidies. This 
would have the effect of stunting the growth of passenger service, a situation Brown hoped to avoid 
at all costs.  
Brown’s solution was to facilitate a meeting whereby the major passenger-carrying airlines 
would voluntarily split up the airmail map in order to evenly distribute subsidies. This was the 
ultimate purpose of the May 19 meeting, a meeting Brown hoped would establish a firm foundation 
for the future of American air transport. The Postmaster invited only well-established carriers with a 
history of passenger service, a fact that resulted in a number of small, independent operators being 
unable to even bid on airmail routes. 208 This situation would later give rise to charges of collusion, 
as Brown’s actions—at least in spirit—violated the terms of the Watres Bill.209  
Brown, however, believed that his actions represented the best and most logical way to assure 
the future of American passenger airlines. In a memorandum summarizing the May 19 meeting, Earl 
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Wadsworth related that the meeting was organized “for the purpose of discussing the provisions of 
the Watres’ [sic] Bill insofar as it offered aid to the passenger lines.” According to him, it was 
common knowledge that “none of the so-called strictly passenger lines are breaking even and it is 
apparent that they will need some assistance if they are going to continue.” To address that 
circumstance, “the PMG expressed the desire to know whether it is going to be possible for the so-
called pioneer operators to agree among themselves as to the territory in which they shall have 
paramount interest.”210 Here Brown clearly relates his plan for securing the health of passenger 
carriers, a plan centered on voluntary cooperation between the government and commercial interests, 
and between the commercial interests themselves. 
Significantly, the airline executives at the meeting expressed approval of Brown’s plan. Jack 
Maddux, representing Maddux Airlines and Transcontinental Air Transport, argued that if passenger 
carriers did “not receive an air mail contract then they could not live.” He also related his hope that 
“the [Watres] Bill would take care of this.” At the same time Maddux and others echoed Brown’s 
desire that the assembled carriers could come to some agreement without recourse to competitive 
bidding. Harris Hanshue, representative from Western Air Express, most clearly articulated the 
group’s thinking on the subject, stating “we are willing to do anything within reason to work out the 
plan rather than go into competitive bidding.” After asking if there were any objections to the plan—
there were none—Brown allowed the assembled airline executives to use the room “for the purpose 
of organizing themselves into such groups as may be decided upon and to report back to the PMG 
when they had reached a conclusion in regard to the suggested plan.”211 
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Brown hoped that this and subsequent meetings would result in the major airlines splitting up 
air transport routes in a logical manner. Specifically, the Postmaster General desired that a single 
carrier operate each of the three main transcontinental “trunk” lines stretching from the East to the 
West Coast.212 In his mind, this organization would support the continued development of a number 
of mature airlines, and would encourage technological advances and passenger service by creating 
long-distance routes between major passenger destinations—New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta, 
Dallas, Chicago, Denver, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, for example.  
Brown was not reticent in making his views known to the assembled representatives. 
According to C. E. Woolman of Delta Airlines,213 “the Postmaster General had definitely stated that 
he intended that each of the three transcontinental routes would be operated by a single company.” 
Further, Brown visited these meetings “from time to time,” and “expressed some irritation over the 
fact that the conflicting interests in dividing the air mail routes under consideration could not settle 
their differences.”214 Ultimately, these meetings failed to produce unanimity and Brown stepped in 
to act as a referee, splitting up airmail routes according to what he believed to be the best interests of 
both the carriers themselves and the country. According to Wadsworth, the absence of agreement 
forced the assembled airline representatives to “submit these controversies to [Brown] as arbiter, and 
agree to be bound by [his] decision.”215 
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Unfortunately for Brown, his actions attracted unwanted scrutiny. The U.S. Comptroller 
General, J.R. McCarl, “ruled against and declared unlawful the granting of these routes by 
extensions as presented to him by the Postmaster General,” forcing Brown to pursue another tack to 
achieve his goals.216 According to Woolman, Brown responded to McCarl’s actions by announcing 
“that the Central and Southern Transcontinental routes would be let by bids but announced 
specifications which virtually eliminated from bidding any other than” Brown’s chosen airlines.217 
Specifically, Brown mandated that prospective bidders post a $250,000 bond to ensure financial 
stability and establish good faith. Bond posting was not a new requirement, but the amount was 
many times greater than that required for previous contracts—generally under $15,000. Further, at 
the urging of William MacCracken, Brown imposed a night-flying requirement, which the former 
believed would separate the experienced operators from new upstarts.218 Neither of these new 
requirements were unreasonable in and of themselves, but they had the effect of radically limiting 
the number of airlines “qualified” to bid on airmail contracts. As a result, Brown was largely able to 
achieve his goals, though in a more convoluted manner than he had initially planned.  
These maneuverings ultimately allowed Brown to remake the airmail map in his own image. 
The new contract requirements disallowed bids from the vast majority of new and unproven airlines, 
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and Brown used his powers to extend and consolidate existing lines to fit his logical plan. By the 
summer of 1930 Brown had created a map defined by major airlines flying three foundational 
transcontinental lines, with “feeder” lines serving the majority of population centers in the U.S. 
Further, he worked to eliminate small routes with minimal mail volume and little potential for 
growth into passenger service. Brown’s efforts also resulted in a steady reduction in Post Office mail 
subsidies. Brown lowered airmail rates several times during his tenure in response to improved 
efficiencies and the continuing growth of passenger-carrying operations. 
These actions attracted increasingly scathing criticism from airlines cut out of Brown’s vision 
and Congressional Democrats chafing under twelve years of leadership from Republican presidents. 
This antipathy eventually resulted in Brown’s removal from office and widespread attempts to 
discredit both his person and his actions. The Postmaster General, however, maintained that he had 
always acted in the best interest of the country. In 1934, Hugo Black called Brown before his Special 
Committee to answer for his supposed crimes—an opportunity that Brown utilized to defend his 
policies.  
These statements offer perhaps the clearest articulation of Brown’s views on aviation’s 
significance to the United States, and the government’s proper role in promoting its growth. Brown 
began his testimony by explaining the rationale that guided his crafting of the Watres Bill. “The 
major purpose of the legislation,” he stated, “was not to transport the mails at the lowest possible 
cost to the government, but to foster the . . . aeronautical industr[y].” The bill itself, he explained, 
“states its purpose to be ‘Further to encourage commercial aviation.’”219  
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Brown next turned to a summary of his views on federal aviation policy. In his opinion “the 
ultimate goal of the commercial aviation policy is to create an economically independent 
aeronautical industry.” To achieve that overarching goal, Post Office airmail subsidies were 
specifically designed to enable “air transport operators to recoup in the form of mail pay their out-of-
pocket losses while they are building up adequate passenger and express revenues from the public 
and are developing transport airplanes capable under competitive conditions of earning their costs of 
operation.”220 Brown explicitly saw aviation as a nascent industry in need of public aid. Airmail 
revenue, in this context, served as a kind of grant, enabling air transport operators to remain solvent 
while encouraging maturation that would eventually wean them off federal payments.  
Bearing that fact in mind, Brown argued that he undertook all of his actions under the Watres 
Act to serve the public interest. “Every such action,” he argued, “resulted in improved public service 
and ultimately in lower flying costs which were passed on to the Government in the form of reduced 
mail pay.”221  
The former Postmaster General also emphasized how his actions served to specifically promote 
passenger-carrying operations. He articulated how he used the new powers granted him by the 
Watres Bill to exert “pressure on the air mail carriers, who with minor exceptions had theretofore 
been confining their operations exclusively to carrying the mail, to transport passengers and express 
in order to build up revenues from the public and thus lighten the load on the Post Office 
Department.” At the same time Brown explained how his actions served to rationalize the air 
transport map by using “every proper influence to consolidate the short, detached and failing lines 
into well financed and well managed systems,” and “providing three independent intercontinental 
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operations with appropriate north and south intersecting services.” He hoped that these actions 
would in time “ attract public patronage, reduce operating costs and develop, if possible, a transport 
airplane capable . . . of earning enough to pay its own way without subsidy.”222 
Brown also tied aviation’s health to the wellbeing of the nation. In pursuing the above policies, 
Brown stated that he “took it for granted that the uninterrupted development of the air transport 
industry, necessary to keep the aeronautical art in our country abreast of that art throughout the 
world, was vital to our national security and that the air mail itself was performing an essential 
service for the business of the country.”223 This statement provides a succinct articulation of 
Brown’s larger goals. Aviation, in his view, was central to the economic health of the nation. 
Further, aviation’s continued development also affected America’s security, and maintaining a 
technological edge was vital to protecting American interests at home and abroad.  
As such, Brown saw his role as Postmaster General extending far beyond the carriage of the 
mail. He used the power granted him by the Watres Bill to take almost single-handed control of 
commercial aviation with the goal of shaping it into a fiscally solvent, technologically advanced 
industry predicated on carrying passengers over a rational network of airways. In that effort he 
worked closely with members of the industry to promote the growth of airlines he felt had the best 
potential to realize these goals. In that context, his actions emerged as a natural outgrowth of 
Hoover’s policies and represented Brown’s effort to apply associative principles to the air transport 
industry.  
Tellingly, Brown’s actions provide the clearest example of Hoover’s associative ideology 
operating in practice. Though at times Brown’s actions demonstrated a heavy-handed approach that 
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suggests the limitations of Hoover’s associationalist thought, the Postmaster General’s efforts were, 
for the most part, effective in fostering the growth of nascent airlines, promoting safe operations and 
beginning to increase the carriage of passengers. Brown’s specific decisions emerged from a logical 
analysis of the emerging industry, and reflected a genuine desire to benefit both aviation and the 
United States. In Brown’s mind, those decisions did not represent collusion or fraud. Rather, they 
offered the best way for the government to help promote the rational growth of an embryonic 
industry while avoiding counter-productive competition. 
 
After the 1932 elections, Brown’s view came under attack from several sources. First, the 
airlines excluded from his airmail network increasingly lobbied the Post Office and Congress for 
airmail routes. Second, Congressional Democrats—particularly anti-monopoly forces led by 
Alabama Senator Hugo Black—vocalized their opposition to Brown’s efforts to shape the industry 
through associationalist policies.224 In a February 1934 radio address over the Columbia 
Broadcasting Service network, Black concisely articulated his antipathy to Brown’s actions. Black 
argued that aviation had been “greedily grabbed away from the control of those interested in aviation 
progress.” As a result of its consolidation into holding corporations and the mergers Brown helped 
push through, it was now “utilized by profiteers as a means of private gain through stock jobbing, 
speculation, and monopoly.”225 Black used even stronger language in an address to Congress two 
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months later when he stated his intention to investigate “what I consider to be a network of intrigue, 
chicanery, manipulation, and fraud.”226 
Black’s rhetoric, and his creation of a Senate Special Committee to investigate supposed fraud, 
corruption, and collusion in the aviation industry represented the culmination of a rising tide of 
discontent with Brown’s policies. At the same time, however, they also reflected Black’s own views. 
Black hailed from rural Alabama, and during his Senate career remained passionately opposed to 
concentrations of power and wealth. Robert van der Linden describes Black as a man “raised in a 
Populist household,” a “Southern Progressive Democrat . . . vehemently opposed to all monopolies” 
and a man who “sought to expose their purported evil to the light of public scrutiny.”227 Black, 
therefore, was a perfect candidate to lead the charge against Walter Brown’s policies, and did so 
with notable vigor.228 
Beginning in February of 1933, Black began calling for a formal investigation of Post Office 
policies. By March, the Senate agreed to create a special committee charged to “investigate and 
make a full, complete, and detailed inquiry into all existing contracts entered into by the Postmaster 
General for the carriage of air mail.” 229  The resolution empowering the Special Committee laid out 
four specific tasks: first, to determine “all the circumstances surrounding the execution and 
continuation of, and the necessity, if any, of maintaining and altering, or canceling such contracts;” 
second, to investigate “the organization and financial conditions of associations, partnerships, or 
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corporations with which such contracts have been entered into;” third, to conclude “the extent of any 
activities . . . with which such contracts have been entered into, in any effort to obtain, through 
legislation or otherwise, cash subsidies from the United States;” and, finally, to determine “any other 
facts relating to legislation or appropriations affecting air mail” contracts.230 In short, the Senate 
tasked the newly created Special Committee with determining why the Post Office granted airmail 
contracts to the carriers it did, under what auspices those contracts were granted, the financial status 
of the companies receiving contracts, and the status of federal cash subsidies paid out to airmail 
carriers.  
In assuming this mandate, Black made a concerted effort to highlight the historical precedent 
for such an investigation.231  In an April 25, 1934 speech to Congress summarizing the Committee’s 
findings, Black explicitly tied his actions to a long history of Congressional examinations of fraud 
vis-à-vis Post Office mail contracts. Informing his peers of four relevant historical examples, Black 
suggested that in each case, “the machinations, the methods, the means used have been identical.” 
Citing “extensions, combinations to bid,” and the “granting [of] extra allowances” for mail routes 
during the Lincoln, Garfield, Theodore Roosevelt, and Hoover administrations, Black argued that in 
each case Congressional investigators were “hampered and handicapped by those who said it was a 
partisan investigation.”232 
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Specifically, Black suggested that in at least four previous instances, the Post Office had 
granted private mail contracts either without competitive bidding or under strictures that undermined 
the spirit of competition. In each case investigators had been charged with acting out of a partisan 
desire to undermine the political opposition, rather then any genuine desire to oppose corruption. 
Those charges, Black contended, had been groundless, as they were in the current case. In all four 
historical examples, Black highlighted the prompt cancellation of the fraudulent contracts, and 
suggested that a failure to do so for airmail contracts awarded by Walter Brown would be “un-
American.”233 As such, Black publicly identified himself with a long history of anti-corruption 
forces while simultaneously focusing attention on past Post Office scandals. 
Black’s Special Committee began its investigation in the summer and early fall of 1933, 
though it did not formally convene until September 28. Black chose A. G. Patterson to be his chief 
investigator. Patterson, a member of the Interstate Commerce Commission, immediately created an 
investigations staff and proceeded into the field to interview airline executives and collect financial 
statements from airlines and their holding companies. Under Black’s guidance, Patterson also 
created a questionnaire that the investigative team sent to all significant airlines operating in the U.S. 
That questionnaire presented a detailed list of inquiries, requesting information on airmail routes 
served, any extensions or consolidations thereto, financial statements, the capital structure of the 
company, lists of officers and directors, names and addresses of all stockholders, information 
regarding directors and/or stockholders owning stock in other aviation companies, specifics 
regarding the amount of mail carried, rates, any changes thereto, and any connections between 
employees, directors or stockholders and the government.234  
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With the investigation Black hoped to expose several fraudulent practices emerging from 
Hoover administration policies. First, he believed that Brown’s actions at the “spoils conferences” 
had awarded airmail contracts without competitive bidding, violating the terms of the Watres Act. In 
doing so, moreover, Brown and the major airlines had illegally shut small, independent operators out 
of the proceedings and prohibited them from bidding on routes. Second, Black hoped to show that 
the three large aviation holding corporations possessed interconnecting directorates with connections 
to governmental officials. Black believed that these holding corporations represented illegal 
monopolies that encouraged collusion to the detriment of fair competition. Finally, the Senator 
hoped to demonstrate that the Postmaster himself owned stock in one or more aviation companies 
and thus benefited illegally from his ability to grant airmail contracts.235  
These points of emphasis represented legitimate concerns with federal airmail policy, but they 
largely ignored the contextual factors shaping Hoover and Brown’s policies. Specifically, Black, 
Patterson, and the rest of the investigators remained seemingly unaware of the technological and 
organizational difficulties associated with operating a regularly scheduled airline route. For the 
Democrats, the issue was simply one of concentrated power and wealth, with little appreciation for 
the complicated context affecting aeronautical growth.  
This lack of familiarity with aviation clearly comes through in a memorandum describing one 
of Patterson’s interviews. The memo’s author, Hainer Hinshaw—at the time employed by United—
had been a leading airline executive from the mid 1920s on, was familiar with the creation and 
expansion of airlines, and had attended Brown’s conferences. Hinshaw wrote that the investigator 
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appeared uninformed about legal issues relating to airmail contracts, and that “[Patterson’s] memory 
had to be refreshed as to the wording . . . of the Watres Act” and “the numerous mass meetings held 
by the then Postmaster General.” According to Hinshaw, Brown had extended airmail routes “on the 
theory that a few able companies would perform more satisfactorily than many smaller ones,” 
resulting in reduced rates for the government. Further, the United executive stated that the pressure 
to extend many of these routes “came from the affected localities” desiring airmail service, not from 
the Postmaster General himself.236  
Patterson also appeared to lack knowledge of the qualifications airlines had to meet in order to 
bid on airmail contracts. During the same interview, Hinshaw wrote that he had to explain to 
Patterson that the “Watres Act required certain qualifications before a prospective bidder could be 
qualified to bid.” Specifically, Hinshaw highlighted “certain requirements in the matter of speed, 
equipment, and seats to be furnished.” Emphasizing that there were only five companies who could 
even qualify as bidders, the airline executive stressed that “those lines protesting against the present 
day air mail structure were not in existence at the time of the advertisements . . . their protests came 
long after the awards were made.”237 Patterson remained focused on attempting to prove that the 
Post Office had illegally granted contracts to operators that did not enter the lowest bid. Hinshaw’s 
testimony, however, indicates a distinct lack of awareness of the legal and technological issues at 
hand. Robert van der Linden argues that Black and Patterson saw little value in airmail, and “no 
correlation between the carriage of the mail and the carriage of passengers.” For him this myopia 
was “a recurring theme among the Democratic opposition.”238 As such, in many ways Black’s 
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investigation did not really address the specifics of airmail policy, but rather emerged from political 
concerns tangential to the industry in question. 
Nevertheless, Black went to great lengths to expose what he considered to be widespread fraud 
and corruption in the airline industry. Beginning in January of 1934, Black and his Committee called 
witness after witness to testify against the supposedly illegal practices instigated by Brown. Van der 
Linden describes the hearings as a “comic opera” that brought forth a “succession of witnesses . . . 
who outlined Walter F. Brown’s complicated machinations during the Hoover years.” Investigators 
and several representatives from small airlines presented key testimony about “supposedly 
clandestine meetings between Brown . . . and the representatives of the key holding companies.” 
Those “clandestine meetings,” however, were the large operators’ conferences called by Brown and 
MacCracken in May and June of 1930. Black also focused attention on the holding corporations, 
exposing legal—but perhaps ill-advised—stock machinations that netted airline executives, 
including Charles Lindbergh, large profits.239 Patterson’s investigation brought forward several 
witnesses who claimed to implicate Walter Brown in illegal stock dealings—though Brown was later 
                                            
239 See: Statement of C. E. Woolman to Post Office Investigators C. Fleming and V. V. 
Sugg, Monroe, Louisiana, February 21, 1934, Box 117, RG 46, NARA. Black’s 
investigation revealed that when Lindbergh agreed to become a “technical advisor” to 
Transcontinental Air Transport, he received generous stock options—eventually valued at 
more than $250,000. Unsurprisingly, Lindbergh’s association with TAT dramatically 
increased the stock’s value, and the airline’s President, Clement Keys, advised the pilot to 
sell the new shares quickly and turn a substantial profit. Keys, apparently, also suggested 
that Lindbergh keep the stock deal quiet. This profit-taking was technically legal, but 
certainly appeared unseemly in light of the prevailing economic downturn. See: van der 
Linden Airlines and Airmail, 270, and A. Scott Berg, Lindbergh (New York: G. P. 





exonerated. Finally, Black attempted to prove that the Post Office had granted contracts to airlines 
because of political connections between private interests and public officials. 240   
Black summarized his Committee’s findings in a speech delivered to Congress on April 25 and 
26, 1934. The Senator declared that “there has been a deliberate effort on the part of certain groups 
in America to mislead the public” about the nature of federal airmail policy. After explaining the 
legal definition of fraud, and historical precedents for investigating fraud relating to federal 
contracts, Black proceeded to articulate his interpretation of Brown’s machinations. According to the 
Senator, “beginning before the [Watres] act was passed, the plan was, the scheme was, to let the 
[airmail] contracts without competitive bidding.” Black outlined how in 1929 the Postmaster had 
authored a bill that would allow him to award contracts without bidding and taken it to Clyde Kelly 
in the hopes that Kelly would introduce the bill to Congress. According to Black, Kelly rejected the 
bill because “it made the Postmaster General practically a czar.”241 Kelly then introduced a bill of his 
own that provided for competitive bidding. After Kelly’s rejection of his legislation, Brown took his 
bill to Lawrence Watres, who eventually introduced it to Congress. Following significant debate, 
Congress agreed on a compromise version of the Watres Bill that provided for competitive 
bidding.242  
Black also implicated the airlines themselves for attempting to influence the legislative 
process. Stating that after Watres introduced the airmail bill, “the air-mail operators got busy,” Black 
proceeded to outline what he felt was a concerted effort by big businesses to help pass the Watres 
                                            
240 See: The Truth About Air Mail Contracts, Address by Senator Hugo Black to 
Congress, April 25 and 26, 1934, Box 118, RG 46, NARA 16-17, 35-38; van der Linden, 
Airlines and Airmail, 268-271.  
241 The Truth About Air Mail Contracts, Address by Senator Hugo Black to Congress, 
April 25 and 26, 1934, Box 118, RG 46, NARA, 1, 4-5.  





Bill in order to secure financial benefit. The Senator related, “the record is filled with telegrams and 
letters telling [the airlines] to bring people here and to continue their activities in connection with the 
bill.” Moreover, the airlines “were not satisfied with their regular lobbyists in Washington.” They 
brought in new, more influential lobbyists, and, according to Black, this work was “not the work of 
no $50 a month lobbyist.” Black presented evidence that airlines brought in highly paid lobbyists to 
push for the Watres Bill’s approval, believing that the legislation offered them the possibility of 
tremendous profits.243 The Senator presented evidence from the airlines themselves that suggested 
the companies saw material benefit in the proposed legislation that would definitively raise their 
airmail revenues.244  
The Senator then turned to Brown’s conferences in May and June of 1930. For Black, these 
meeting exemplified the core of Brown’s collusive agenda. He argued that the Postmaster 
purportedly called the airlines to Washington, D.C. “to convince them that he had played fair in the 
passage of the Watres Act.” Brown real aim, however, was “not to take care of them, but to get them 
in a meeting where they would disagree [about splitting up the airmail routes] and he could throw 
the whole thing out.” For Black, this was the preeminent example of Brown’s deceitfulness. The 
Postmaster “called [the airlines] by deception . . . believing, as he said, that they could not agree,” 
with the specific goal of subverting the bidding process. Black argued that from the beginning, 
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Brown’s “plan was to do away with competitive bidding and to give more to him who had 
something and take away from him who had not.”245  
For Black the whole process, from Brown’s authoring of a new airmail bill to the granting of 
contracts in the summer of 1930, represented a fraudulent, collusive effort to undermine open and 
fair competition. Following the previous statements, Black went on to present evidence from 
airlines’ records and from the Post Office documenting Brown’s specific actions at the conferences. 
He argued that the airlines colluded with one another to split up routes without resort to bidding and 
that certain airlines received preferential treatment from the Post Office in light of their political 
connections. Additionally, Black argued that the Postmaster General had overstepped his authority 
by granting long route extensions, forcing consolidations in the industry, and scheming to confer 
routes without competitive bidding. Black also turned to evidence from Comptroller General McCarl 
prohibiting Brown’s route extensions and forcing Brown to put several routes up for bid—doing so, 
however, under restrictions that assured the Postmaster’s chosen companies would receive the 
contract.246  
Black’s revelations, however, were not revelations at all for anyone familiar with the 
contemporary development of American commercial aviation. Further, his reasoning does not stand 
up to close scrutiny. First, as previously mentioned, Brown readily admitted that he called the 
conferences with the express desire of splitting up the airmail map without recourse to what he 
considered destructive competitive bidding. He did so, moreover, with the consent and, indeed the 
support, of the major airlines. Both sides saw a need for focused federal support to promote the 
growth of passenger service, and both sides worked toward this end. These actions, while anathema 
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to Black’s populist antimonopoly stance, represented a perfectly rational modus operandi for Brown 
and his associative ideology—collusion yes, but collusion for the greater good of the industry. As 
such, the Senator and the Postmaster did not disagree materially about the events themselves, only 
their implications.  
Additionally, Black’s testimony to Congress implied that the airlines were simultaneously 
perpetrators and victims in the legislative process. The Senator pilloried airlines for their efforts to 
lobby for the Watres Bill, but then suggested that Brown used that very bill to avoid competitive 
bidding at the airlines’ expense. Much of this apparent inconsistency resulted from Black’s lack of 
appreciation for the distinction between the larger, more established airlines lobbying for the Watres 
Bill and attending the conference, and small independent operators cut out of Brown’s vision. 
Brown’s actions did benefit some airlines at the expense of others, but those cut out of the airmail 
map—and those arguing most stridently for the investigation—were for the most part simply 
unprepared to undertake regularly scheduled mail service, and certainly not able to carry passengers. 
Again, Black’s actions focused on narrow legal and economic issues without taking the larger 
context into account.247  
Regardless of these issues, however, Black’s investigation caught the attention of the American 
media and led to widespread coverage of the proceedings. As early as February 1933 Time reported 
that “Postmaster General Brown drew the wrath of the House Post Office Committee and some 
operators by juggling airmail routes.” The magazine stated that Brown had done so “in precisely the 
manner which the law provides but which his critics will call ‘arbitrary.’”248 A year later the 
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magazine reported that Democratic actions had “swept away the last remaining glory of the 1920s 
[the rise of American aviation] and consigned it to the nation’s junk heap of lost illusions.”249  
The Nation published even harsher criticism of Republican actions, writing in February 1934 
that “our worst fears about the air . . . mail contracts awarded under the Hoover administration are 
being confirmed daily by the Black Committee.” The article continued by decrying “all the waste, 
favoritism, and graft that have been exposed,” and calling for an end to profiteering and collusion.250 
Only two weeks later the periodical again focused on the Senate Committee’s action with even 
harsher rhetoric for Hoover and Brown. An article entitled “So They Found The Body” related, “the 
favoritism, graft, and corruption of the Hoover Administration are, it seems, beginning to attract 
public interest, and I venture to say that before the Congressional investigations are concluded the 
name of the Harding Administration will be a symbol of purity to the American people.”251  
The impetus for at least a significant part of this coverage appears to have emerged from the 
actions of Fulton Lewis, Jr., a reporter with the conservative Universal News Service.  According to 
Robert van der Linden, Lewis “despised [Walter] Brown on personal grounds,” and worked behind 
the scenes to initiate Black’s investigation and promote media coverage of the hearings. Van der 
Linden argues that Lewis “gave Black a copy of his lengthy report detailing the alleged misdeeds of 
the department and the airlines,” a document that “carefully pleaded the independent [airlines’] 
position, exposing the alleged misappropriation of federal funds, waste, and fraud while ignoring the 
machinations of the independents’ own deceptions.”252 
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Lewis, in fact, submitted a statement to the Black Committee, a document that laid out much of 
his evidence against Brown and the Hoover administration. Summarizing his findings to the 
Committee, Lewis testified that as a result of his investigation, “three salient factors appear evident 
without question.” First, he argued “that the Postmaster General originally planned to enlarge the air 
mail system of the United States by negotiation without competitive bidding.” Second, “that 
Congress definitely and overtly refused to give him this authority, on the grounds that it was 
contrary to American traditions and principles of government.” Finally, “that, with this insistence on 
competitive bidding, the Congress intended that Section 7 of H.R. 11, 704 [the section of the Watres 
Bill addressing route extensions] would be used only for exigencies of practical necessity” in order 
to “avoid the submission of short and insignificant fragments of routes to bidding when such a 
course would be manifestly impractical, futile, and wasteful.”253 Lewis concluded that Brown had 
deliberately set out to subvert the legislation. After failing to get the bill passed with a provision to 
allow the Postmaster General to award routes without bidding, he had unlawfully used the Watres 
Bill’s provisions to sidestep the issue, in express opposition to Congressional wishes. 
Lewis also presented evidence of collusion between airline executives and federal officials. He 
related that “Hainer Hinshaw refers to Postmaster General Brown as ‘cousin Walter’ and to 
President Hoover as ‘cousin Herbert.’” Further, Hinshaw’s brother Davis “played an active and 
prominent role in Mr. Hoover’s 1928 campaign” and “Hainer also assisted.” Lewis was forced to 
admit, however, that he could not find direct evidence that these relationships materially influenced 
Brown’s granting of airmail routes. His implications, however, fed into Black’s pre-existing 
concerns about collusive practices in the industry. Lewis’s prominent place in the media, moreover, 
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assured him a ready platform from which to publicize his views, which served to further the case 
against the Hoover administration.254 
Black’s investigation, and the furor it created, ultimately pushed the Roosevelt Administration 
to take drastic action. After a meeting between Black and President Roosevelt at which the Senator 
urged the President to take immediate steps to end the existing system, Roosevelt met with 
Postmaster General James Farley on February 8, 1934. Following negotiations between the 
President, Postmaster General, Post Office Solicitor, and the Attorney General the next day, 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 6591, canceling all federal airmail contracts granted prior to June 
of 1933 and directing the army to fly the mail until Congress could pass new legislation.255  
Farley, former head of the Democratic National Convention and a man with close personal ties 
to Roosevelt, took the lead in implementing the order. Following its issuance, he explained the 
rationale for canceling the contracts in an open letter to Senator Black. The Postmaster General 
began by stating that he did “not believe that the air mail appropriations should be expended for the 
benefit of a few favored corporations.” Following Black’s logic, Farley continued by arguing that 
these “favored corporations” “could use the funds as a basis of wild stock promotions resulting in 
profits of tens of millions of dollars to promoters who invested little or no capital.” Farley also 
suggested that airmail subsides were never “intended to be used by great corporations as a club to 
force competitors out of business and into bankruptcy. Nor,” he continued, “should appropriations 
and contracts be given out to a few favored corporations by convenience and agreement.”256 
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Farley’s rationale echoed Senator Black’s concerns almost verbatim. This agreement also 
extended into Farley’s treatment of his predecessor’s actions and the events of the “spoils 
conferences.” Farley contended that “Postmaster General Brown proceeded to build up, by so-called 
‘extensions’ of routes,” the airmail lines of major carriers such as United, American, and TWA. 
Farley was “convinced,” moreover, “that before any of the air mail contracts were awarded, those 
interested held meetings for the purpose of dividing territory and contracts among themselves.” 
Farley pointed to the meetings in May and June of 1930 as proof of this collusive behavior, arguing 
that “these meetings resulted in . . . the practical elimination of competitive bidding.”257 For Farley, 
Brown’s actions were patently unacceptable and threatened to corrupt a key aspect of Post Office 
policy. The Black Committee’s “revelations” also represented an opportunity to further discredit 
Republicans and strengthen the Democratic administration during a time of great turmoil.  
Unfortunately for Farley and Roosevelt, the army’s attempts to fly the mail ended in disaster. 
Between February and June of 1934 at least 65 Army pilots crashed on airmail routes, resulting in 
the death of 12 pilots. The Army demonstrated an inability to meet the rigorous requirements 
associated with flying regularly scheduled routes at night and in bad weather. To compound their 
problems, the winter of 1934 was one of the worst on record, forcing army flyers to deal with terrible 
snowstorms, low visibility, and chilling temperatures. These events resulted in a public-relations 
debacle and harsh criticism from the media, airlines, Army, and Congress. Roosevelt found himself 
having to defend his actions against the attacks of men like Charles Lindbergh and his efforts to do 
so represent one of the defining aspects of his aviation policy. 
 
                                            





Black’s actions ultimately had the desired effect, largely discrediting Walter Brown’s actions 
as Postmaster General and casting a shadow over the entire Hoover administration. The actions of 
the Senate Special Committee in large part led to Roosevelt’s cancellation of the airmail contracts 
and forced a reorganization of the industry. Black successfully put forward his view of a fraudulent, 
collusive, monopolistic industry antithetical to American ideals of free competition. His speeches 
and press releases clearly capture the zeal with which he went about his task and encapsulate his 
apparent hatred for concentrated wealth.  
Traditionally, scholars have interpreted Black’s actions and the Senate Special Committee 
proceedings as a referendum on federal aviation policy. Robert van der Linden writes that Black was 
a “dangerous opponent” of Brown’s and refers to the Senator as being “passionately predisposed 
against all concentrations of economic or political power.”258 In a similar vein, R.E.G. Davies calls 
attention to the “nationwide scandal” that emerged from the Committee proceedings and relates that 
“Brown left office in disgrace.”259 Clearly, Hugo Black was no fan of Walter Brown, and the 
Senator’s actions demonstrate the lengths to which he was willing to go to expose perceived wrongs 
relating to the commercial aviation industry.260  
These interpretations, however, largely ignore two key points relating to Black’s actions. First, 
they assume that Black had little interest in aviation beyond his focus on destroying “harmful” 
concentrations of wealth and power. In fact, the Senator appears to have had significant connections 
to aviation independent of his relationship to the Special Committee. In his correspondence and 
public pronouncements, moreover, Black appears to have shared at least a portion of Hoover and 
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Brown’s vision regarding aviation’s place in America’s future. Second, the previous assumption has 
led to the general conclusion that either his antimonopoly focus and/or political concerns formed the 
basis for Black’s actions vis-à-vis the Special Committee. A close examination of the evidence, 
however, suggests that Black may have acted at least in part from a genuine desire to save the 
aviation industry from itself. In other words, Black’s interest in aviation may have pushed him to 
undertake the special investigation as a constructive, rather than a purely destructive process.  
These facts necessitate a reevaluation of the events of 1933 and 1934. Rather than viewing 
Black’s rhetoric, the creation of the Senate Special Committee, and the subsequent cancellation of 
airmail contracts as rejection—at least temporarily—of Hoover’s vision for aviation’s future, the 
events should instead be viewed as part of the ongoing debate regarding aviation’s proper place in 
America’s future. In this interpretation, Black’s actions vis-à-vis the Special Committee were not 
destructive, but instead strove to remove corrupt elements that the Senator viewed as antithetical to 
aviation’s ultimate success. As such, Black, commonly depicted as aviation’s biggest opponent, 
instead emerges as yet another party interested in promoting aviation’s place in America’s future. 
Granted, his vision was markedly different than Walter Brown’s, but that vision nonetheless 
identified similar potential for American aviation.  
Black outlined his perspective in a February 1934 radio address over the Columbia 
Broadcasting System network. In a piece entitled “Aviation and Air Mail Contracts” Black 
attempted to educate the public about why Roosevelt and Farley had cancelled commercial airmail 
contracts the week before. Black began his remarks, however, with a strident articulation of 
aviation’s value to America. “Let me begin,” he said, “by stating my own belief that aviation is 
destined to have a most important place in our National progress in peace time.” Black then went on 





people, who love peace, and who abhor war, realize that if war should ever be forced upon us, we 
could not today defend ourselves, without a modern, well equipped, efficiently manned, aviation 
system.”261  
With these remarks, Black echoed Hoover’s goals for aviation stretching back to the beginning 
of the previous decade. Clearly the Senator understood aviation to play a central role in American 
commerce, a role with the potential to grow in the near future. In addition, his identification of the 
national security value of a mature commercial aviation network and a mature aeronautics industry 
mirror almost exactly statements put forward by Hoover, MacCracken and Harry New.  
Black also drew similar conclusions from that analysis. In his words, the knowledge of 
aviation’s dual value “imperatively demands that this Nation take whatever steps are necessary to 
foster, encourage, and maintain this great peacetime servant of progress; this indispensable war 
necessity.” He thus stridently argued that the government had an obligation to continue to support 
the development of commercial aviation. His objections, then, concerned the means of achieving that 
goal, not the goal itself. Black echoed these sentiments in his April address to Congress, arguing that 
“aviation is destined to become a great and integral part of the commerce of this nation . . . just as 
the railroads supplanted the stagecoach, so aviation is marching forward.”262 
In order to secure aviation’s ultimate success, Black argued that the industry needed to be 
cleansed of its corrupt, collusive, and fraudulent aspects. This, then, represented the central rationale 
for his investigation and his support for the cancellation of airmail contracts. For him, those actions 
embodied a necessary step on aviation’s path to success. The cancellation of those contracts, he 
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stated to the radio audience, “will not retard aviations [sic] orderly progress. It will accelerate it . . . a 
reorganized industry, with honest stock capitalization; fair profits, contracts that are just; and 
controlled by operators instead of speculators is the way to succeed in aviation.”263  
These statements demonstrate that Black’s fundamental purpose was to encourage the healthy 
development of American aviation. Political expediency and his longstanding focus on opposing 
concentrated wealth and power undoubtedly shaped the way Black went about his investigation, but 
it seems clear that his goal was strikingly similar to Hoover’s and Brown’s. Moreover, Black’s 
identification of aviation’s value to America in both peacetime and wartime signal his familiarity 
with the relevant context. As such, Black’s actions, and the circumstances emerging out of his 
Special Committee investigation suggest the need for a thorough reevaluation. In this view, Black 
does not represent an opponent of aviation, but rather an advocate; his disagreements with Brown 
and Hoover center on the means through which the government should encourage aviation’s growth, 
not the ultimate ends of that policy.  
Tellingly, Black maintained an interest in aviation-related matters long after the end of his 
Special Investigation. At the urging of Franklin Roosevelt, Black took the lead in authoring 
legislation to supplant the Watres Bill. Writing to Black in June of 1935, Roosevelt stated his “hope 
we can get some legislation” passed. He suggested that Black “run down and talk with me about it” 
in order to expedite the process.264 The so-called Black-McKellar Bill forced the breakup of the large 
aviation holding corporations, mandated competitive bidding for federal airmail routes, and forbade 
companies and executives who had participated in the “spoils conferences” from applying for 
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contracts.265 While many scholars have viewed this bill as an attempt to punish the airlines for 
collusive practices under the Hoover administration, Black’s focus on aviation’s future suggests a 
different conclusion. His continued interest in aeronautical development supports the analysis that 
Black’s efforts to craft the bill represented an attempt to put aviation on a sound financial and 
political footing in order to assure its success. 
Additionally, Black maintained active correspondence with numerous parties associated with 
American aviation. In 1935 Paul Brattain, Assistant General Manager of Eastern Airlines, wrote 
Black in the hopes that the Senator would use his influence to secure additional aviation 
infrastructure at airports in Montgomery and Mobile, Alabama. Brattain wrote, “I know . . . you still 
have an active interest in aviation,” and went on to request that Black look into installing additional 
lighting and a new radio beacon in Montgomery.266 
Black was most active, however, in aviation-related labor issues. The Senator played a crucial 
role in securing the passage of S. 2486, a pilots’ amendment to the Railway Labor Act in 1935, 
which secured additional rights regarding hours and pay for commercial flyers.267 Black also 
maintained an ongoing correspondence with David L. Behncke, President of the Air Line Pilot’s 
Association. Behncke wrote Black on a variety of topics including pilots’ pay and hours, legislation, 
hiring and firing practices, and the organization of the commercial industry. Illustrative of their 
relationship is an ongoing correspondence between February and May of 1935 concerning the 
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allegedly improper firing of seven Northwest Airlines pilots. According to a February 7, 1935 letter 
from Behncke, Northwest had acquired a smaller carrier, Hanford Airlines, and promptly fired seven 
of the former carriers’ pilots. According to the ALPA President, “we strongly suspect that it was a 
tacit understanding between Northwest and Hanford . . . that Northwest Airlines was not to reemploy 
any of the Hanford pilots because they were strong union men.”268 Two days later Black wrote to F. 
W. Wittemore, Northwest’s Vice President in charge of operations to request an explanation for the 
terminations.269 This began more than two months of ongoing correspondence during which Black 
worked diligently to secure the reemployment of the seven pilots in question. Eventually his efforts 
were rewarded, and Northwest agreed to hire back the men in question.  
Later that year Black wrote the National Labor Relations Board on behalf of the ALPA and 
contacted Eastern Airlines directly regarding an additional labor dispute.270 This ongoing 
relationship remained focused on labor issues, reflecting Black’s interest in fair competition and 
opposition to concentrated power. Nonetheless, his actions demonstrate an ongoing interest in 
American aviation, and a willingness to take action in support of his vision for aviation’s future.  
Black also maintained an interest in aviation’s military significance. In March of 1936 Paul 
Thomas, General Director of the Air Defense League, wrote Black in order to request the Senator’s 
support for their organization. The ADL purported to be a non-partisan group focused on raising 
awareness of America’s pressing need to continue aeronautical development to bolster national 
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defense.271 The same month, Black received a note from Judge Lee Smith—like Black a native of 
Alabama—expressing concern over “our air strength in the United States as compared to other 
nations.” Black responded to the query encouragingly, writing, “I appreciate your views on the 
subject very much and will state that I favor sufficient Congressional appropriation to see to it that 
we have an air force adequate for our protection.”272  
Collectively, these actions demonstrate Black’s focus on assuring the continued growth of 
American aviation. Far from appearing as a vitriolic opponent of commercial airlines, Black instead 
seems to have worked hard to secure pilots’ rights, promote stable commercial growth, and assure 
aeronautical development as an aid to national defense. Certainly Black differed with Hoover and 
Brown in his perspective on the proper means through which American aviation should grow. That 
disagreement, however, should not overshadow the Senator’s ongoing commitment to aeronautics.  
 
Ultimately, Black’s investigation and his Special Committee hearings served to validate 
Hoover’s vision for American aviation. Traditionally, scholars have interpreted Black’s strident 
rhetoric denouncing Brown and the alleged fraud and collusion in the airline industry as a 
repudiation of the preceding administrations’ policy. In that view the Black-McKellar Bill remains 
something of an aberration—an attempt to punish the worst offenders, but legislation that in the end 
changed little. A closer examination of the hearings and of Black himself, however, suggests the 
need for a different perspective. Black clearly differed with Hoover and Brown over the means 
through which the government should act to support commercial aviation. His opposition to 
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monopoly and concentrated wealth and power resulted in his efforts to discredit Brown and expose 
fraudulent practices within the industry. Those efforts, however, did not reflect a fundamental 
disagreement about the ends federal policy should serve. Black, in fact, echoed many of Hoover’s 
ideas concerning the role aviation should play in America’s future. In both his public 
pronouncements and private correspondence the Senator maintained an interest in promoting 
aeronautical growth. That growth, in his view, was crucial for American commerce and for national 
defense.  
These facts suggest a remarkable unanimity amongst American policymakers regarding 
aviation. Moving forward, Franklin Roosevelt increasingly came to dominate federal policy as his 
New Deal programs took an ever more active role in promoting aeronautical development. 
Roosevelt’s actions, however, largely stayed true to the foundations set down by Hoover and 
confirmed by Black. Although Roosevelt’s relationship to aviation was defined by the exigencies of 
the Depression, the President’s policies would ultimately come to confirm the prevailing view of 





 Chapter 4—A New Deal for Aviation?: Franklin Roosevelt and American Aviation 
Policy 
 
Long before he assumed the presidency, Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated a keen interest in 
aviation. Only twelve years after the Wright Brothers’ first flight, Roosevelt penned an article for 
Flying magazine emphasizing aviation’s military value. Writing for the September issue, Roosevelt 
argued, “for military reasons it is absolutely essential that the aeronautics arms of the Army and 
Navy be increased, not by doubling, but a hundred fold.” In the same article he emphasized the 
leading role Americans had played in aviation’s development, commenting, “everybody knows that 
this country did the pioneer work in aviation, that hundreds of Americans have devoted their time 
and thought to the development and actual use of the aircraft.” For Roosevelt, that history assured 
America’s readiness to “build up this branch of essential national defense.”273  
Roosevelt sustained this early interest in aviation throughout his political life, for both personal 
and policy-related reasons. In 1915 he authored another article entitled “Scouts and Aircraft” in 
which he argued that fast ships and spotter aircraft would play crucial roles in future naval 
engagements.274 In 1918 while serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy he attended the 
inauguration of U.S. airmail service, joining President Woodrow Wilson in seeing off the first mail 
flight from Washington, D. C. to New York. Roosevelt famously flew to Chicago to accept the 1932 
Democratic presidential nomination in person—this in spite of the discomfort that flying caused the 
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polio-disabled governor. He was also the first president to fly while in office, traveling on a Pan Am 
Clipper across the Atlantic in 1943 to meet with fellow allied leaders.275  
While anecdotal, these examples suggest that Roosevelt maintained a keen interest in 
American aeronautics for the duration of his political career. That interest, moreover, translated into 
an ongoing focus on federal policy. In fact, during his tenure as President, Roosevelt consistently 
worked to foster aeronautical development for both military and commercial ends. Significantly, 
those efforts encompassed policies broadly similar to those of his predecessor, Herbert Hoover. 
Although Roosevelt’s actions demonstrated superficial differences with Hoover’s, there appears to 
have existed remarkable unanimity in the foundational aspects of each President’s desire to support 
the nascent aviation industry. Roosevelt, like Hoover, embraced policies highlighting his 
commitment to promoting commercial growth and displayed a keen insight into aviation’s future 
potential.    
Historians of both American aviation and Roosevelt himself, however, have consistently 
overlooked FDR’s actions. Scholars cite the President’s supposed error in canceling commercial 
airmail contracts in 1934, and point to the lack of a focused and consistent policy in the vein of 
Herbert Hoover as evidence that Roosevelt lacked a coherent policy focus. Epitomizing this view, in 
his book Airlines and Airmail, Robert van der Linden argues that “Roosevelt never had a coherent 
national aviation policy.”276 
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This focus on the coherence—or lack thereof—of Roosevelt’s aviation policy conceals the 
significant contributions FDR brought to American aeronautics between 1932 and 1939. Roosevelt 
lacked the consistent, activist vision that defined Hoover’s commitment to promoting aviation’s 
progress, but this should in no way obscure the gains he worked to foster. During his first two terms 
in office, Roosevelt actively engaged aviation-related policy matters. Beginning in 1934, he found 
himself embroiled in the controversy over the cancellation of commercial airmail contracts. Though 
this resulted in widespread criticism of the President, Roosevelt nonetheless labored to re-establish 
commercial service on a sound basis. To that end he worked closely with Senator Hugo Black (D-
Alabama) to help secure the passage of new legislation to return the mail to commercial carriers and 
assure the continued growth of the industry.  
In 1935 Roosevelt created the Federal Aviation Commission. The President tasked the 
Commission to examine all aspects of American aviation—from commercial to military to 
infrastructure—in order to develop a focused, forward-looking national policy to guide continued 
aeronautical progress. In the wake of the Commission’s activities, Roosevelt worked closely with 
members of Congress to shape new legislation that would ultimately take the form of the Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938. This pivotal bill created the legislative foundation that would direct 
American aviation until deregulation more than 40 years later. As part of that process, the President 
also promoted the creation of the Civilian Pilot Training Program, which introduced thousands of 
Americans to flying and helped create a pool of licensed pilots who would play a crucial role for 
both the military and commercial carriers.  
Finally, under the auspices of numerous New Deal agencies including the Civil Works Agency, 
Public Works Agency, and Works Progress Administration, Roosevelt utilized federal public works 





actions resulted in tens of millions of federal dollars being spent to build airports around the country, 
literally creating the foundations of the postwar air transport boom.  
These efforts suggest a need to reevaluate Franklin Roosevelt’s contributions to the 
development of American aeronautics. His constant engagement with aviation policy highlights his 
ongoing interest in the progress of the commercial industry. FDR also focused on aviation’s military 
value, highlighting the need for more and better-trained pilots, continued research and development, 
and a mature manufacturing sector.277  These foci belie the image of a President uninterested in 
aviation, whose most significant actions vis-à-vis aeronautical policy resulted in a public-relations 
disaster following the deaths of twelve Army pilots.  
Scholars’ lack of appreciation for Roosevelt’s actions appears to flow more from his style than 
from substance. As President, FDR often worked behind the scenes, organizing fact-finding groups, 
speaking with myriad advisors, and subtly working to shape the legislative process.278 In sharp 
contrast to Hoover, Roosevelt did not come into office with a ready-made plan for American 
aviation. In the late 1920s Hoover had already constructed a coherent aviation policy, and his 
economic philosophy of the associational state provided a ready-made framework with which to 
guide federal policy. Roosevelt, on the other hand, approached aeronautics in a reactive, rather than 
a proactive manner. Though personally interested in aviation, his involvement with flying before 
assuming the Presidency was limited to efforts to secure more military aircraft while serving as 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Further complicating the issue, Roosevelt took office in the midst of 
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the Great Depression and, as a result, he spent his first months in office focused on the banking 
crisis, rising unemployment, and the implosion of the world’s economy. 
Roosevelt’s lack of transparency and his ongoing efforts to combat the worst effects of the 
Depression, however, should not obscure his commitment to American aeronautical progress. His 
lack of a “coherent” policy says more about Hoover’s activism and Roosevelt’s style than the latter’s 
actual contributions to American aviation. In fact, in many ways Roosevelt’s actions represented a 
natural outgrowth of the foundations set down during the preceding Republican administrations. 
FDR maintained a federal focus on Post Office subsidies to passenger carriers, continued to promote 
close cooperation between the government and the industry, organized numerous forums through 
which he attempted to determine the proper path for future growth, and worked to pass legislation 
that would place American aviation on a firm commercial footing. Ultimately, Roosevelt’s 
relationship to aviation must be viewed in a different light than that of his predecessor: the coherence 
of his policy derives from the results of his actions, rather than their philosophical bases. Those 
actions, moreover, resulted in the greatest gains American aviation had yet experienced and in large 
part created the foundations of our modern air transport network.   
 
As President, Roosevelt first addressed aviation policy in a sustained way as a result of the 
Black committee hearings of 1934 and 1935. Unlike Herbert Hoover, before assuming the 
Presidency Roosevelt lacked a preconceived plan for dealing with aeronautics. Though he had taken 
the unprecedented step of flying to Chicago to accept the Democratic nomination for President in 
1932, he made no significant policy statements related to aviation during his candidacy or in the first 
months after taking office. In large part this reflected the prevailing conditions the country faced at 





structure. Though many Democrats viewed their victory in the 1932 election as an opportunity to 
challenge Republican airmail policies introduced by Walter F. Brown, it appears that, at least 
initially, Roosevelt did not involve himself in these machinations. 
By 1934, however, Roosevelt began to take a more active role in the emerging airmail scandal. 
The creation of Hugo Black’s Senate Special Committee initiated a rising tide of discontent with 
prevailing policy and ultimately led Roosevelt and his Postmaster General, James Farley, to take 
drastic action. On February 8 of that year Roosevelt met with Farley, the Post Office Solicitor, and 
the Attorney General.279 At that meeting the policymakers concluded that they should annul all 
airmail contracts made prior to June 16, 1933.280 The next day Roosevelt issued Executive Order 
6591, confirming the cancellation of all domestic airmail contracts and directing the Secretary of 
War to make arrangements for the Army to fly the mail. Per Roosevelt’s instruction, the Secretary 
was ordered to “place at the disposal of the Postmaster General such airplanes, landing fields, pilots, 
and other employees and equipment of the Army . . . needed or required for the transportation of 
mail, during the present emergency.”281 
Almost immediately, Roosevelt’s actions proved contentious. Two days after the issuance of 
the order, Charles Lindbergh sent a telegram to Roosevelt sharply critical of his action. Arguing, 
“your action of yesterday affects fundamentally the industry to which I have devoted the last twelve 
years of my life,” Lindbergh proceeded to attack the ethical foundations of the executive order. 
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According to his telegram, “your order of cancellation of all air mail contracts condemns the largest 
portion of our commercial aviation without just trial . . . your present actions does [sic] not 
discriminate between innocence and guilt and places no premium on honest business.” Continuing, 
Lindbergh warned that the President’s actions had the potential to cause great harm to “the finest air 
lines in the world.” In his words, “unless the facts leave no alternative the condemnation of 
commercial aviation by cancellation of all mail contracts and the use of the army on commercial air 
lines will unnecessarily and greatly damage all of American aviation.”282 
Much to the displeasure of the White House, Lindbergh, through his attorney and legal advisor 
Colonel Henry Breckinridge, simultaneously released the telegram to the press. The famous aviator’s 
public stance against the administration attracted significant media attention and aroused controversy 
over the proper course of action with regard to the continuing aviation scandal. On February 12, The 
New York Times published Lindbergh’s letter in its entirety, reporting on the “strong protest” that the 
famous aviator had voiced against the President’s actions. The same article revealed, “it is known 
that [Lindbergh] agrees with veteran mail pilots that the lives of inexperienced men . . . may be 
risked” if Roosevelt’s plan was put into action.283 Two days later, the Times reported on an uproar in 
Congress when a Republican representative attempted to have Lindbergh’s protest formally entered 
into the record.284  
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Roosevelt, however, was not content to ignore the challenge. In a February 12 memo released 
to the press, Stephen Early, Secretary to the President, clearly articulated the White House’s stance 
on Lindbergh’s actions. Early wrote, “the common practice is to allow the President, when he is 
addressed . . . the courtesy of receiving and reading . . . communications before they are read by 
others than the person addressed.” The Secretary then suggested that Lindbergh’s actions “would 
indicate the message obviously was sent for publicity purposes.”285 Such an immediate and forceful 
response highlights the influence Lindbergh had with the American public. As a February 19 Time 
article reported, “a front-page criticism from Col. Lindbergh the White House could not safely 
ignore.”286  
Regardless of the White House’s annoyance, Lindbergh’s public criticism clearly aroused 
strong feelings in many Americans. In the days and weeks after the publication of Lindbergh’s 
telegram and the official White House response, letters began to pour into Washington, D.C. in 
response to the scandal. According to a report prepared for Harllee Branch287 in April of 1934, as of 
the twelfth of that month Americans had written a total of 2,049 letters and telegrams to either the 
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President or the Post Office following Farley and Roosevelt’s cancellation of airmail contracts. Of 
these, around 100 focused specifically on either the so-called “Lindbergh letter” or Early’s 
response—though many more made mention of the controversy.288 
Letters addressed to the White House exhibited a fairly even split between support for the 
President and Lindbergh, but virtually all expressed strong feelings. On February 13 telegrams 
addressed to the President expressed displeasure at “the slurring comment of your Secretary Stephen 
Early with respect to Lindbergh’s telegram”289 and referred to Early’s actions as “a very gratuitous 
and unwarranted insult.”290 A letter from the following day expressed even stronger feelings. 
Writing directly to the President, Emma Dillon referred to Roosevelt’s “cowardly personal attack” 
on Lindbergh, according to her an action that “convinced many that you cannot meet the issue 
squarely.”291 
Opinion ran just as strongly in support of Roosevelt. Myles Lasker penned a letter thanking 
Early for the “opportunity to congratulate you on the bravest stand I have ever known a man to make 
. . . it takes real nerve to ‘buck’ a fellow like Lindbergh and I personally think you handled him to a 
sweet fare-thee-well. It was magnificent.”292 Another letter sent that same day expressed similar 
support, relating, “good work on the way you ‘called’ the aviator who has never cared much about 
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the press until he wanted to use it.”293 Perhaps the strongest commentary came from Sallie Stockard, 
who wrote, “Permit me please, to help handle Lindy. This is the first time I have noticed him 
showing the Ass’s Ears” and later referred to Lindbergh’s “overweening pride.”294 The tensions 
between Roosevelt and Lindbergh continued for months, with a Newsweek article from March 
calling their feud a “dramatic shadow-boxing exhibition between [the nation’s] two particular 
heroes.”295  
American concerns, however, extended beyond the specific dictates of Roosevelt’s ongoing 
feud with Lindbergh. In fact, it appears that Roosevelt and Farley’s decision to cancel airmail 
contracts aroused even more ire. Like the letters referring explicitly to the Roosevelt/Lindbergh 
controversy, those dealing more generally with the airmail scandal exhibited a rough parity between 
support for and opposition to Roosevelt’s actions. According to a Post Office report, by April the 
White House and Post Office had received 548 letters and telegrams directly condemning the 
cancellation, and 668 expressing support for that action.296  
Significantly, that correspondence included letters from both lawmakers and members of the 
aviation industry. On February 10, Representative Harry Musselwhite (D-Michigan) wrote the 
President to express approval for his actions. A member of the House Committee on Post Office and 
Post Roads, Musselwhite wrote of his “desire to express my approval of your pronouncement of the 
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cancellation of air mail contracts with private companies.”297 While Musselwhite’s political 
affiliation and position on an interested Committee would suggest the predetermination of his 
support, the message is nonetheless representative of a number of lawmakers’ positive responses to 
Roosevelt’s action. 
Airline executives also penned quick responses to the cancellations. Croll Hunter, the General 
Manager of Northwest Airways, wrote the President on February 15 to express his opinion that 
“unless there is some modification of the existing order of the Postmaster General, this great airways 
system faces certain destruction.” Hunter’s worries were well founded as his airline, like every other 
that had formerly flown the mail, struggled to make ends meet flying passengers without the aid of 
airmail revenue. Nonetheless, Hunter’s letter voiced approval for Roosevelt’s policy. He wrote, “we, 
as good citizens, find no fault with your great effort to clean up the airways situation, and to provide 
for the people of this country an efficient, comprehensive, and honest system of airway 
development.”298  
Public scrutiny of White House airmail policy grew much more intense as the army began its 
first airmail flights. Though it appears that the American public initially supported Roosevelt’s 
actions by a slim margin, this began to change as military pilots experienced difficulties flying the 
mail. From the first, the army appeared ill prepared to undertake airmail operations. On February 16, 
three army pilots crashed and were killed while on familiarization flights. Six days later, two more 
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flyers perished, with another following suit February 23. By the second week in March, four more 
pilots had died in airmail-related crashes.299  
 These fatalities resulted from a series of unfortunate factors. First, army pilots lacked 
sufficient experience flying at night and in bad weather to take on regularly scheduled airmail 
flights. Military aircraft generally lacked adequate navigational aids, and many planes were 
unsuitable for mail service. In addition, Roosevelt’s quick and unprecedented actions placed the 
army in the unenviable position of having to hastily cobble together an airmail service using existing 
material and pilots with minimal time for training. To add to the army’s troubles, the winter of 1933-
34 was one of the worst on record, and military pilots began their flights in the midst of a series of 
blizzards. As a result, the army’s attempt to fly the mail resulted in an abject disaster and a public-
relations nightmare for the army and the White House alike.300  
The American public reacted quickly to the mounting death toll. Letters began to pour into the 
White House decrying the President’s actions. On March 19, E. F. Gillespie wrote a harshly critical 
letter to Roosevelt stating, “ten dead and fourteen injured suggests an almost irretrievable error of 
judgment.” Gillespie later suggested that the President “send Jim Farley on a few night air mail 
flights.”301 Americans also worried what the army’s lack of preparedness to fly the mail heralded for 
national security. Frank Patrick wrote the President on March 11, asking, “if the army can not carry 
the mail, how can it win a war?” Patrick, a veteran of the Spanish American War and World War I, 
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stated that the army had “miserably failed” in its mission and decried the military’s lack of ability to 
perform a given duty.302  
The army’s failure also attracted attention from well-known figures in aviation. No less an 
authority than Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell weighed in on the controversy in a letter 
to Hugo Black. Mitchell expressed support for Roosevelt’s actions, writing “the President and the 
government should be justly proud in the position they have taken with respect to our aeronautics. 
The people of the United States had the right to expect that the Army Air Corps could fly the mail 
with ease.” The general suggested that the debacle had in fact been a blessing in disguise, for 
without such a wakeup call, the nation would have been unprepared in the event of a war.303  
Mitchell, however, was in the minority.304 Their attention fed by increasing press coverage of 
crashes and fatalities, most Americans focused on the President’s role in ordering army airmail 
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flights. A Time article from March 5 reported that while commercial operators had “warned 
Washington and the country that the Army . . . was not equipped or trained to step into the breach 
[flying the mail] . . . their words were swept aside as sour grapes.” More worrying for Roosevelt, the 
article also reported that, as a result of army fatalities, “citizens began to wonder if . . . President 
Roosevelt was not wrong on his airmail policy,” and highlighted the fact that “the White House was 
accused of ‘legalized murder.’”305 
Roosevelt reacted to the criticism by scaling back army operations and pushing for increased 
training and reduced schedules that would not force unprepared pilots to fly in bad weather. 
Following four fatal crashes in the second week of March, Time reported, “through the sky Death 
continued to dog the Army Air Corps carrying the mail.” In response, Roosevelt commanded the 
Secretary of War to “issue immediate orders to the Army Air Corps stopping all carrying of airmail 
except on such routes, under such weather conditions and under such equipment and personal 
conditions as will insure . . . against constant recurrence of fatal accidents.”306 The President’s 
actions did have the desired effect of lessening the number of fatalities, but did so at the expense of 
reducing airmail poundage to such an extent that the army’s efforts held only marginal utility.307 
Ultimately, Newsweek referred to Roosevelt’s decision to have the army fly the mail as “the worst 
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political blunder of the administration,” hardly the legacy Roosevelt had hoped for regarding his first 
significant involvement with aviation. 308 
FDR, however, had never considered the army to be a permanent solution. In the immediate 
wake of cancelling commercial contracts, Roosevelt began to work toward the creation of new 
legislation that would return the airmail to private contractors. On March 7 the President wrote 
Senator Hugo Black in reference to airmail contracts, simultaneously contacting Senator Kenneth 
McKellar (D-Tennessee) and Representative James Mead (D-New York) on the same subject.309 In 
his letter to Black, Roosevelt expressed hope that contracts could be returned to commercial airlines 
“as soon as possible.” The President argued that new legislation would allow the government to 
“avoid the evils of the past, and at the same time encourage the sound development of the aviation 
industry.” He ended the letter with the hope that “enactment of legislation along the lines suggested 
will establish a sound, stable, and permanent air-mail policy.”310  
Roosevelt’s push for legislation included concrete outlines for a new contract structure. He 
articulated a plan grounded in the idea that “new airmail contracts be let for a period not exceeding 
three years on full, open, and competitive bidding, with a limitation of the rate of compensation 
above which no contract will be awarded.” Within this framework, FDR moved to create a specific 
set of regulatory qualifications. First, he argued that “only speed, useful load capacity and safety 
factors and devices should be considered” in equipment specifications. He suggested successful 
bidders be granted six months to qualify for performance of the contract and the Interstate 
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Commerce Commission fix future rates no later then six months before the end of any three year 
contract.311  
A further series of dictates spoke directly to the perceived collusion sanctioned by Walter F. 
Brown. The President expressed his desire to see “the proposed law prohibit the award of an air-mail 
contract to any company affiliated with any other company having connections with subsidiaries, 
affiliates, associates, or holding companies” in the aviation business and forbade the merger of mail 
contractors or the subletting of any contract. FDR also mandated that the government refuse to grant 
contracts to any company whose officers were party to the “spoils conferences” of 1930.312  
Finally, Roosevelt pushed aggressively for changes to labor policies and pay scales in the 
industry. He emphasized the need for safeguards to prevent “the evil practices of excessive salaries, 
unearned bonuses and illegitimate personal expense accounts detrimental to the interests of 
legitimate stockholders and the public.” Addressing the wellbeing of pilots, mechanics, and line-
workers, Roosevelt pushed each airmail contractor to establish “maximum flying hours; minimum 
pay and a pension system.”313  
Roosevelt’s focus on new legislation apparently had the desired effect. Two days after the 
President wrote Black, McKellar, and Mead, Black and McKellar jointly introduced what Time 
referred to as “the administration bill.” That bill, which later became the Air Mail Act of 1934,314 
“made all of the President’s points,” and embraced the framework Roosevelt articulated in his 
letter.315 On June 12, 1934 Roosevelt signed the bill into law, formally ending the airmail scandal 
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and providing the legislative foundation for commercial airmail contracts that would hold sway until 
the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 
 
Historians have given Roosevelt little credit for his role in facilitating a productive end to the 
airmail scandal. Scholars point to the supposedly partisan origins of the Black Special Committee as 
evidence that Roosevelt and the Democrats remained focused on political issues rather than acting 
out of a genuine desire to shape aviation. Roosevelt’s lack of a coherent, publicly-stated aviation 
policy has led to charges that his actions sprang from political expediency. The widespread 
unpopularity of his decision to cancel private contracts and have the army fly the mail have only 
furthered perceptions that the President lacked awareness of the complexities of military and civilian 
aviation. Finally, his push for new legislation included provisions explicitly countering many of 
Walter F. Brown’s associative policies, leading to the conclusion that Roosevelt failed to appreciate 
the value of the preceding administration’s aviation strategy. In sum, existing scholarship paints 
Roosevelt as acting for selfish political reasons, reacting to a scandal through which the President 
sought to score political points rather than from any genuine desire to promote aviation. 316   
This interpretation, however, largely ignores the remarkable continuity between Roosevelt’s 
actions and those undertaken during the preceding administration. Throughout the turmoil of the 
airmail scandal Roosevelt acted from a genuine desire to promote the continued growth and 
expansion of American commercial aviation. Though he, like Black, disagreed with Walter Brown 
about the implications of economic concentration in the aviation industry—seeing holding 
                                            
316 For the most recent and most prominent example of this interpretation, see: van der 
Linden, Airlines and Airmail, 235-291. Also reflecting this analysis are: Davies, A 
History of the World’s Airlines, 128-130, and Nick Kommons, Bonfires to Beacons: 
Federal Civil Aviation Policy Under the Air Commerce Act, 1926-1938 (Washington, 





companies as dangerous and harmful to aviation’s commercial foundations317—Roosevelt never 
sought to undermine the core aspects of Hoover and Brown’s aviation policy.318 His efforts, in fact, 
played a crucial role in preserving and ultimately expanding the government’s central role in 
supporting airline development.  
Ultimately, the President’s actions returned airmail contacts to private hands in the interest of 
promoting commercial growth. The airmail scandal also motivated Roosevelt to take a more active 
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role in creating a national aviation policy, first through the creation of investigative bodies like the 
Federal Aviation Commission, and later through his efforts to shape the Civil Aeronautics Act. 
These efforts eventually resulted in the creation of legislation that codified the majority of Hoover’s 
vision and established a paradigm for American commercial aviation that lasted until the late 1970s.  
The essential continuity between Hoover and Roosevelt’s aviation policies, however, should 
not obscure several specific points of differentiation. First, Roosevelt’s outline for new legislation 
embraced several features at odds with Brown’s efforts to shape the provisions of the Watres Act. 
The President’s focus on three-year contracts ran counter to Brown’s hope for longer, ten-year route 
certificates. Brown pushed for the longer duration in large part to reward pioneer operators. The 
Postmaster hoped that the security of a decade-long hold on airlines’ route structures would promote 
continued technological development and encourage carriers to spend money on larger, more 
passenger-friendly aircraft. Roosevelt, in contrast, pushed for shorter contracts to maintain a focus 
on competition and allow the ICC to revise rates at shorter intervals.  
Roosevelt also maintained a clear emphasis on promoting open and competitive bidding. 
Unlike Brown, the President appears to have believed that bidding would serve both public and 
commercial interests. He made it clear that proper equipment, speed, load capacity, and safety 
should be the only specifications considered when weighing airmail bids—a change from Brown’s 
policy of emphasizing night flying requirements and other qualifications specifically designed to 
benefit pioneer operators. The President emphasized that limiting bidding requirements in this way 
would ensure “that the bidding shall be really competitive,”319 not merely a method through which to 
exclude unwanted proposals.  
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Roosevelt’s most contentious point of divergence with the Hoover administration emerged 
from his efforts to change the industry’s organization. He argued that holding corporations and other 
industrial conglomerations were “clearly contrary to good faith and public policy,” and pushed to 
exclude any such organization from bidding on airmail contracts.320  Where Brown had seen holding 
corporations as positive organizations with the potential to streamline research and development, 
promote technological progress, and maximize efficiency in production and airline operation, the 
President saw them as barriers to competitive bidding and a danger to the public interest. Roosevelt’s 
desire to exclude any airline represented at the “spoils conferences” from bidding highlighted his 
desire to break with past policies.  
Perhaps because of Roosevelt’s divergence with a number of Hoover administration policies, 
many leading members of the aviation industry sharply disagreed with the President’s legislative 
plans. Ernest R. Breech, President of North American Aviation, in a statement to the House Post 
Office and Post Roads Committee, argued that “the President’s . . . recommendations . . . would 
result in the greatest possible confusion within the industry.”321 TWA President Richard Robbins 
expressed a similar sentiment, stating, “President Roosevelt has been cruelly misinformed as to the 
facts of the airmail situation.”322  
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This opposition appears to have been motivated primarily by the President’s desire to level the 
playing field for bidding on airmail contracts. Breech argued that “the strong, well-managed and 
adequately financed companies now face the prospect of having their investments wiped out by the 
opening of these routes to competitive bidding.” According to the NAA President, this “would throw 
the industry back to the conditions existing in the early stages of development, thereby sacrificing 
not only the results of pioneering efforts to date, but in effect confiscating the properties and 
investments of the air mail carriers prior to the cancellation order.”323 Breech’s argument echoed the 
core values that had guided Walter Brown’s aviation policy. Fundamentally, the aviation executive’s 
opposition to the new policy reflected his belief that pioneer operators should be rewarded for their 
efforts to establish commercial air service.  
Eddie Rickenbacker, North American’s Vice President, expanded on this line of thinking in 
testimony given before the Senate Committee on Post Office and Post Roads, March 17, 1934. While 
outlining his criticisms of the proposed legislation, the World War I fighter ace stated, “I feel it will 
be a serious mistake if the equalities of the present operators of the air transport lines of this country 
are not recognized and given preemptive rights on the routes which they have pioneered at great 
expense to their stockholders.”324 Like Breech, Rickenbacker believed that the proposed legislation 
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would unfairly penalize pioneer operators by opening bidding to new airlines that had not spent the 
time and money developing infrastructure and promoting commercial development.  
While scholars have interpreted these facts as evidence that Roosevelt did not necessarily have 
the best interests of the industry at heart, that analysis does not fully account for Roosevelt’s 
motivations. A closer look demonstrates that the President embraced these policies out of a genuine 
desire to promote the sound development of American aviation. Clearly, Roosevelt did not adhere to 
the same associationalist beliefs his predecessor had utilized so effectively with regard to aviation. 
Instead, he strove to create transparency in the industry and promote what he believed to be healthy 
competition. In his mind, the airmail controversy called for clear and direct action to clear away the 
supposed evils of the past and return commercial flying to its developmental path. In this sense, 
FDR’s actions represent a natural outgrowth of his broader New Deal philosophy—using the power 
of the federal government to promote economic growth while attempting to combat the worst 
excesses of trusts and industrial conglomerations.  
Distinctions between Hoover’s associationalist focus and FDR’s New Deal, however, should 
not obscure the overarching similarities in the Presidents’ aviation policies. Debates over the proper 
qualifications for airlines bidding on airmail routes assumed the inherent value of government 
airmail subsidies, confirming the essential continuity of federal policy. Concluding his letter to Hugo 
Black, Roosevelt summed up his goal for the new legislation, writing, “real competition . . . will 
stimulate inventive genius, and should give to our people safer and better equipment both for 
commercial and military purposes.”325 Though the specifics of this policy ran counter to the wishes 
of aviation executives—who, it should be pointed out, had legitimate concerns regarding their 
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pioneering status—they nonetheless reinforced the President’s desire to follow Hoover’s 
developmental path.  
While confirming the basic continuity between Hoover and FDR’s policies, Roosevelt’s 
legislative proposal encompassed several specific points of divergence. First, he pushed for new 
labor provisions that would protect pilots, maintenance men, and line workers from unfair 
employment practices. A commitment to creating guidelines for maximum hours, minimum pay 
standards, and pension systems for airline workers signaled Roosevelt’s focus on promoting stable 
growth.326 Second, his desire to end the practice of interlocking directorates within the aeronautics 
industry received broad support from executives. Breech publicly argued for the desirability of 
prohibiting overlapping management structures,327 and Rickenbacker voiced his support for a 
provision “that there shall be no interlocking directors or stock ownership in competitive air 
transport companies.”328  
Roosevelt must also get credit for successfully returning airmail contracts to private operators. 
While in retrospect doing so appears inevitable, contemporary conditions mitigated against an easy 
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return to commercial airmail. Black’s Senate investigation had thrown the industry into chaos and 
drawn negative attention to the airlines and federal airmail contracts. The army debacle further 
exacerbated the problem and placed Roosevelt in a difficult situation. He faced the pressure of 
returning airmail contracts to private carriers as quickly as possible while addressing the concerns 
raised by Black’s investigation and the subsequent media uproar.  
Admittedly, Roosevelt’s legislation included punitive measures directed against the airlines 
present at the spoils conferences and their executives.329 In addition, critics warned that his 
commitment to three-year route contracts and open competitive bidding would unfairly penalize 
pioneer operators. FDR’s opponents cautioned that both of these facts undermined the Hoover 
administration’s focus on using the power of the federal government to intentionally shape 
aeronautical growth. Those criticisms, however, assume the objective value of Hoover and Brown’s 
policies. While it appears that the Republican administration’s focus on associational policies did 
successfully support commercial growth, they also contained the potential to stifle the creation of 
new companies and privileged a few large airlines. Though Hoover and Brown deserve much credit 
for their efforts to develop American aviation, the specific manifestations of their economic 
philosophy should not be assumed to encompass the only “correct” path for American airlines. More 
significantly, Roosevelt’s actions in fact preserved the heart of Hoover’s vision. Though the new 
legislation differed from the Watres Act in many particulars, it nonetheless maintained the federal 
focus on utilizing informal airmail subsidies to support the development of commercial aviation—a 
fact that should not be taken for granted in the wake of the vitriolic rhetoric of the Black Committee 
investigation. That fact, moreover, highlights the general unanimity of opinion amongst 
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policymakers regarding aviation’s significance, and the federal government’s role in promoting 
aeronautical growth.  
Scholars have generally depicted this result as something of an accident. According to Robert 
van der Linden, in the end, Farley, Roosevelt, and the Democrats “unwittingly . . . validated Walter 
Brown’s program.”330 In van der Linden’s opinion, this resulted from the prevailing momentum that 
Hoover and Brown had created. In his words, after federal contracts were again put up for private 
bids, “the awards were given essentially to the same airlines that had flown the routes before. These 
airlines had the equipment, personnel, money, and infrastructure already in place along these routes . 
. . Realistically, no independent airline stood a chance of flying the mail more efficiently or 
safely.”331 In other words, Roosevelt’s actions appear to have achieved success in spite of his 
policies, not because of them.  
A broader view of these issues, however, serves to clarify the President’s productive role in 
bringing the airmail scandal to a close. Ultimately, Roosevelt’s actions demonstrated a coherent 
focus on promoting the development of American commercial aviation. His support for canceling 
private contacts may have been unwise, but in the wake of the army debacle he worked consistently 
to return federal airmail contracts to private operators on a sound commercial basis. Though his 
economic philosophy differed in some important details from that of his predecessor, his motives 
were similar. Moreover, he recognized the inherent value in utilizing federal airmail subsidies to 
promote aeronautical development and pushed for legislation that preserved the core of Hoover’s 
vision for American aviation. Roosevelt never considered a fundamentally different course of action, 
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eschewing any thoughts of nationalization or doing away with governmental subsidies.332 Faced with 
a difficult political situation, Roosevelt worked diligently to create a compromise addressing the 
harshest criticisms of the Watres Act while preserving its central policies. In so doing, he validated 
the central aspects of Hoover’s aviation policy and confirmed his commitment to fostering 
aeronautical growth along essentially similar lines. 
 
Roosevelt’s engagement with the airmail scandal and his efforts to help shape the Black-
McKellar Bill of 1934 pushed him to take a more active role in molding federal aviation policy. 
Specifically, the President came to believe that policymakers needed more information about all 
aspects of aviation—including, but not limited to commercial, military, private, manufacturing, 
lighter-than-air craft, and education—in order to make informed decisions regarding the federal 
government’s proper role in promoting aeronautical development. In part, that belief emerged from 
Roosevelt’s expressed worry “that the United States has no broad aviation policy.” To address that 
concern the President suggested in a White House memorandum that “Congress might well 
authorize the appointment of a commission to make immediate study and recommend . . . a broad 
policy covering all phases of aviation and the relationship of the government thereto.”333  
To that end, in the spring of 1934 Roosevelt pushed for the creation of the Federal Aviation 
Commission.334 Roosevelt encouraged the Commission to cast their nets broadly and request 
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testimony from pilots, designers, manufacturers, airline executives, labor leaders, academics, and 
policymakers. His hope was that the investigation would provide a comprehensive overview of 
American aviation. At the same time, the President anticipated that the Committee’s efforts would 
result in concrete suggestions for future federal policy. 
Through the summer and fall of 1934, a parade of the most significant figures in American 
aviation testified before the Commission. Charles Lindbergh, General William Mitchell, Juan 
Trippe, William MacCracken, Eddie Rickenbacker, W. A. Patterson and others offered their 
perspective on myriad aspects of American aeronautics and made suggestions regarding the proper 
course for federal policy. The depth and breadth of this testimony provides a singular opportunity to 
determine prevailing opinions about the contemporary state of American aviation. In addition, the 
Commission serves as a concrete example of Roosevelt’s desire to work behind the scenes to 
promote fact-finding efforts and facilitate improvements in federal aviation policy. 
The Commission’s findings reveal a remarkable unanimity of opinion regarding the most 
significant aspects of federal policy. The vast majority of witnesses urged the government to remove 
federal oversight for aviation from the Commerce Department and create an independent agency 
tasked to oversee all aspects of American aeronautics. Testimony also focused on the continued 
importance of federal airmail subsidies. Finally, witnesses almost unilaterally pushed for more 
federal engagement with both regulation and promotion. The Commission’s report reflected these 
findings and presented a comprehensive set of recommendations for changes to federal policy. These 
suggestions appear to have played a major role in the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 
                                                                                                                                  






As such, the Commission must be seen as a vital aspect of Roosevelt’s efforts to craft federal policy 
in the years after 1935.  
 
From the outset Roosevelt immersed himself in the Commission’s activities. He began by 
taking an active role in determining who would serve on the Commission itself. In a June 1934 
White House memo he articulated his opinion regarding the groups’ proper make-up. The President 
presented an outline establishing a five-member board. Members would not require congressional 
confirmation, no more then three could represent the same political party, and the members would be 
allowed to choose their own chairman. Perhaps to entice potentially reluctant commissioners, 
Roosevelt also suggested that they receive compensation equivalent to “a Senator or Representative 
in Congress.”335  
By July, Roosevelt’s plans had come to fruition. Clark Howell chaired the five-man 
Commission, which included several noted aviation-related figures. Howell, a former editor of the 
Atlanta Constitution, had served the federal government before. In 1922 Warren Harding named him 
to a special mining commission, and Herbert Hoover had tapped Howell to be a part of a national 
transportation commission. This background, plus his Democratic affiliation and political 
connections, made Howell an excellent candidate for the position. Along with Howell, the 
Commission included Edward P. Warner, Albert J. Berres, Jerome C. Hunsaker, and Franklin K. 
Lane, Jr. Both Warren and Hunsaker had longstanding connections to the aviation industry. Warner, 
a pioneer aviator in his own right, had served as chief physicist for the National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics in the years following World War I, and from 1926-29 served as the Assistant 
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Secretary of the Navy (AIR). Hunsaker taught aeronautics at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, and designed a number of significant aircraft for the U.S. Army Air Corps.  
In the wake of their respective appointments, the members of the Commission worked closely 
with Roosevelt to coordinate their agenda. On July 25, Howell wrote the President to request a 
meeting. Reminding Roosevelt that the Commission’s hearings began on September 17, Howell 
related, “it is . . . advisable before we proceed with these hearings to have a conference with you.” 
Howell suggested that the members of the Commission meet with Roosevelt at Hyde Park on 
September 14.336 Roosevelt granted Howell’s request, a fact that strongly indicates the significance 
with which he viewed the Commission’s activities.  
Before and after that meeting, Howell and the rest of the Commission worked diligently to 
fulfill the President’s wishes. Specifically, they requested testimony from virtually every significant 
player in American aviation. Organizing the Commission’s schedule by topic—air transportation, 
civil aviation, airports, national defense, procurement of military material, coast guard, lighter-than-
air craft, relations of government and industry, research and education, and aeronautical law—they 
brought scores of witnesses to Washington, D. C. to provide insights into their respective areas of 
expertise. Exemplifying their thoroughness, the Commission sent out questionnaires and requests for 
testimony to 22 airlines alone.337  
That testimony demonstrated a remarkable unanimity of opinion. Most significantly, almost 
every witness pushed for continued federal airmail subsidies. Representatives from the Post Office, 
the Commerce Department, private interest groups, and the airlines all depicted airmail revenue as a 
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necessary precondition for continued commercial growth. In addition, witnesses pushed for 
increased coordination between the government agencies involved with aviation. Some witnesses 
argued for the more radical step of creating an independent regulatory agency responsible for all 
aspects of aviation oversight. The push for increased federal engagement with flying was also 
manifested in a general desire for the government to aggressively promote aeronautics. Specifically, 
many witnesses argued for an increased governmental focus on research and education. Finally, 
testimony before the Commission overwhelmingly saw federal involvement with aeronautics as vital 
for both the commercial and military success of the United States.  
Airmail subsidies naturally formed a focal point for the Commission in the immediate wake of 
the airmail scandal and the new Black-McKellar legislation. While that law had returned postal 
contracts to private carriers, tensions remained high concerning the future of these lucrative routes. 
Almost without exception, witnesses testifying before the Commission expressed firm support for 
the continued need for subsidies. On September 25, the Commission heard testimony from Rex 
Martin, Assistant Director of the Bureau of Air Commerce. Appearing in the place of his boss—
Eugene Vidal—Martin began by focusing on the value airmail subsidies brought to the industry. In 
his prepared statement Martin argued, “adequate mail pay or subsidy for mail-passenger service is 
vital to the development of air transport and its safe operation . . . this method provides an incentive 
for the development of passenger and express business and a more rapid development of the art.” 
Martin’s perspective echoed the vision first put forward by Herbert Hoover, and cohered with Walter 
Brown’s strategy to a large degree. Like Brown, Martin hoped that “surpluses accruing as a result of 
a subsidy should be employed for expansion and new equipment.”338 In this view, airmail revenue 
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would not only provide for the solvency of American airlines, but would also promote the growth of 
passenger service and the development of new aircraft.   
Echoing Martin’s sentiment, representatives from the Post Office seconded the support for 
continued subsidies. Second Assistant Postmaster General Harllee Branch clearly expressed his 
agency’s position on the subject, stating, “there can be no doubt that the support which the 
government has given air transport through air mail pay has been largely responsible for this 
remarkable development of the aviation industry itself.” Relating that, in his opinion, the Post 
Office, more than any other government agency, carried the primary responsibility “to foster the 
development of the commercial air transport system,” Branch suggested that Post Office policy 
affected both airlines and manufacturers. In his words “by enabling the commercial companies to 
carry on, the commercial companies have been able to buy modern equipment from the 
manufacturers . . . the manufacturing companies have not only kept abreast . . . of the aviation 
development in the country, but, in our opinion, outstrips the manufacturing industry . . . of any 
other country.” As such, postal subsidies represented the centerpiece of government policy. They 
supported the growth of airlines and manufacturing firms, and maintained America’s preeminence in 
aviation. Reflecting on their significance to commercial carriers, Branch concluded his testimony by 
expressing doubt whether “there is any [airline] now operating which could continue to operate . . . 
without this help which the government gives them.”339  
Understandably, airline executives also argued for the continued necessity of airmail payments. 
Eddie Rickenbacker, Vice President of North American Aviation, stridently expressed the opinion 
that Post Office subsidies offered the best and most fiscally responsible way to promote the 
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continued development of commercial aviation. In line with Brown’s interpretation of the Watres 
Act, Rickenbacker suggested that “there should be in addition to a regular payment for the carriage 
of mail to all lines, a subsidy for a period of years, graduating down dependant entirely on the 
proved revenues from passengers and express to those lines that must have it to exist.” He grounded 
that policy by arguing that airlines “are rendering a genuine service to the traveling public, to the 
Post Office, and to the industrial life of this country.” In fact, the former ace went so far as to argue 
that not only did such a policy represent the most cost-effective way to provide such service, but that 
“the air transport industry . . . has subsidized the government [and] people as a whole.”340  
While Rickenbacker presented the most strident rhetoric in support of a continued government 
airmail subsidy, many other members of the industry echoed his general argument. Ernest Breech, 
the President of North American Aviation stated, “ I agree fully with the principle of subsidy,”341 
and W. A. Patterson, President of United Airlines, argued that government subsidies had “rebounded 
to the definite advantage of air transportation.”342 All of these men viewed federal support as 
foundational to the continued growth of American air commerce. While many argued that the 
development of air transport would eventually remove the need for such payments, in 1934 the 
general opinion strongly supported continued subsidization.  
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That support also extended to aviation interest groups. Most significantly, the Commission 
heard testimony from the National Aeronautic Association. The NAA represented the most 
significant private aviation-related organization in the country, with influence over federal policy, 
labor, and engineering. NAA President Hiram Bingham was a former U.S. Senator from 
Connecticut, and maintained close ties to lawmakers. In his testimony, Bingham suggested that 
overturning the Watres Act had been a mistake. Bingham claimed that the bill had “led to a great 
deal of criticism, and [had] been somewhat misunderstood.” Nonetheless, he argued that the 
Commission should recommend to Congress “the granting of bonuses or direct subsidy for improved 
air transport in the carrying of mail, passengers, express, and so forth.” Such a policy “would be 
advisable for the promotion of American aviation.”343  
Though subsidies represented the single greatest point of consensus among witnesses, several 
other themes stand out prominently in the Commission’s testimony. Witnesses expressed broad 
agreement that the federal government should continue and, in fact, increase its regulation of 
American aviation. Specifically, members of the government and industry argued for greater 
coordination among government agencies with ties to aviation and a stronger link between military 
and civil aviation policy. Many witnesses went so far as to argue for the creation of an independent 
Commission tasked only with overseeing aeronautics—an opinion that presaged the creation of the 
Civil Aeronautics Authority four years later.  
Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper took the lead in pushing for improved coordination 
among federal agencies. Arguing that aviation represented “an industry of the greatest importance to 
our future national defense and for serving America and the world,” Roper stated that “an effort 
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should be made more definitely to initiate a cooperative consultation among [government] agencies” 
in order to “bring about the necessary and logical Federal aviation policy and procedure.” To that 
end, Roper suggested “that the interests of aviation from every standpoint could be best served by 
the creation of an aviation commission entirely divorced from all departments of the government and 
to give continuing and comprehensive study to all phases and factors of our national aeronautical 
picture.”344  
Representatives from the industry seconded Roper’s hopes. Lester Seymour, President of 
American Airlines, laid out his ideas in no uncertain terms, stating, “it is my opinion all of our 
affairs should be controlled and regulated by one Government department. I think that department 
should have complete control over our affairs in the way of regulation, assistance . . . the setting of 
rates, the provision in reference to ground aids to navigation . . . one Government body that gives its 
complete attention to the activities of the air transport companies.”345 W. A. Patterson shared similar 
sentiments, testifying that commercial aviation would be best served by the government granting 
“broad powers to a permanent, independent federal aviation commission.” In Patterson’s opinion 
that commission should be “charged with the responsibility of the economic growth and supervision 
of civil aeronautics.”346 
On October 16, no less a figure than Charles Lindbergh expressed his support for an 
independent regulatory agency. Called to testify by the Committee “as being exceptionally well 
informed and widely experienced” in aviation-related matters, Lindbergh laid out a concrete plan for 
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the establishment of such an agency. Beginning with the assertion that “regulation is essential in the 
interests of safety,” he went on to argue, “I believe there should be a permanent aviation commission 
or some body to carry out the essential regulation of air transport. I feel that that body should be 
completely independent of any other form of transportation.” Lindbergh also expressed support for 
the general legislative outline established by Walter F. Brown. In Lindbergh’s mind, government 
oversight of airmail routes with a focus on limiting bidding to “responsible operators” represented 
the most effective way to continue aeronautical development.347  
These witnesses argued that aviation’s growing significance to the economic and military 
health of the nation necessitated a new, independent regulatory agency devoted solely to aeronautics. 
Such a commission would enable the government to centralize oversight of safety, licensing, 
infrastructure, navigation, rates, and routes under one roof. Doing so would take regulatory 
responsibilities from the Post Office, Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Bureau of Air 
Commerce in the Commerce Department and combine them in a single new agency in a drive for 
consistency and efficiency. Witnesses hoped that doing so would streamline government 
engagement with aviation and establish more stable and coherent policies.  
The broad-based support for creating such an agency highlights the unanimity of opinion 
regarding the government’s responsibility to aeronautics. Witnesses’ testimony reveals arguments 
strikingly similar to those utilized by Hoover, MacCracken, and New when pushing for the initial 
wave of aviation legislation in 1925 and 1926. Further, the desire to increase federal powers and 
unify governmental responsibility in a new, independent agency points to aviation’s growing 
significance. As commercial aviation continued to develop and airlines demonstrated that they could 
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successfully carry both passengers and cargo on regularly scheduled routes, airline executives and 
policymakers alike looked to the ever-brighter future that the new technology held for the nation. For 
these witnesses that growth necessitated increased federal engagement, and conclusively proved that 
aviation was worthy of federal support.  
Consistent with the desire for the government to support continued aeronautical development, 
many witnesses also pushed for a greater federal focus on promoting aviation. Daniel Roper argued 
that “federal policy to guide in the development of our aviation industry should encourage and 
prompt business initiative in airplane development and production.” The Secretary of Commerce 
also emphasized the need for further education. Developing his own lexicon, Roper suggested “we 
need to ‘aeorize’ our nation . . . [government] policy should stimulate proper school and educational 
endeavors among the youth of the land and cultivate air-mindedness among the people generally.”348 
Charles Lindbergh commented that government encouragement of continued research was “the 
proper thing to do,” and expressed his support for more general promotion.349  
In a later phase of the hearings, the Commission heard testimony from Dr. Karl Compton, 
President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Compton had a long history of engagement 
with aviation, serving as an aeronautical engineer in the Army Signal Corps during World War I and 
helping promote M.I.T.’s aeronautical engineering department—the first in the country, established 
in 1913.  Speaking in his capacity as an expert on engineering and as a member of President 
Roosevelt’s Science Advisory Board, Compton expressed firm support for increased federal 
promotion of aviation. Addressing “the general question of encouragement of aviation by the 
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Government,” Compton stated, “the public interest requires that the Government take whatever steps 
it can to encourage and stimulate any new developments” in aeronautics. Later, he suggested that 
aviation “has not come anywhere near realizing what its ultimate possibilities are for public service,” 
a situation that mandated continued governmental promotion.350  
A final thread flowing through the Commission’s public hearings concerned aviation’s value to 
America. Virtually every witness expressed the sentiment that aviation was central to the continued 
development of the American way of life—a fact that necessitated a clear and sound federal policy. 
Eddie Rickenbacker hoped that the Commission realized aviation’s “importance as a social, political, 
and commercial asset to this country.”351 Daniel Roper emphasized aviation’s status as “an industry 
of the greatest importance to our future national defense and for serving America . . . commercially 
and socially.”352 These statements suggest that, for most contemporary Americans, federal aviation 
policy had effects far beyond airmail rates and routes. In fact, aviation’s central importance to 
America meant that governmental engagement with aeronautics had implications for national 
security, social, political, and commercial progress, and, indeed, had the potential to affect virtually 
all aspects of America’s future. Even more significantly, it appears as if all interested parties shared 
this vision. In fact, the FAC revealed no countervailing opinion worthy of mention.353 Although the 
FAC was certainly predisposed to request testimony from those interested in aviation’s continued 
progress, the striking agreement regarding aviation’s growing influence remains noteworthy. 
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Agreement over aviation’s value, moreover, extended beyond the FAC hearings. 
Contemporary periodical coverage demonstrates that, although concerns over safety remained 
significant, by the mid 1930s many Americans had embraced aviation’s commercial potential. In 
1936 Newsweek published an article entitled “Airlines: U.S. Report Shows All Types of Air Traffic 
Soaring.” Commenting on increases in business the previous year, the article happily related, “all 
through 1935 airline officials, totting up payload manifests, beamed with satisfaction. Month after 
month their summaries showed passenger, mail and express traffic soaring to new records.”354 Two 
years later, Life was confident enough in the industry’s commercial stability to run the headline 
“Aviation Comes of Age.” Highlighting airlines’ rapid commercial development, the article related 
that “in its short life, air transport has advanced infinitely faster and more wisely then the railroads 
did in their early life.”355 These articles suggest that by the midpoint of the decade, a majority of 
Americans had eschewed cultural tropes linking aviation with danger and entertainment, and 
increasingly looked at flying as an emerging mainstream transportation technology.356  
By the end of 1934 the Commission had concluded its hearings and began to formulate its 
official report. Given the broad agreement among the Commission’s witnesses, that report broke 
little new ground. Opening with a statement confirming aviation’s significance to the nation, the 
report argued, “it should be the policy of the United States to maintain a position of world leadership 
in air transport, and to lend such aid as may be necessary to insure that the most modern and efficient 
equipment and methods shall be applied on American domestic and foreign airlines.” The 
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Commission supported continued subsidies, to that end suggesting, “whatever additional sums 
[above and beyond Postal Revenues] are for the time being necessary to maintain and develop 
adequate transport services should be allocated specifically to that purpose by the government.”357  
Howell and his fellow members pushed for commercial carriers to be issued certificates of 
convenience and necessity, for continued federal support for lighting and navigation facilities, and 
for the preservation of competition between airlines “while avoiding uneconomic paralleling of 
routes or duplication of facilities.” The Commission’s report also extended their recommendations to 
overseas routes. It argued that “promotion of American-flag carriers connecting the United States 
with our territories overseas” represented a central tenet of “the national policy of stimulating air 
transport.”358 
Reflecting the general consensus among its witnesses, the Commission also called for the 
creation of an independent aviation commission. Such an “air commerce commission” should have 
“its members appointed by the President and with the consent of the Senate for long terms.” It 
should have “broad supervisory and regulatory powers over civil aeronautics, and particularly over 
domestic and foreign air transport.” Commission members, however, were quite vague regarding the 
specific nature of those powers. While their report did suggest that the proposed commission “should 
have all powers necessary to the attainment of its general supervisory and regulatory purposes, 
including the power to hold hearings and conduct investigations,”359 it is not clear to what extent 
such a commission would supersede the activities of the Post Office or the Commerce Department. 
In fact, Howell and his peers believed that the ICC should still control airmail rates, a detail that 
                                            
357 Report of the Federal Aviation Commission (Washington D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, January 1935), Box 19, RG 197, NARA, 9. 
358 Ibid, 10-13. 





would seem to undermine the regulatory powers of the proposed commission. Nonetheless, it 
remains significant that the FAC believed that the creation of a new, independent commission was 
central to aviation’s success in America. 
Finally, the Commission’s report included numerous recommendations concerning civil and 
military aviation, education, and promotion. The report argued in favor of federal support for the 
development of more economical and easier to fly private aircraft that would allow more Americans 
to take to the air. With regard to the military, it emphasized the continued need for cooperation 
between civilian and military policymakers, the value of high quality military aircraft, and the 
promotion of integrated manufacturing organizations.360 The Commission highlighted the value that 
the NACA brought to American aeronautics in terms of both research and education, and 
recommended that the NACA work more closely with universities to foster aeronautical education 
and coordinate technological development.361  
Ultimately, the Federal Aviation Commission’s actions served to codify the widespread 
consensus regarding American aviation. Though its report did take a step forward in recommending 
that aviation fall under its own regulatory agency, both witnesses’ testimony and the Commission 
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itself primarily functioned to summarize existing attitudes vis-à-vis the government’s proper 
relationship to aeronautics. In doing so, however, the Commission largely confirmed the value of 
Hoover’s vision for American aeronautics, and at least to some extent exonerated Walter Brown. 
Clearly, most interested parties saw federal subsidies, increased regulation, and government 
oversight of rates and routes as necessary preconditions for further growth.  
Clark Howell remained in close contact with Roosevelt for the duration of the Commission’s 
activities and coordinated with the President when preparing to release the Commission’s findings to 
the public. On January 25, 1935 Howell wrote the President to emphasize the “importance of 
sending a message to the two Houses of Congress” to express support for the Commission’s 
activities. Howell summarized the FAC’s findings for Roosevelt, and, in particular, focused on the 
fact that “practically all testimony before our Commission urgently recommended the creation of [an 
independent aviation] Commission.”362  
Although Roosevelt placed his support behind the Commission’s activities, he did not move 
aggressively to initiate its recommendations at that time.363 It seems, however, that those 
recommendations had a continuing influence on his later action. His familiarity with the FAC report 
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appears to have pushed him to take a more active role in the crafting of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 
1937 and 1938. That legislation embraced the majority of recommendations put forward by the 
Commission, most importantly vesting federal control over aviation in a new regulatory agency—the 
Civil Aeronautics Authority. If nothing else, Roosevelt’s support for the creation of the FAC and his 
continued connection with its actions demonstrates an ongoing interest in federal aviation policy. 
Though that interest remained a far cry from Hoover’s focused vision, it nonetheless suggests that in 
the wake of the airmail scandal Roosevelt maintained an active interest in aviation’s importance to 
American society, commerce, and national defense. 
 
In fact, national defense figured prominently in Roosevelt’s engagement with aviation policy 
throughout the 1930s. Perhaps reflecting his early commitment to the utilization of aircraft while 
serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt demonstrated an early recognition of 
aviation’s military value—particularly air power’s value to American military preparedness. Even 
more than Hoover, Roosevelt focused on the necessity of creating a powerful air service to protect 
the country in the event of war. While he, like Hoover, saw close connections between military and 
commercial aviation, Roosevelt focused much more intentionally on building up American air 
defense as an end in itself. This focus represents an important, and generally unacknowledged, 
element of his aviation policy.364 
Significantly, Roosevelt maintained this focus in the midst of the Depression, a period of small 
military budgets and a time when isolationists held sway in Congress. In January of 1935 the 
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President wrote the Secretary of War to express his concerns about the paucity of military aircraft. 
Referencing earlier correspondence in which he had pushed for the purchase of additional airframes, 
Roosevelt made clear his recognition that the current shortage of military planes reflected the 
“failure of appropriations prior to 1933.” While the President related that “it is unwise, from the 
point of view of national finances, and, incidentally, from the point of view of public opinion, for me 
to recommend additional increases over those contained in the budget,” he nonetheless emphasized 
the need for easy access to new planes. “In regard to aircraft,” he wrote, “it is essential, in my 
judgment, that more complete plans be laid for increased production in the event of war and also that 
the private manufacturers be speeded up on actual contract construction.” Roosevelt also 
demonstrated his familiarity with the idiosyncrasies of airframe development, writing, “I recognize 
the necessary delay incident to testing of the new types—in other words, the trial planes.” Despite 
those potential problems, however, the President maintained that “when the production order is 
given . . . it takes far too long to get deliveries.”365 In simple terms, Roosevelt felt he could not 
authorize new funds for military aircraft at the moment, but pushed the Secretary of War to do all he 
could to streamline the procurement process so that, in the event of a conflict, aircraft could be built 
as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
The President’s concerns about military aviation only grew in subsequent years. In December 
of 1938 he received a memorandum from Dr. Joseph Ames, Chairman of the NACA, which warned 
of America’s increasing inability to compete with European nations in the air. Ames wrote, “the 
United States is rapidly falling behind, if it has not already fallen behind, in the development of 
aircraft.” In Ames’ opinion this fact resulted from “the emphasis that has been placed by European 
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nations on the importance of aeronautical research and their tremendous increase in research 
facilities.” The Chairman urged Roosevelt to approve funds for the improvement of American 
facilities—specifically those at Langley Field, totaling over 13 million dollars.366  
Eight months later Roosevelt again focused on the increasing need for military aircraft. Writing 
to Charles Horner, President of the National Aeronautical Association, the President expressed his 
opinion that “few objectives are more important at the present time to the commerce of the United 
States and to the national defense than the continued progress of our aviation.” He referenced the 
“expenditure of great sums to increase the size and effectiveness of our military and naval air forces” 
and expressed hope that Horner would help the government educate the American people about 
aviation’s centrality to American security. “If progress is to continue,” the President argued, it was 
vital to awaken “the American public to a full realization of the importance of these efforts.”367 
Certainly, by the summer of 1939 Roosevelt’s actions reflected an awareness of the deteriorating 
political situation in Europe, but his continuing focus on aviation’s military value is nonetheless 
consistent with earlier statements. 
Roosevelt’s commitment to American military aviation represents one of the most coherent 
aspects of his aviation policy. Throughout his time in office he maintained a focus on aviation’s 
importance to American national defense. Even in the midst of the Depression Roosevelt pushed for 
more manufacturing capacity and focused on creating a procurement system that would serve the 
country well in the event of conflict. This focus is even more significant when considering that many 
contemporaries in the American military remained unconvinced about aviation’s value on the 
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battlefield. In many ways, while military aviation took a back seat to airlines and record-setting 
efforts during the 1930s, Roosevelt’s continued recognition of aeronautics’ value to national defense 
speaks to his continuing engagement with aviation policy.   
 
Concomitant with Roosevelt’s increasing focus on military aviation during the latter part of the 
1930s was his growing interest in securing sweeping new legislation. In the wake of the Federal 
Aviation Commission’s activities and continuing debate in Congress about the best way to support 
aeronautical development, FDR took a leading role in the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Act. 368 
In addition to working closely with the bill’s eventual sponsors—Pat McCarran (D-Nevada) and 
Clarence Lea (D-California)—Roosevelt created the Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aviation 
Legislation with the goal of drafting a suitable bill. Throughout the legislative process he kept up a 
steady correspondence with interested parties and used his power to secure the passage of a bill in 
line with his interests. That bill ultimately created a new regulatory agency for aviation, in the 
process removing control from the Post Office, ICC, and Commerce Department. In doing so 
Roosevelt finally made good on Hoover’s promises of almost twenty years before. The CAA placed 
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aviation on a sound financial footing, provided for coherent and efficient regulation of rates, routes, 
navigation, and safety, and provided the administrative structure that would guide commercial 
aviation for the next forty years.  
Beginning in the early months of 1937, Roosevelt began to take a more active interest in 
securing new aviation legislation. In the wake of the Federal Aviation Commission’s report he had 
expressed lukewarm support for the Commission’s recommendations—stating his general support 
for the report but remaining silent on the value of a new administrative body. As such, his actions 
had the result of stalling attempts to craft a sweeping new law. Roosevelt’s reasons for this course of 
action remain unclear, but, nonetheless, by 1937 his tone had changed markedly.  
In February of that year Clarence Lea, the primary Congressional supporter of what would 
become the Civil Aeronautics Act, wrote to Roosevelt in the hopes of securing the President’s 
support for new legislation. Lea wrote that he was “trying to work out aviation regulatory 
legislation,” and “would be glad for any suggestion from you that would help us to express the 
Administration’s viewpoint in this new legislation.” Lea referenced Roosevelt’s “messages of 
January 13, 1935 and June 7, 1935,” and expressed hope that the President would make clear his 
wishes with regard to a new law.369 Two days later Roosevelt responded emphatically to Lea’s 
query. In a memo to his secretary he wrote, “I want to get Clarence Lea down here right away”370—
presumably to discuss new legislation. 
By late spring, Congress was beset by proposals for new aviation laws. More than half a dozen 
new statutes had been put forward, though the two most significant came from Lea and Senator Pat 
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McCarran.371 The situation called for executive leadership and in May Harry Truman wrote 
Roosevelt to brief the President on the legislative process. Roosevelt responded on May 29, stating 
that he had “not had an opportunity yet to go into the specific provisions” of the proposed 
legislation.” The President did, however, make it clear that he was “getting all the information I can 
on its various aspects.” In the same letter Roosevelt also emphasized his changing opinion regarding 
the creation of a new regulatory body. “For your information,” he wrote, “my general feeling is that . 
. . no administrative powers should be transferred to the Interstate Commerce Commission.”372 373 
At the same time, other lawmakers increasingly looked to the Administration to provide 
guidance. On May 26, Sam Rayburn (D-Texas) wrote Roosevelt, enclosing a letter from Lea and 
“urging the importance and necessity of administration interest in working out an aviation regulatory 
measure.” Rayburn stated his belief that “this is an important matter that should have early attention 
with a view of securing worthwhile legislation.”374 Less than a week later Roosevelt signaled his 
willingness to take an active role in mediating opposing pieces of legislation. Writing to his 
secretary, he stated his desire to “try to get Lea and Mead375 together and try to reconcile their two 
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bills.” Echoing his letter to Truman, he went on to make clear that “the important thing . . . is to 
prevent administrative duties from being handed over to the Interstate Commerce Commission.”376   
By July, Lea was pushing for the passage of a new law before the end of the session. Writing to 
the President at the end of the month, he emphasized that he desired to see a new bill passed “very 
much . . . before Congress adjourns.”377 Roosevelt, however, remained unwilling to commit. 
Replying to Lea on August 5, he wrote, “I believe it would be desirable to postpone this matter until 
a later time when the various agencies of the Government concerned with this vital subject may have 
a better opportunity to work out a basic national program for aviation which will serve the needs of 
the country for some time to come.”378 In large part, Roosevelt’s recalcitrance appears to have 
emerged from continuing efforts by the Post Office and Commerce Department to block new 
legislation.379 Additionally, Lea’s bill represented only one of a series of new bills put forward 
during the session. Though by this time the President clearly supported new legislation, it appears 
that he remained unconvinced that Lea’s bill contained all of the answers. 
In response to the increasingly confused legislative landscape, Roosevelt moved to create an 
independent committee tasked to author a new bill. In late July he wrote to Harllee Branch 
suggesting that as “it look [sic] now as if there will be no aviation legislation at this session . . . I 
suggest that as soon as the session closes, the Interdepartmental Committee on Civil Aviation be 
expanded to cover the whole aviation field . . . and that the Committee charge itself with the 
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preparation of a bill for the next session in January covering the whole subject of aviation, including 
mail.”380 By August, the President had altered his design and hoped to create an entirely new 
committee. Replying to a note from Roosevelt, Branch wrote that since no new legislation had been 
approved before the end of the session, “I agree with your suggestion that a special commission, 
composed of representatives of the governmental agencies at present concerned with the various 
phases of aviation, and any others whose knowledge and advice may be helpful, be named to go into 
this whole question and make recommendations to you.”381 
By September, Roosevelt had his special commission, the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Civil Aviation Legislation. Made up of representatives from the War, Navy, Commerce, and Post 
Office Departments, the President authorized the committee “to study aviation needs as related to 
future legislation, giving special attention to the bills introduced at the last session of Congress.”382 
Roosevelt hoped that the new body would be able to craft a bill adhering to his wishes, but close 
enough to Lea’s for the legislator to introduce it to Congress under the Representative’s name.   
By and large, Roosevelt got his wish. The Interdepartmental Committee completed its work by 
the beginning of the new year. It recommended a bill embracing the central suggestions put forward 
by the Federal Aviation Commission—most significantly the creation of a new “Air Commission” as 
an independent regulatory body with broad responsibilities over civil and commercial aviation. In 
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addition, the Committee’s bill provided for governmental regulation of airmail and passenger rates, 
“close and continuous governmental control of financial aid for air lines,” federal oversight of 
airlines’ financial structures, provisions for certificates of convenience and necessity for carriers, and 
governmental support for research and development.383 As such, the bill represented a significant 
change from the existing regulatory structure and laid a stable and profitable foundation for the 
industry.  
With the newly minted bill in hand, Roosevelt wasted little time in attempting to introduce the 
measure to Congress. In early January he submitted a copy of the legislation to Clarence Lea, with 
the hope that Lea could reconcile the Committee’s bill with his own. Lea responded by using the 
President’s bill as a basis from which to draft a new bill. The resulting piece of legislation, H.R. 
9738, included the vast majority of the President’s Commission’s recommendations, and quickly 
gained the support of both the President and members of the aviation industry.384 Through the spring 
of 1938 Roosevelt kept a close watch on the bill’s progress, largely though his secretary—and son—
James Roosevelt. The younger Roosevelt accomplished this through an ongoing correspondence 
with Clinton Hester, a member of the Interdepartmental Commission and a key player in reconciling 
the President’s bill with Lea’s.  
This line of communication proved particularly valuable as Lea attempted to reconcile H.R. 
9738 with a competing bill introduced to the Senate by Pat McCarran. On February 8 Hester wrote 
Roosevelt to advise the Secretary that he had been in contact with the Post Office Department and 
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Senator McCarran attempting to reconcile both parties to the Lea bill.385 In early March James 
Roosevelt penned a memo for his father warning that although “Senator McCarran this afternoon 
sent to you a letter enclosing an aviation bill . . . Hester tells me it contains none of the White House 
recommendations.”386 The same day however, James penned another memo advising the President 
that “the aviation bill [presumably Lea’s] is moving right along.”387  
Later in the month the President moved more forcefully to bring the competing pieces of 
legislation together. On March 18 Hester wrote to James Rowe, James Roosevelt’s Secretary, 
relating that, under instructions from the White House, he met with several legislators including 
Senator McKellar to get them “in line on the civil aviation legislation.”388 The President’s insistence 
eventually paid off, and by April 15 Hester was able to relate that Lea’s bill had moved out of the 
Representative’s sub-committee, and he was hopeful that the bill would be reported favorably to the 
House the following week.389  
Though arm-twisting remained to be done, the House passed Lea’s bill on May 18, paving the 
way for differences between that bill and McCarran’s Senate bill to be resolved in conference. In the 
end, Roosevelt’s efforts were rewarded with a bill that conformed in all significant details to the one 
constructed by his Interdepartmental Committee. The House agreed to the conference report on 
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Lea’s bill on June 11, and the Senate followed suit on June 13. Ten days later, Franklin Roosevelt 
signed the Civil Aeronautics Act, formally establishing the regulatory foundation that would guide 
American aviation until deregulation in the 1970s.390  
Policymakers, airline executives, and the press readily acknowledged the new law’s 
significance. The June 27 edition of Newsweek hailed the Act as a “Magna Charta of the Air,” 
drawing attention to the comprehensive nature of the legislation and remarking that the newly 
created Civil Aeronautics Authority would certainly be “more air-minded” than its forebears.391 
Time displayed a similar enthusiasm, in July telling its readers that “the new act was far better for all 
concerned than anything previously devised for air industry control.”392 Everyone, it seems, clearly 
understood the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act to be a seminal moment in the development of 
American air commerce.  
 
The passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act represented the culmination of more than twenty 
years of federal efforts to define the proper relationship between the government and aviation. 
Though that effort had begun under Herbert Hoover during his tenure as Commerce Secretary, it was 
Franklin Roosevelt who ultimately brought that dream to fruition. Roosevelt’s role in promoting the 
development of American aviation has often been overlooked in light of his apparent mishandling of 
the airmail scandal and his at times inconsistent focus on aeronautics. Those facts notwithstanding, 
Roosevelt must be seen as a figure central to the maturation of American federal aviation policy. His 
engagement with the airmail scandal, creation of the Federal Aviation Commission, commitment to 
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promoting military aeronautics, and crucial role in securing the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act 
signaled his ongoing commitment to this issue. Though he did not publicly express a powerfully 
coherent vision for aviation’s future like his predecessor, in the end his accomplishments speak for 
themselves.  
Significantly, despite the marked differences between Hoover and Roosevelt’s economic 
philosophies, the two men demonstrated remarkable unanimity in their efforts vis-à-vis aviation. 
Both consistently worked to promote commercial growth, emphasizing the need for federal 
subsidies, focusing on safety, and working to increase federal regulation and oversight. In addition, 
both undertook these efforts in the midst of the Depression, highlighting their commitment to 
aeronautical development. Operating in a cultural environment that increasingly embraced aviation’s 
commercial value, Roosevelt was ultimately able to realize Hoover’s dream of seeing commercial air 
transport reach maturity.  
Ironically, however, another piece of Roosevelt’s aviation policy has received virtually no 
attention. The President’s dedication to public works resulted in the largest federal expenditures on 
aviation infrastructure in the nation’s history, far eclipsing the efforts of the Bureau of Air 
Commerce. Through agencies like the Civil Works Administration, Public Works Administration 
and Works Progress Administration the federal government spent millions of dollars to build and 
improve airports around the country. Those expenditures resulted in the creation of tremendous new 
infrastructure and in large part created the conditions for the possibility of the postwar commercial 
aviation boom. Often overlooked, that history represents a central aspect of Roosevelt’s commitment 





Chapter 5—Laying Foundations: New Deal Public Works and Aviation 
Infrastructure 
 
 In many ways American aviation came of age during the latter half of the 1930s. In spite of the 
turmoil created by the airmail scandal of 1934 and the passage of the subsequent Black-McKellar 
Bill, this period witnessed the beginnings of widespread profitable passenger service with the 
introduction of the Douglas DC-3 in 1936, the origins of the modern air traffic control system, and, 
with the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, the creation of a regulatory foundation that 
would guide commercial aviation into the jet age and beyond. 393 In no small part, commercial 
aviation’s rapid and sustained development reflected Franklin Roosevelt’s commitment to promoting 
American aeronautics. Roosevelt’s actions—from his creation of the Federal Aviation Commission 
to his pivotal role in shaping the Civil Aeronautics Act—furthered contemporary commercial growth 
and made clear his dedication to advancing the vision established by Herbert Hoover almost 20 years 
before.  
 During the same period, however, Roosevelt’s sponsorship of New Deal public works had at 
least as significant an effect on the development of American aeronautics. Roosevelt and key 
advisors like Harold Ickes and Harry Hopkins utilized New Deal agencies like the Civil Works 
Administration (CWA), Public Works Administration (PWA), and Works Progress Administration 
(WPA) to reshape aviation infrastructure around the country, in the process constructing the literal 
foundations for future commercial growth. These actions signaled a sharp departure from Herbert 
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Hoover’s commitment to the so-called “dock” concept, and indicated an increased federal 
willingness to promote aeronautical development.394  In that effort, Roosevelt and his allies oversaw 
a significant reinterpretation of Hoover’s vision regarding the government’s proper role vis-à-vis 
aviation and opened the door to a dramatic extension of federal responsibility.  
Between 1933 and 1939 New Deal public works agencies expended tens of millions of dollars 
on aviation-related projects, in the process building or improving almost 1,000 airfields around the 
country. Significantly, the disbursement of these monies mandated local buy-in; towns and cities had 
to submit formal requests for federal funds. As such, New Deal public works spending on aviation 
infrastructure reflects a unique synergy between American air-mindedness and expanding federal 
effort to support aeronautical development. Hundreds of towns and cities clamored for access to 
federal funds to improve their local airports, while New Dealers strove to distribute federal capital to 
the projects with the greatest potential to advance American aviation. These efforts represent one of 
the most significant, and certainly one of the most overlooked, elements of Franklin Roosevelt’s 
aviation policy. They mandate a reevaluation of that policy, but also highlight the enduring legacy of 
New Deal public works spending.  
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Franklin Roosevelt came to embrace public works spending as a part of his ongoing efforts to 
combat the economic dilemmas brought on by the Great Depression. In an effort to jump-start the 
moribund economy and create employment opportunities for untold thousands of Americans, 
Roosevelt and his fellow New Dealers oversaw the creation of a wide-ranging public works 
infrastructure. Under the auspices of organizations like the PWA, CWA, and WPA, the Roosevelt 
Administration expended billions of dollars on public buildings, roads, bridges, dams, and airports. 
According to historian Jason Scott Smith, between 1933 and 1939 the federal government disbursed 
more than two-thirds of its emergency expenditures on public works programs, an increase of 1,650 
percent over the four-year period preceding the Depression.395 Initially designed primarily to put 
Americans to work, these organizations ultimately changed the American landscape.  
A survey of these programs’ accomplishments makes clear how significant their legacy has 
been. During its tenure, the PWA, relying on private contractors and focusing for the most part on 
large-scale construction projects like the Boulder Dam, spent its funds in 3,068 of the nation’s 3,071 
counties. Following its creation in 1935, the WPA focused on lighter construction and eschewed 
private contracts. It was responsible for building 78,000 bridges, improving almost 40,000 public 
buildings, building 480 airports and improving 470 others.396 The WPA also created a number of 
subsidiary organizations, such as the Federal Writer’s Project and the National Youth 
Administration. Among other efforts, WPA employees recorded oral histories of surviving former 
slaves, painted murals around the country, and employed thousands of young people while providing 
them with job training. These programs created physical reminders of the New Deal’s lasting 
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influence on American life and, as Smith suggests, “wrought in concrete and steel a tangible 
representation of [New Deal] political philosophy.”397  
For the most part, however, historians have overlooked these agencies’ lasting contributions to 
the American landscape. According to Smith, liberal historians like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and 
William Leuchtenburg “presented public works programs as well-intentioned welfare programs that 
failed to end unemployment.”398 An overview of these historians’ works supports Smith’s point. 
Schlesinger offers an analysis of New Deal public works grounded in the assumption that these 
programs’ primary function was relief. He grants their productive capacities, but focuses on their 
short-term value to the Depression-era economy, rather than their lasting legacy for America.399 
Leuchtenburg suggests that Roosevelt’s actions represented a “bold departure” resulting in 
“impressive achievement,” but nonetheless dismisses public works’ ultimate value. Leuchtenburg is 
particularly critical of the WPA, which he argues “never came close to meeting Roosevelt’s goal of 
giving jobs to all who could work.” In this analysis, public works should be viewed as a failure, 
having never achieved their intended function.400 401 
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 More recent interpretations give even less credence to public works agencies’ value. Most 
visible among these analyses is the work of Howard Zinn. Zinn argues that public works programs 
represented an outgrowth of Roosevelt’s “opportunistic” political savvy, embodying far more style 
than substance. In this analysis agencies like the PWA and WPA furthered a public works agenda 
“called into play only in times of desperation,” ultimately serving to codify the ”ideological and 
emotional limits” of the New Deal.402 Summarizing this line of analysis, Smith argues that Zinn and 
his fellow revisionists portray New Deal public works as “underfunded measures that served only to 
prop up the existing order,”403 rather than honest attempts to improve the country’s economic straits 
and promote infrastructure development.404  
Collectively, these interpretations fail to grant New Deal public works agencies the credit they 
deserve. Public works spending, in fact, profoundly advanced American infrastructure. Although 
New Deal agencies did not realize the short-term goal of employing all out-of-work Americans and 
ending the Depression, these programs re-made America through the construction of bridges, 
buildings, roads, dams, airports, and countless other improvements. In Smith’s words, these New 
Deal programs “were an extraordinarily successful method of state-sponsored economic 
development” that transformed the physical American landscape and redefined government’s 
relationship to the people.405  
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Nowhere was this truer than America’s airports. Through federal funding and public works 
organizations, the nation’s transportation infrastructure witnessed a revolution. When Franklin 
Roosevelt assumed the Presidency, the majority of American airports were little more than level 
grass fields with a windsock, a hangar or two, and possibly a lighted beacon. Although the 
Commerce Department worked steadily to improve navigation and radio aids for pilots and construct 
emergency landing fields along major airmail routes in the years after 1926, by the early ‘30s the 
majority of U.S. airports remained largely unimproved.  
In large part, this situation reflected the legacy of Herbert Hoover’s commitment to the so-
called “dock” concept. The federal government’s unwillingness to subsidize airport construction—
and indeed its inability after the passage of the 1926 Air Commerce Act—resulted in airport 
development proceeding haphazardly throughout the 1920s and early 1930s.406 Further complicating 
matters, while the Air Commerce Act clearly defined airfields as a local responsibility, it did little to 
delineate the nature of that local control. As a result, by the mid 1920s a variety of public and private 
interests—municipalities, private individuals, and private organizations, among others—controlled 
various airports around the country.407  
Beginning after the passage of the Air Commerce Act, several factors pushed airports to 
embrace increasingly standardized operating procedures. First, the formalization of federal 
regulation pushed state after state to pass enabling legislation formally approving municipal 
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ownership of airfields.408 Second, the newly created Bureau of Aeronautics moved aggressively to 
establish airways and enforce standardized safety and licensing regulations. This push for 
standardization in turn highlighted the need for uniform principles of airport operation. The 
evolution of navigational aids and radio communication further emphasized the need for consistent 
practices on the ground as well as in the air. Finally, as commercial aviation grew and matured, 
pilots and airlines increasingly embraced standardized practices in radio communication, scheduling, 
ticketing, and flight operations.409  
As airports became increasingly standardized, support for municipal ownership also grew. 
Supporters of public ownership pointed to the leading role the federal government embraced in 
licensing, safety regulation, and infrastructure creation, arguing that local control should begin 
where federal control ended. Further, proponents contended that public ownership of airports 
represented the only way to ensure that all users would be treated fairly, as interested parties worried 
that private owners might be tempted to sell airport property if a more profitable use presented 
itself—something public control would protect against. Finally, in many cases airports proved to be 
unprofitable enterprises, a significant problem for private ownership but less of a concern for local 
governments that increasingly came to view airfields as a municipal asset: attracting air service, 
promoting modernization, and serving as a visible example of a town or city’s “air mindedness.”410  
                                            
408 Before 1926, it remained unclear whether local governments had the authority to own 
airfields. During this period the status of aviation regulation remained murky, and it was 
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airports, airways, and general oversight. As a result, many municipalities were reluctant 
to undertake airport ownership. Following the passage of the Air Commerce Act, 
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As a result, by the mid 1930s the template for America’s airports had for the most part been 
established. Airfields would serve as public utilities, embracing standardized operational principles 
and promoting both local and national interests. That template, however, predominantly applied to 
unimproved fields lacking a majority of the services crucial to modern commercial operations. 
Airports’ lack of improvement became an increasing liability as commercial operations 
matured in the early 1930s. As passenger services expanded and newer, larger, and faster aircraft 
came into service, grass fields and a lack of adequate terminal space proved increasingly inadequate 
to meet the growing needs of airlines and passengers alike. By 1934, with the passage of the Black-
McKellar Bill and the introduction of the Douglas DC-2,411 it became increasingly clear that 
virtually all of America’s airports would need significant improvements to handle growing passenger 
traffic and larger, heavier aircraft. The weight and speed of new aircraft necessitated paved, 
reinforced runways that would not become waterlogged after heavy rains or throw up clouds of dust 
during droughts. Airlines needed larger hangars for these planes, and growing passenger traffic 
mandated larger terminals and more organized ticketing and boarding procedures. Additionally, as 
radio and navigational aids continued to improve, airports found themselves needing ever-increasing 
funds to stay abreast of current developments.412 In short, the rapid development of commercial 
aviation and the increasing importance of passenger operations mandated that airports rapidly 
improve their facilities or risk missing out on airline service. 
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412 While the Commerce Department took responsibility for funding and constructing 
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Airports, 41-48, and Nick Kommons, Bonfires to Beacons: Federal Civil Aviation Policy 






Unfortunately, the financial conditions created by the Depression meant that at the time when 
municipal governments had the greatest need to fund aviation-related improvements, they were the 
least able to do so. The economic downturn hamstrung municipalities unable to fund basic 
governmental services, to say nothing of paved runways, airport perimeter lighting, and large new 
terminal buildings. As a result, airport development lagged far behind the rapid progress affecting 
aircraft and airlines during the same period. By the mid 1930s, hundreds of American towns and 
cities found their ability to provide commercial service limited by their obsolete airports, and 
hundreds of others lacked fields suitable for commercial operations.   
This context set the stage for the tremendous gains New Deal public works programs brought 
to American airports. FDR’s willingness to abandon the dock concept—and its attendant limitations 
on federal aid—signaled a new federal willingness to support infrastructure development. Most 
significantly, the WPA Airways and Airports Division spent hundreds of millions of dollars to build 
new airfields and improve existing airports around the country. While the strictures imposed by the 
Air Commerce Act somewhat limited public works agencies’ actions—for example, the WPA 
expended tremendous funds to pay for labor, but refused appropriations for materials—these 
agencies nonetheless wrought fundamental changes to American airport infrastructure.  
Notably, aviation-related public works spending did not finance “make-work” programs. 
Between 1933 and 1939 public works agencies—led by the WPA’s Airways and Airports 
Division—focused on providing funds to aviation-related projects that would offer the maximum 
benefit to both local communities and the nation at large. Those projects emerged from collaboration 
between municipal governments and federal officials. Localities had to voluntarily apply for federal 
dollars and substantiate the utility of the proposed work. WPA administrators carefully weighed 





works funding thus provided a vital resource for communities unable to undertake airport 
improvements on their own—a crucial resource in the midst of the Depression. Further, the concrete 
results brought about by WPA activities highlight the gains New Deal public works brought to 
American aviation during a period of rapid aeronautical development.  
New Deal public works’ aviation-related activities must be seen as integral to Franklin 
Roosevelt’s aviation policy and a fundamental element of the New Deal’s lasting legacy. Public 
works projects modernized America’s airports and created the literal foundation for the postwar 
boom in commercial aviation. New Deal agencies built and/or improved almost 1,000 U.S. airfields 
in the years before 1939, providing much-needed jobs to thousands of Americans and funding the 
creation of infrastructure that fueled commercial aviation’s dramatic postwar growth. Through 
airport expansion, the construction of paved and concrete runways, new terminals, new and larger 
hangars, paved ramps, the installation of perimeter lighting, runway lighting, spotlights, and the 
construction of entirely new airports, these agencies fashioned the physical foundations that created 
the conditions for the possibility of widespread commercial passenger service in large, modern 
airliners. Largely ignored by scholars of both aviation and the New Deal, these agencies’ actions 
serve as concrete evidence of the President’s lasting commitment to promoting American 
aeronautical development. Their massive expenditures revealed a new federal willingness to take an 
activist role in airport construction, and the nature of the improvements they created stand as a 
testament to the value of those public works programs.  
 
From the outset, public works formed a central element of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal 
political agenda. Knowing even before his election that his response to the social and economic 





moved quickly to enact a dynamic legislative program. The first hundred days of Roosevelt’s 
Presidency have rightly become legend. The rapid passage of bills like the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act, along with the creation of institutions like the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Federal 
Emergency Relief Agency formed one of the most creative legislative periods in American history. 
These institutions radically altered the relationship between the American government and people, in 
the process redefining government’s responsibility to its citizens. Along with later New Deal bills 
like the Social Security Act, these programs formed the core of a legislative revolution that continues 
to shape Americans’ lives to the present day.413 
Within that larger context, public works formed a central element of Roosevelt’s strategy to 
mitigate the harshest effects of the Depression. According to Jason Scott Smith, these programs 
“emerged at the intersection of economic development and unemployment,” promoting the dual 
goals of works relief and infrastructure creation.414 In doing so, they built on a tradition of utilizing 
government-funded building programs to allay high levels of unemployment. Smith relates that the 
goal of lowering prohibitive unemployment motivated state-sponsored infrastructure programs as old 
as the Erie Canal. As a result, by the early 20th century, a “generation of businessmen and politicians 
. . . came to associate public works spending with economic stabilization and economic growth.” 
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(New York: Vintage Books, 1955); Carl Degler, Out of Our Past: The Forces that 
Shaped Modern America (New York: Harper and Row, 1984); Leuchtenburg, FDR and 
the New Deal, and Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal. 





That generation included figures like Herbert Hoover and William Gibbs MacAdoo, men whose 
economic philosophies emerged from a broadly progressive tradition.415  
Following America’s descent into Depression in the fall of 1929, Hoover found himself in 
desperate need of methods through which to mitigate the effects of the economic downturn. Initially, 
he moved to increase funding for public road building, but quickly discovered that the economic 
situation called for more radical action. Hoover’s subsequent creation of the President’s Emergency 
Committee for Unemployment (PECU) and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) signaled 
a new willingness to use federal funds to stimulate employment though public works.416  
Unfortunately for the Republican President, neither of these programs served to lift America 
out of the Depression. PECU expenditures proved insufficient to offset the massive decline in state 
and local construction projects, and the RFC’s program of offering loans to banks and railroads 
received widespread criticism for offering money to those who needed it the least. By the eve of the 
1932 election, Hoover’s public works programs lay in disarray, and the country seemed farther than 
ever from economic recovery.417 
 In spite of their apparent failure, Hoover’s actions ultimately proved constructive by providing 
a template for his successors’ public works agenda. Specifically, Hoover’s passage of the 
Emergency Relief and Construction Act (ERCA) in 1932—the legislative foundation for the RFC—
created the blueprint for Roosevelt’s Public Works Administration. With the powers granted to it by 
the ERCA, the RFC provided for federal loans to states for work relief, made loans available to 
states for self-liquidating public works projects like roads and bridges, and approved additional 
federal funds for the creation of national public works projects like the Boulder Dam. In doing so, 
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Smith argues that the ERCA “established an important precedent by demonstrating alternative uses 
of the state’s capacity to influence society,”418 a capacity Roosevelt would soon expand.419 
Upon assuming the Presidency, Roosevelt immediately moved to enlarge federal public works 
expenditures. FDR’s efforts began with the passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 
in June of 1933. Title II of the NIRA provided for the creation of what ultimately became the PWA 
with an appropriation of 3.3 billion dollars. Those monies—the equivalent of more than 45 billion 
dollars today—represented almost six percent of the U.S. gross domestic product that year, and more 
than 165 percent of the government’s revenues. Roosevelt and his aides—notably Harold Ickes, 
Secretary of the Interior and subsequent Director of the PWA, and Francis Perkins, Secretary of 
Labor—hoped that the funds would be sufficient to relieve unemployment while simultaneously 
improving the nation’s infrastructure.420  
In a July 1933 press release, Ickes described the goals of the newly announced public works 
program. “The intention,” he stated, “is to employ as much labor as possible in order to speed up the 
return of prosperity.” To that end, he argued that federal employment on public works projects 
would have benefits for all of society, not merely those receiving a government check.421 Ickes 
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Olsen, Herbert Hoover and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (Ames: Iowa State 
University Press, 1977). 
419 It should also be noted that Roosevelt had at least some personal experience 
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infrastructure. 
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suggested that “by employing as many people as possible at a living wage we will give buying 
power to the persons so employed.” This, in turn, would stimulate new buying power as local 
businesses profited from increased commerce. “Then, factories will begin to turn out more goods 
and the stores will sell more goods. Thus more and more people will be employed, until . . . we have 
an ascending economic spiral.”422 
For Ickes, the goal of creating economic growth mandated that the PWA only expend funds on 
projects with a demonstrable value beyond the immediate employment they might offer. In his 
words, the PWA should only fund “socially desirable” projects. That social value, he contended, 
necessitated that any public works project “must contribute something of value to the community 
and not merely be a makeshift to supply work.”423 In a speech to the American Conference of 
Mayors in September 1933, Ickes expanded on that theme, suggesting that PWA programs offered 
“the greatest opportunity for municipal improvements in the history of the country.”424 As such, the 
Interior Secretary clearly delineated the dual goals of New Deal public works. Though Ickes later 
received criticism for his parsimonious disposition of PWA funds, his early articulation of 
Roosevelt’s agenda clearly established the ideological foundation for these New Deal programs.425 
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Soon, New Deal public works activities expanded far beyond the initial dictates of the NIRA. 
The preliminary PWA appropriation formed the beginning of what ultimately became a series of 
massive New Deal expenditures on public works. In 1935 Roosevelt created the WPA with an initial 
appropriation of 4.88 billion dollars, and both the PWA and WPA received additional funds during 
their respective tenures. Roosevelt also pushed for the creation of the CWA and the Civilian 
Conservation Corps (CCC), though these programs proved far less costly than either the PWA or 
WPA.426 Collectively, these programs signaled the ongoing centrality of public works to Roosevelt’s 
New Deal. These agencies disbursed billions of taxpayer dollars to stimulate employment and 
improve the American landscape. Projects like the Hoover Dam, the Appalachian Trail, roads, 
bridges, airports, public buildings, and countless other improvements came to fruition under the 
auspices of New Deal public works. Admittedly, these programs did not pull the United States out of 
the Depression. They did, however, fundamentally change the American landscape and served to 
redefine the relationship between the American government and the people. In fact, Smith goes so 
far as to argue that the New Deal and its public works agenda “saved capitalism.”427 Regardless of 
that fact, however, public works must be seen as an integral element of Roosevelt’s New Deal 
agenda—not merely as an attempt to promote employment, but as an effort to promote the creation 
of valuable infrastructure. 
 
Nowhere were those dual goals more apparent than in New Deal efforts to construct airports 
and other aviation-related infrastructure. New Deal public works offered a unique remedy for the 
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prevailing conditions aviation faced in the mid 1930s. Largely through the efforts of the WPA’s 
Airways and Airports Division—which funded improvement programs for virtually every American 
airport—public works expenditures revolutionized the American air transport network, laying the 
groundwork for the modern air commerce system and creating the conditions for the possibility of 
dynamic growth during the postwar period. These efforts stand as a preeminent example of 
Roosevelt’s efforts to support the growth of American commercial aviation. Almost universally 
overlooked by historians, Roosevelt’s support for public works formed a vital pillar of his aviation 
policy and highlighted his willingness to embrace a dynamic model of economic development. 
Even before the creation of the WPA in 1935, members of the Roosevelt Administration 
identified airports as sites that would benefit from public works expenditures. As early as 1933 the 
CWA embarked on an ambitious program to improve airports around the country. In an October 
1934 memo, Harry Hopkins outlined the goals of that effort.428 Reporting that the CWA had 
launched the “airport program” in the winter of 1933, Hopkins stated that the public works agency 
undertook “improvement and construction on a very elaborate and extensive scale.” The program 
invited communities to “pledge themselves generously in one way or another” to acquire land for the 
creation of new or improvement of existing facilities. More than 2,000 did so, a figure almost equal 
to the number of the country’s recognized airports at the start of the program.429 Significantly, CWA 
                                            
428 At the time Hopkins was serving as the head of the Federal Emergency Relief Agency 
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the CWA, a short-lived works program spanning the winter of 1933-34. Roosevelt later 
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efforts mandated local buy-in, basing appropriations on communities’ willingness and ability to 
contribute to the process. The immediate positive response suggests widespread public support for 
aeronautical development, and highlights the collaborative nature of New Deal public-works policy 
with regard to aviation. In fact, the CWA program appears to have created the template that guided 
subsequent WPA activities.   
In that effort, the CWA worked closely with the Commerce Department to ascertain the most 
beneficial way to disburse federal funds. According to Hopkins, “it was decided to make a study in 
cooperation with the Aeronautical Branch of Commerce . . . to determine a plan likely to give the 
best results from an aviation standpoint considering the needs and requirements of our national 
defense branches, the probable extension of commercial air transport, and the necessity for 
emergency facilities.” The result of that study was an airport building program focused on the 
creation of safer landing fields. The CWA asked participating communities to confine expenditures 
to projects that “would result in the preparation of the best possible landing fields” designed to 
“directly add to the safety of commercial air transport.”430  
Though it lasted less than six months, the CWA program was an apparent success. The October 
memo documented that states and localities demonstrated “wholehearted support” for the plan. By 
the conclusion of the program, CWA funds had funded 2,000 projects, half of which had achieved 
completion.431 In Hopkins’ opinion the CWA effort “resulted in the greatest contribution to the 
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safety and convenience of air transport during the history of its development.”432 Though perhaps a 
bit of an overstatement, Hopkins’ enthusiasm demonstrates the Roosevelt administration’s early 
commitment to utilizing public works appropriations to fund airport improvement. Hopkins’ early 
engagement with aviation projects prefaced the actions of the WPA’s Airways and Airports 
Division. Even more significantly, the CWA’s cooperation with the Aeronautics Branch displayed a 
genuine desire to promote projects with maximum value for American aeronautics. Although it 
distributed less than two million dollars, the CWA effort set the stage for later, larger public works 
aviation projects and created a precedent for funding projects with definitive value for American 
aviation.  
The influence of the short-lived CWA program soon spread far beyond Hopkins’ office. By the 
spring of 1935 reference to that program appeared in testimony before Roosevelt’s Federal Aviation 
Commission. John Geisse, head of the Bureau of Air Commerce’s Development Section, highlighted 
the program’s value in his prepared statement. Commenting that public works expenditures on 
airports “are in the interests of every man, woman and child in the United States,”433 he argued that 
public works projects had value both “as a stimulus to recovery and as an aid to national defense.”434  
Geisse’s testimony centered on the material benefit public works’ expenditures could bring to 
communities, the nation, and the aviation industry. Geisse referred to the CWA program as a 
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template, arguing “what can be accomplished by . . . Federal assistance was most clearly 
demonstrated at the start of our Civil Works Administration Airport Project.” Geisse explained that 
the CWA program operated as “a semi-Federal project in which additional funds over [localities’] 
regular allotment were to be allocated to those communities desiring airport facilities and willing to 
acquire sites.” Like Hopkins, Geisse found the response from localities around the country to be 
immediate and enthusiastic. In fact, he told the Commission that his office “was absolutely swamped 
with requests for assistance.” In Geisse’s opinion, had the program continued it would have resulted 
in every American community of substance having its own airport.435  
 Unfortunately, the CWA program ended before that goal could be realized. As a result, Geisse 
focused on the pressing need for additional airfield construction. He reported that over 1,000 
American cities with populations of 5,000 or more lacked landing facilities, in addition to more than 
15,000 communities with populations under 5,000. Even more worrying, he reported that the 
majority of airports in America’s larger cities were “most inaccessible.” For Geisse, public works 
represented the best way to address the urgent need for improved aviation infrastructure. Federal 
expenditures would “accomplish much in eliminating this unfortunate condition,” he testified, and 
“permit the airplane to attain the utility of which it is capable.”436  
Geisse’s testimony certainly reflected the influence of his position as an employee of the 
Bureau of Aeronautics, but his plea for public works resounded beyond his departmental agenda. 
Geisse’s identification of the CWA program’s value, and his focus on localities’ enthusiastic 
embrace of that program suggests widespread support for aviation-related public works projects. 
Further, Geisse’s statements convey localities’ inability to fund such improvements themselves. 
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Economic conditions conspired to limit air-minded communities’ ability to improve facilities, a 
situation Geisse argued hurt both the localities themselves and the nation at large.  
Indeed, Geisse argued that federal expenditures on aviation-related projects were uniquely 
capable of benefiting municipalities, the aviation industry, and the nation.437 While he argued that 
public works projects would have immediate material benefit for national defense, he also suggested 
that funding aviation projects had great potential to stimulate economic development. Geisse began 
this line of reasoning by explaining that “the amount of Federal expenditure which would be 
justified in fostering aviation . . . must be reached by consideration of the amount of employment 
which can be provided per dollar of Federal expenditures as compared to that which can be 
accomplished by other means.” Aviation-related spending, he claimed, had the potential to stimulate 
employment far more than spending on highways, public parks, and public buildings. Geisse 
reported that “airplane manufacturers . . . have been able to make sales in the vicinity of the C.W.A. 
airport projects that they could not possibly have made without this activity.” That “induced 
expenditure” for new aircraft “provides a continuous market for labor that is not provided in the 
other types of projects mentioned and which is additional to that occasioned directly and indirectly 
by the Federal expenditure.” Therefore, public works spending on aviation infrastructure had the 
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potential to sustain an entire industry, as well as promoting the continued development of the nation 
at large.438 
Indeed, for Geisse, promoting aeronautical development represented a foundational investment 
in America’s future. As such, he argued that “Federal expenditures on aviation are not at all intended 
to provide greater pleasure or profit to those directly concerned in the purchase and sale of aircraft.” 
Instead, they represented an avenue through which the government could promote national 
development. Reminding the Commission that their mission was to concern themselves “with the 
future of aviation, not the present,” Geisse called upon Commission members to “consider the utility 
of the airplane not as it is today but rather what it may reasonably expect to become five or ten years 
hence.” In his estimation, “the provision of landing facilities at close intervals and convenient to the 
places you or I may care to visit together with the development of safer and more economical 
airplanes will have a profound effect on our inclination to purchase an airplane.” Geisse thus 
envisioned a truly air-minded nation, a nation with a dense network of commercial air transport, and 
a nation in which a significant minority of citizens actually owned a plane.439  
Geisse’s testimony demonstrates that he understood aviation-related public works to have 
ramifications far beyond airport boundaries. While highlighting these projects’ immediate material 
benefits, he focused just as strongly on how the continuation of a public works agenda had the 
potential to revolutionize American life. Geisse was certainly inclined to emphasize aviation’s 
current and future value, but his focus on public works remains significant. Like Hopkins, Geisse 
saw public works not merely in terms of immediate employment, but in terms of what that 
employment could create. Indeed, if anything, Geisse’s statements seem overly focused on the 
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revolutionary potential public works had to create a truly air-minded nation. Nonetheless, Geisse’s 
identification of the CWA program’s immediate material value and the potential of similar projects 
to revolutionize American aviation stands as a testament to the influence of emerging public works 
ideology—specifically, public works’ central place in plans for aeronautical development.  
 
Those plans accelerated dramatically following Roosevelt’s creation of the WPA in the spring 
of 1935. Under the direction of Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt tasked the WPA with providing direct 
employment—largely to unskilled laborers—on building projects around the country. Unlike the 
PWA, which operated through government contracts with private contractors, the WPA focused on 
maximizing the number of workers on government payrolls. That goal has resulted in scholars 
criticizing Hopkins and other WPA administrators for promoting make-work projects and valuing 
employment over production.440 In this analysis, the WPA’s inability to pull the United States out of 
its depressive cycle highlights the agency’s ultimate failure. As Jason Scott Smith points out, 
however, the WPA did in fact build things—often working on construction projects with lasting 
value for the country. 
This was certainly the case regarding WPA efforts to construct aviation-related infrastructure. 
In fact, from the outset, Hopkins and other WPA administrators demonstrated a clear focus on 
funding projects with the highest potential to promote the rational growth of American aviation. 
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Working closely with local governments and private interest groups, the WPA’s Airways and 
Airports Division demonstrated a keen interest in aeronautical development, and within the confines 
of its agency’s mission strove to maximize the value that its appropriations brought to construction 
projects around the country.441  
From its inception, the WPA Airways and Airports Division’s work reflected the influence of 
the CWA airport-building program preceding it. Significantly, WPA administrators looked upon 
their efforts as an attempt to realize the unfulfilled goals that the CWA and Bureau of Air Commerce 
had identified two years before. In September of 1935, Airways and Airports Division Technical 
Supervisor L. L. Odell reported that as of the 14th of the month, the WPA had approved work on 459 
projects around the country, encompassing a total federal appropriation of $57,500,000.442 That 
figure dwarfed the total CWA expenditures for airport construction, and begins to give a sense of the 
magnitude of the scale upon which WPA efforts took place.  
Odell, however, provided those figures in order to demonstrate how far short WPA 
appropriations fell of the goals set by the Bureau of Air Commerce. Odell related that the joint 
CWA/Commerce program had identified a total of 1,229 first priority work projects, necessitating 
the allocation of $80,400,000 in federal funds. The Supervisor, however, estimated that Commerce 
had undervalued the cost of many of those projects. In Odell’s opinion, the completion of all 1,229 
projects would require the disbursement of an additional $76,500,000, for a total of $113,000,000. 
Despite the enormity of this sum, Odell “respectfully suggested that WPA funds in the total amount 
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(including projects already approved) . . . be earmarked for allocation to Airway and Airport work” 
in order to “meet the requirements of the Bureau of Air Commerce program.”443 
While the WPA ultimately fell short in its effort to realize the goals established by the 
Commerce program,444 Odell’s focus on funding meaningful projects certainly challenges the 
WPA’s make-work stereotype.  As with the CWA efforts, the Airways and Airports Division took its 
lead from the Bureau of Air Commerce, the government agency most closely associated with 
aeronautics. That relationship suggests that the WPA formed a part of a larger government effort to 
promote the continued development of American flying. Obviously, this took place within the 
strictures of WPA efforts to promote employment, but it remains significant that administrators 
identified goals related to infrastructure development, not merely work rolls.  
Additionally, both the CWA and WPA airport-building programs highlight the Roosevelt 
Administration’s abandonment of the “dock” concept of government responsibility for airways. 
Utilizing public works funds for airport construction flew in the face of Hoover and MacCracken’s 
theory that government responsibility should end at the airport’s boundary. Although this new 
willingness to fund federal aviation-related construction projects certainly had its roots in the 
pressing economic needs of the 1930s, it remains significant that Roosevelt and Hopkins did not 
hesitate to create an Airways and Airports Division within the WPA and disburse funds for airport 
construction. In fact, this move may have precipitated a legislative change. The Civil Aeronautics 
Act removed proscriptions on federal funding for airports, allowing the government to take the lead 
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in funding the creation of a national air traffic control system and encouraging an ongoing federal 
push for airfield improvement.445  
By the spring of 1936, the WPA had backed away from its hopes of fully realizing the goals 
established by the Bureau of Air Commerce program. Nonetheless, the public works agency 
maintained its commitment to funding aviation-related projects with demonstrable aeronautical 
value. A March press release stated that as of February 15, the agency had released funds for 410 
airport and airway projects. Those projects, 325 of which were already under construction, would 
employ 50,000 men, and involved funds totaling $21,090,965.446 The same document also provided 
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an update on the number of Washington-approved aviation-related projects. To date, Roosevelt had 
signed off on more than 1,400, encompassing total allocations of $110,172,828.447 
According to Hopkins, those approvals reflected a concerted effort by WPA administrators to 
fund projects with a maximum value for both employment and infrastructure. The Director 
explained, “the WPA airways and airport program illustrates the co-ordinated effort required in the 
creation of works of national value through employment of labor formerly on relief.” WPA staff, he 
related, worked closely with other federal agencies, including the Departments of Treasury, War, 
Navy, Commerce, and the Post Office to maximize the value of WPA public works. The Airways 
and Airport Division, moreover, continued to work in concert with the Bureau of Air Commerce to 
ensure the utility of aeronautical projects. “Arrangement has been made with the Bureau of Air 
Commerce,” Hopkins emphasized, “for the inspection of all WPA airway and airport projects as to 
their aeronautical fitness.”448 As he had since 1933, Hopkins worked diligently to support 
improvements to aviation infrastructure while simultaneously fulfilling his obligation to put 
Americans to work. Though the strictures imposed by the WPA’s enabling legislation made it 
impossible to strictly adhere to the Bureau of Air Commerce’s ultimate goals, WPA administrators 
maintained their focus on aeronautical progress. 
As state administrators released funds on more and more projects, both WPA employees and 
the American public began to appreciate the concrete gains the Airways and Airports Division 
brought to the American landscape. In the fall of 1937, the WPA’s Washington office sent a party of 
observers on a three-week airport inspection trip around the country, traveling more than 11,000 
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miles and visiting 30 states. Designed to evaluate the work WPA activities had accomplished to date, 
members’ interactions with local government officials and the general public also revealed 
Americans’ opinions of that work. A. B. McMullen, Chief of the WPA Airport Section Safety and 
Planning Division, reported that he “found the highest praise for the work the WPA has done, 
particularly on airports.”449 That praise, however, did not necessarily reflect a comprehensive 
knowledge of WPA activities. W. Sumpter Smith, the WPA’s Principal Aeronautical Engineer, 
wrote he “was surprised at the fact . . . that the great majority of the local businessmen with which 
the personnel of our party came into contact had practically no idea of the actual workings of the 
WPA, how they functioned, or just what they were actually accomplishing.” Despite that ignorance, 
Smith indicated that “these businessmen were amazed to know the extent of actual worthwhile 
permanent physical facilities” being constructed with WPA funds.450  
Public appreciation for these WPA projects seems to have sprung at least in part from their 
relationship to aeronautics. McMullen wrote that “the most outstanding and interesting incident in 
connection with this trip was the keen interest in aviation demonstrated by the public officials, 
business men [sic] and influential citizens wherever we went.” Significantly, he also found that 
Americans’ interest in aviation encompassed far more than a desire to improve their individual 
communities. McMullen enthusiastically commented on Americans’ almost universal “desire to see 
not only a satisfactory airport in their own community but a nationwide system of airports adequate 
to permit the continual growth and safe operation of air transportation in the United States.”  
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This focus on development extended beyond infrastructure creation. Relating his discovery of 
“another idea that seemed to be prevalent in all sections of the country,” McMullen observed that 
citizens highlighted the “necessity for a well planned long-term program of airport and airway 
development with the Federal Government.”451  Collectively, McMullen’s comments highlight 
aviation’s continued prevalence for a majority of Americans. Local enthusiasm for the WPA 
program—evidenced by the number of local requests, towns and cities’ willingness to spend their 
own dollars to match WPA allocations, and the enthusiastic receptions these administrators 
enjoyed—serves as a telling example of contemporary American “air-mindedness.” Simultaneously, 
these actions suggest that both local governments and the American public shared federal hopes for 
continued aeronautical development. 
Americans’ continued passion for aviation is not surprising, but it is significant. By the late 
1930s the pioneering days of flying were, for the most part, in the past. Lindbergh’s trans-Atlantic 
flight had occurred ten years before, but the American public maintained a keen interest in 
aeronautical development. McMullen’s observations confirm that the “winged gospel” was still alive 
and well in many parts of the country, in spite of eight years of economic misfortune. That fact 
certainly aided the WPA Airways and Airports Division’s popularity, but McMullen’s report also 
points to a more focused interest in the continued development of American aeronautics. Americans’ 
identification of the need for a comprehensive and coherent air transport network and a focused 
federal plan for continued development suggest that many citizens saw aviation’s sustained 
advancement as a corollary to America’s own fortunes. Though public works represented only one 
part of a much larger edifice, Americans could point with pride to the—literally—concrete gains the 
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WPA wrought. In the context of the Depression, these gains offered hope for the future far beyond 
the immediate employment created by these projects. 
WPA administrators shared both the pride in public works programs’ accomplishments and the 
recognition of the continued need for federal guidance and funding.  McMullen wrote that, as a 
result of WPA actions, “airport construction has advanced at least 15 years.” In his judgment, 
“present day transport planes could not be economically operated had it not been for the new airports 
constructed and the improvements and enlargements made on existing airports by . . . Work Relief 
agencies.” Progress to date, however, merely emphasized the need for additional federal action. 
“Even considering the progress that has been made,” McMullen reported, “the airports of the United 
States are still far behind the development of the airplane and the air transport requirements of [the 
present day].”452 New aircraft like the DC-3 and the continued development of radio 
communications and air traffic control accelerated the rate of change and highlighted the need for 
even faster infrastructure construction to keep pace. 
For both McMullen and Smith, that context dictated the need for a focused development plan 
for U.S. airports. In his report, Smith emphasized the “absolute necessity” of “a national plan for the 
logical development of a Federal Airways System.” Such a plan, Smith argued, demanded a 
construction program “for carrying out the orderly development of . . . ground facilities” and 
uniform standards and layouts for “the proper development of individual airports and other aviation 
ground facilities.”453 He further explained that the program would require “constructing or 
improving 1,000 additional airports” beyond those already improved with WPA funds, an 
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accomplishment he considered the “minimum required to constitute an adequate national airways 
system necessary to accommodate flying equipment already in use or actually under construction.” 
Smith estimated that a plan of that magnitude would cost more than 300 million dollars.454 
McMullen echoed the need for a further program for infrastructure development, though his 
articulation did not include a plan as specific as Smith’s. In his letter, McMullen emphasized the 
need to “make a modern airport usable 24 hours a day, 12 months a year.” That necessity, coupled 
with the rapid enlargement of transport aircraft, made paving, lighting, and other associated 
infrastructure “absolutely necessary” for the successful operation of flying fields. McMullen 
estimated the cost of his program at 285 million dollars—strikingly close to Smith’s valuation.455 
Unfortunately, these types of development programs lay outside the purview of the WPA, a 
fact both men recognized. McMullen lamented the fact that “the present WPA investment being 
made in airports could be of a more permanent and useful nature if more funds were available for 
materials and equipment.” The Safety and Planning section chief, however, had no illusions about 
the WPA’s ability to meet those needs. Writing, “from the nature of its purpose the WPA may 
always be limited as to the funds it can expend for materials and equipment,” McMullen 
recommended that “an annual appropriation for airport construction be made available to and 
administered by some Federal agency.”456  
 Smith expressed an even clearer understanding of the limitations embodied by a work relief 
program. “It is obvious,” he wrote, “that a relief program should be concerned primarily with work 
only at those locations where needy unemployed persons are eligible for relief . . . funds available 
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for non-labor purposes will very likely be inadequate for any high-type construction.” From these 
facts, Smith drew the obvious conclusion, recording, “I do not believe it practicable for a relief 
organization, such as the WPA, to carry out a nation-wide airport program if preference is to be 
given to the necessity for aviation facilities rather than to the requirement for relief.” Like 
McMullen, he suggested the need for a federal airport program administered by “some federal 
agency,” within which the WPA would operate as a source of labor where conditions permitted.457 
 These comments demonstrate WPA administrators’ nuanced understanding of their agency’s 
role, and the limitations imposed by that function. Far from overseeing a make-work program, both 
Smith and McMullen seemed frustrated by the WPA’s inability to bring plans for comprehensive 
aviation infrastructure improvements to fruition. At the same time, however, both men clearly 
recognized that the WPA’s primary responsibility was to provide work relief, not promote a national 
airways program. Balancing these two goals, Smith and McMullen highlighted the progress WPA 
funds had brought about to date and the potential for further gains while emphasizing the need for a 
different federal agency to take the lead in promoting a national program of airway development.  
 Significantly, both men understood WPA airways construction to be part of a larger effort to 
develop American aeronautics. Though work relief remained the WPA’s central project, Airways 
and Airports Division administrators placed WPA activities within the larger context of a national 
airways program. In their view, the labor provided by public works projects offered an avenue 
through which to accomplish larger goals, not merely an end in and of itself. Their depictions of 
local leaders’ enthusiasm only further the view that, at least with regard to the WPA’s aviation-
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related work, all concerned parties embraced public works not only for their contributions to local 
employment, but also as a way to promote aeronautical progress.  
 Ultimately, both Smith and McMullen realized that the WPA’s airway and airport program 
could not fulfill all of America’s aviation infrastructure needs. Nonetheless, both men highlighted 
the dramatic success WPA actions encompassed. At least with regard to aviation, it appears that 
public works had the potential to fulfill the dual goals of putting Americans to work while offering 
an avenue for valuable infrastructure improvements. Reflecting on the lengthy inspection trip, 
McMullen summarized Airways and Airports Division activities to date. “In general,” he wrote, “the 
airport program conducted by the WPA is popular throughout the United States and the permanent 
improvements made on airports, which are the foundation of all aviation, have done a great deal to 
counteract or silence critics of the Works Progress.”458 Though not without difficulties, from 
McMullen’s perspective, at least, WPA actions were a rousing success. 
 
 An examination of WPA activities at the local level reveals a similar pattern. Localities 
enthusiastically applied for funds, highlighting their commitment to aeronautical progress and 
demonstrating their willingness to support that commitment with local dollars. WPA regional 
administrators worked with local authorities, public figures, and interest groups to promote 
employment while attempting to maximize the value of aviation-related infrastructure 
improvements. In communities like Chicago, Knoxville, Newark, San Diego, and St. Louis, the 
WPA either dramatically improved or built entirely new airports. The efforts to achieve those goals 
demonstrates the sometimes contentious relationship between WPA administrators and community 
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leaders. At the same time, they emphasize federal administrators’ consistent efforts to promote 
projects with maximum value for each locality and the nation. 
 WPA appropriations helped to fund a variety of aviation infrastructure improvements around 
the country. First and foremost, states and localities used public works appropriations to fund airport 
improvements. Whether this resulted in the construction of entirely new fields or the improvement of 
existing ones, WPA funds played a foundational role in transforming America’s airports. In Chicago, 
local leaders initially hoped to use WPA funds to construct a new airport on a man-made island in 
Lake Michigan. According to the Chicago Daily Tribune, “both the legislature and the city council . 
. . passed resolutions recommending the construction of such an airport,”459 a project they felt was 
well suited for public works appropriations.460 Unfortunately, opposition from local civic groups, 
who cited the noise pollution and the expense of such an undertaking, led to the project arriving 
stillborn.  
 Local officials and civic leaders agreed, however, that Chicago needed a larger airport to 
compete in the air transport arena. Chicago’s current municipal field was too small to handle larger 
aircraft under development in the late 1930s, requiring more land, longer, paved runways, new 
taxiways, and a variety of other infrastructure improvements to maintain commercial service.461 The 
situation had become so dire that in 1936 the Chicago Daily News reported that Edgar Gorrell of 
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National Air Transport had warned the city that airlines would be forced to “cut Chicago off their 
main travel lines” in the absence of such development.462  
 In response, in 1937 Chicago asked the WPA for more than 2.4 million dollars to improve the 
municipal airport. Those funds would be used to pave and enlarge existing runways, build new 
runways, construct concrete taxiways, complete a new drainage system including sewers, grade the 
airport and construct concrete sidewalks.463 Subsequently, Chicago requested additional funds to 
construct a light lane for an Instrument Approach System.464 These projects employed more than 
4,000 laborers, and largely achieved completion by the fall of 1939. As a result, Mayor Edward 
Kelley referred to the updated municipal airport as “one of the finest . . . in the country devoted to 
commercial purposes.”465 By all measures, WPA funds transformed the Chicago airport, 
modernizing it to deal with a new generation of aircraft and preparing the airfield to deal with the 
boom in postwar passenger traffic.  
 In Knoxville, Tennessee, WPA allocations helped construct a new regional airfield. Sponsored 
by the city of Knoxville, local leaders hoped the field would serve both Knoxville and the nearby 
cities of Alcoa and Maryville. Although a small municipal airfield existed on the site prior to the 
WPA project, it proved insufficient to meet contemporary commercial needs, necessitating 
significant changes in order to provide the area with regular passenger service. Work began in 
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February of 1936 with a federal appropriation of $593,690.466 According to a WPA progress report, 
federal funds supported “grading, providing drainage and lighting facilities, paving additional 
runways, extending present landing areas, and performing other appurtenant and incidental work.”467  
 Largely complete by the fall of 1937, the new airfield sparked excitement in citizens and local 
officials. The front page of the October 15, 1937 edition of the Knoxville News-Sentinel proclaimed, 
“12,000 or More See Dedication of New Airport.” The article reported that “12,000 to 15,000 
persons . . . braved a cold autumn day to see the thrills in store for them.” The dedication included 
flying exhibitions, a parachutist in a “bat-wing suit,” and speeches by local dignitaries. According to 
Harry S. Berry, the Tennessee State WPA administrator, the opening of the new airport “marked the 
most important date in our transportation history since the first locomotive came through here 80 
years ago.”468 The McGhee Tyson airport opened widespread commercial airline service to 
Knoxville for the first time, and created the foundation of the airfield still serving the region today.  
 Like Chicago, Newark applied to the WPA for funds to improve an already active municipal 
airport. Before World War II, Newark was the busiest airport in the United States. Beginning as the 
eastern hub of the transcontinental airmail service, Newark soon played host to tremendous traffic as 
it served the New York metropolitan area and maintained its central place in the U.S. airmail 
network. As with Chicago, by the mid 1930s, Newark desperately needed improvements to maintain 
its level of service and enable the field to accommodate newer, larger aircraft.469 Looking to the 
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WPA for aid, Newark applied for almost 4 million dollars in federal funds. These appropriations 
paid for drainage work, expansion of the airport through the use of fill dirt and grading, paving 
runways, taxiways and hardstands for aircraft, landscaping, including grading and seeding, 
excavation, and the construction of new hangars.470  
 With total expenditures of more than 5 million dollars, the Newark project was a qualified 
success. Although the improvements had the desired effect on the airport’s ability to accommodate 
the increasing needs of planes and passengers, in the end the construction of LaGuardia Field in New 
York—completed in October of 1939—signaled the beginning of the end for Newark’s prominence 
in the New York area. Nonetheless, WPA appropriations brought significant changes to the airport, 
improvements that would have been financially untenable without federal aid.  
 San Diego also renovated and updated its airport with WPA labor and financial assistance.  
Lindbergh Field operated as one of Southern California’s major transport hubs, serving both the city 
of San Diego and the many military facilities in the vicinity. Like the airports in Chicago and 
Newark, Lindbergh Field needed major improvements to provide infrastructure for larger planes and 
greater passenger volume. Turning to the WPA for assistance, in September 1937 the city applied for 
almost 400 thousand dollars to support “grading, surfacing, oiling and paving Lindbergh Field, 
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together with construction of storm drains, boundary lights, Control Waiting Station, masonry wall, 
concrete walks, steps and ramp, and a wharf and float.”471  
In addition to providing ground facilities, Lindbergh Field served as a seaplane base, and 
therefore had needs beyond those of other airports. San Diego’s 1937 request for funds to support 
the construction of a wharf and float reflect this element of airport operations. In 1939, the city 
submitted an additional public works proposal with the aim of further improving both its ground and 
water-based facilities. In January, the city requested an appropriation of $184,569 for “constructing 
airplane hangars, constructing a control station building, walks, walls, and steps; erecting fences; 
installing water and sewer connections; building seaplane landing facilities . . . moving, installing 
and constructing lighting and power facilities; making and installing pipe for storm drains.”472 As a 
result of that construction, San Diego’s Lindbergh Field was able to serve as an important wartime 
transport center, addressing both civilian and military needs, and offering facilities for both ground 
and seaplanes.  
 In St. Louis, public works made much more modest improvements to the local airport, Lambert 
Field. An appropriation of just under 110 thousand dollars went toward runway extension and 
drainage, while an additional request for $5,243 funded the construction of a new aircraft hangar.473 
The St. Louis Globe-Democrat also reported that federal funds supported the construction of “five 
radio towers . . . to guide pilots to the field during foggy weather.”474 Notably, state WPA 
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administrators rejected several St. Louis proposals for further improvements because local officials 
could not adequately demonstrate the projects’ value.  
Although airport construction and improvement lay at the core of the Airways and Airports 
Division’s mission, WPA laborers also worked on other infrastructure improvements. In California, 
for example, the WPA funded an air-marking program. State officials applied for funds to paint “508 
roof markers in 508 towns as an aid to air navigation.”475 According to the San Diego Evening 
Tribune, Helen Richey, a friend of Amelia Earhart and the famous aviatrix’s partner on her last 
Bendix Trophy race476 headed the project. Designed to make air travel safer, the paper reported, “ten 
foot letters” would be placed on barns, factories, and mountains. The markings would “announce the 
names of the town, an arrow indicating the direction of the nearest airport and another pointing 
north.”477 Seemingly quaint by modern standards, this project nonetheless formed a valuable safety 
aid for both private and commercial pilots and expanded on a program begun by the Commerce 
Department more than ten years before.  
 
The above examples demonstrate the diverse ways in which localities utilized public works 
expenditures to support the development of aviation infrastructure. WPA laborers built hangars and 
terminal buildings, built, lengthened, and paved runways, landscaped, filled, and graded airports, 
built drainage facilities, erected navigational aids, cleared new land, and built seaplane docking 
stations. These projects represented important infrastructure improvements at a critical time for U.S. 
commercial aviation. The majority of airports receiving WPA funds desperately needed new 
                                            
475 J.W. Gentry, District Director, WPA Report of Completed or Discontinued Project, 
June 6, 1937, Box 4, RG 69, NARA.  
476 A cross-country air race first run in 1931.  
477 “WPA Plans Air Markers,” San Diego Evening Tribune, November 17, 1936, Box 5, 





facilities in order to receive newer, larger aircraft and keep up with rising passenger volume. In 
addition, new navigational aids and increasing communications technology demanded ever larger 
and more advanced ground facilities. WPA appropriations made much of this construction possible 
at a time when many American communities struggled to provide their citizens with basic services. 
In the above communities, WPA building projects created the foundation of the airports that would 
serve these communities in the postwar era, leaving a lasting legacy far beyond the immediate labor 
the construction provided.  
These activities also demonstrate the extent to which local communities actively supported 
aviation-related infrastructure creation. The WPA model was not top down; it mandated voluntary 
action on the part of localities. Population centers around the country enthusiastically responded to 
the opportunities WPA funds promised, with local government, civil leaders, and the general 
population playing an active role in the application process and displaying enthusiasm about new 
construction. While the appropriations process was not without tension, the massive scope of 
Airways and Airports Division activities speaks volumes about American towns’ and cities’ desire to 
see new and/or improved airports in their community.  
WPA administrators clearly understood the significance of the work their appropriations 
supported and worked diligently to approve only those projects that would bring lasting value to 
individual communities and the nation at large. Although this brought them into conflict with local 
civic groups and elected officials at times, these men demonstrated a consistent willingness to reject 
projects that failed to achieve minimum standards.  
As with the CWA program of 1933-34, the WPA worked with the Bureau of Air Commerce to 
maximize the value of aviation-related public works. In 1937 A. B. McMullen wrote Earl Popp, the 





noted that the Washington, D.C. office’s Project Control Division requested that the California 
proposal receive approval from Commerce before the release of funds. The Department did so, but 
only under a specific set of conditions. To whit, “that before the project is released for operations by 
the State Administrator and the Chief Regional Engineer, a master plan and complete working plans 
be prepared and submitted to and approved by the Bureau of Air Commerce and the Chief Regional 
Engineer.”478  
San Diego represented far from an isolated case. It appears that WPA administrators applied 
this policy across the board, as demonstrated by correspondence between the Project Control and 
Engineering Divisions in reference to the Chicago airport. In November 1937 the Engineering 
Division recommended the approval of Chicago’s application for funds, “subject to approval of 
plans and specifications by the Bureau of Air Commerce and the Regional Engineer-WPA prior to 
beginning of work.”479 
At times, this oversight resulted in WPA administrators tabling or rejecting applications 
outright. Chicago’s application for 8.5 million dollars to fund a new island airport received close 
scrutiny from administrators, eventually resulting in the proposal’s rejection. “Conditionally 
approved” as of September 1935, WPA administrator Harry Goldberg expressed concern that the 
project did not cohere with WPA goals. Writing that “opponents raise a number of objections” in 
opposition to the proposal, Goldberg highlighted the fact that “other airports proposed in the same 
general location would serve to better purpose for a smaller or no expenditure of government 
money.” As such, Goldberg concluded that Chicago’s plan ran “counter to the provision of the spirit 
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and provisions of the Work Relief Act.” He also emphasized the central role the Bureau of Air 
Commerce played in the decision, reminding his superiors that “final decisions rest first, upon the 
Department of Air Commerce.”480  
Even more striking are WPA and Bureau of Air Commerce assessments of several St. Louis 
proposals. Bureau correspondence between Airport Engineer W. M. Aldous and John Wynne, Chief 
of the Bureau’s Airport Section, shows that St. Louis had a history of presenting hastily prepared and 
inadequately researched proposals for WPA funds—a fact the Bureau did not look well upon. Late in 
1936 Aldous reported that the WPA rejected a September 1935 proposal to reconstruct the banks of 
a creek, and related that proposals approved in both August and September were far over budget. In 
reference to a proposal from October 1936, Aldous wrote, “it is just as well . . . that it was rejected as 
the quantities [of materials] involved are sheerest guesswork.” Summing up St. Louis’s efforts to 
secure public works appropriations, he concluded that all of the city’s proposals were “classified as 
purely relief . . . the estimates as submitted on all past projects represented just guesses.” As a result, 
the engineer urgently recommended “that necessary authority be requested by the WPA . . . to utilize 
these funds for . . . desirable work instead of having to spend them for man time by unduly loading 
up the job.”481  
Apparently, however, Aldous’s concerns did not result in a significant change in St. Louis’s 
efforts to secure WPA grants. In 1939, B. M. Harloe, WPA Chief Engineer, warned the Missouri 
State WPA Administrator that city officials needed to be reminded to submit plans for “suitable 
public projects representing permanent improvements,” not merely make-work projects. 
Additionally, Harloe emphasized that “the Works Progress Administration . . . may not properly 
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recommend the approval of applications which require disproportionate expenditures of Federal 
funds . . . for work whose permanent value is not commensurate with the expenditures required.”482  
At times, the close cooperation between the WPA and Bureau of Air Commerce could have 
more positive effects for localities. In Newark, the Bureau actually pushed the WPA to undertake 
additional construction with the goal of improving safety at the New Jersey field. Writing to F. C. 
Harrington, WPA Assistant Administrator, John Wynne related that “the Department of Commerce 
has been trying for some time to interest the City of Newark in installing . . . [a] new airway traffic 
control unit on top of the administration building.” According to Wynne, Newark had been unwilling 
to expend the funds for the projects and, as a result, Wynne hoped Harrington would include “this 
small unit . . . in the present enormous investment plan now going on at Newark Airport.” 
Highlighting the significance of the air traffic control unit, Wynne argued, “from a safety viewpoint, 
the Department of Commerce is more interested in the unit than any item of improvement for the 
new airport.”483  
As these examples demonstrate, the WPA Airways and Airports Division maintained a distinct 
focus on promoting only those public works projects with the potential to provide longstanding value 
to communities and the nation. Working closely with the Bureau of Air Commerce to ensure that 
proposals met this criterion, WPA administrators did not hesitate to modify or reject applications 
they perceived to lack adequate planning or sufficient value. In many ways it seems that the WPA’s 
effort to promote aviation infrastructure operated almost as an arm of the Commerce Department. 
Commerce’s willingness to ask the WPA for funds highlights the close working relationship 
between the two agencies and the coherence of their goals. Certainly, the WPA’s primary mission 
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remained to provide work relief, but within that context the Airways and Airports Division worked 
tirelessly to improve U.S. aviation infrastructure.  
The WPA’s focus on work relief did, however, place a variety of limits on the types of 
construction the public works agency could undertake. Most significantly, the WPA’s focus on 
providing federal funds for unskilled labor, but not for materials or skilled workers meant that, at 
times, communities could not achieve their desired airport improvement goals. In Newark, 
construction on a new hangar stalled when engineers realized that construction of the building’s 
large, sliding doors could not be accomplished with the existing workforce. In a report on the 
proposed construction of the hangar, Fred Childs, Chief Engineer for the WPA State Division of 
Operations, voiced his concerns regarding this issue. “Certain construction features,” he wrote, “will 
demand that skilled craftsmen be engaged to perform special construction work.” In light of limits 
imposed by WPA contracts, Childs suggested that “it would be most desirable . . . to carefully 
consider the practicability of having all special work performed under private contracts.”484 That, of 
course, would mean that funds for such contracts would not come from WPA appropriations, forcing 
the city to pay for them itself or look to another government agency like the PWA.   
In many instances, local funding proved to be a potential barrier to WPA activities. Because 
the WPA did not provide funds for materials, that responsibility fell upon local communities.485 
Although theoretically the WPA’s focus on procuring matching funds from localities would provide 
for necessary materials and, if necessary, skilled labor, in reality these strictures limited the WPA’s 
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ability to undertake certain projects. Additionally, its focus on work relief meant that the WPA could 
only embark on construction in areas that had sufficient numbers of needy workers. While for the 
most part this did little to limit WPA activities, in some cases this resulted in significant 
expenditures for aviation-related projects with less value than others in sparsely populated areas or 
areas with low unemployment.  
Finally, the WPA’s inability to undertake construction on private land had the potential to 
disrupt operations. Nowhere was this more evident than in Chicago. After abandoning a proposal to 
build a new airport downtown on a manmade island, the city instead looked to expand the existing 
municipal airport. Those plans included almost doubling the field’s acreage in order to construct new 
runways and lengthen existing ones. As part of the effort, the city purchased a significant piece of 
land from the Chicago and Western Indiana Railroad. Unfortunately, the Railroad maintained a 
right-of-way for tracks that bisected the enlarged airfield property. That strip of private property 
precluded WPA workers from extending two runways, and threatened to undermine the entire 
project. Eventually, the city reached a compromise, acquiring a right of way for the railroad around 
the new field, but at an estimated cost of more than 800 thousand dollars to be borne by the city.486 
In other communities, airfields were partially or totally privately owned, leading to an inability to 
utilize public works funding. Although not a significant barrier to airport improvements, this issue, 
like those above, demonstrates the sometimes difficult nature of public works agencies’ efforts to 
promote America’s air transport network. 
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Between 1933 and 1939 America’s aviation infrastructure witnessed a revolutionary change. 
Largely through the efforts of New Deal public works agencies, America’s airports were modernized 
through the construction of concrete runways, lighting systems, taxiways, terminals, hangars and 
control towers. These changes came at a crucial period in American aeronautical development, and 
at a time of vital need for the American workforce. Rapidly advancing technology resulted in the 
creation of new, larger transport aircraft and an expanding air transport network precisely at a time 
when communities found themselves unable to assume the cost of new airport construction. In that 
context New Deal public works achieved the dual goal of putting Americans to work and promoting 
the development of U.S. aviation infrastructure—in the words of historian Jason Scott Smith, they 
formed “an extraordinarily successful method of state-sponsored economic development.”487 
The history of these agencies’ activities—particularly that of the WPA’s Airways and Airports 
Division—have been almost totally overlooked by scholars of aviation and the New Deal. In many 
ways, it appears that Airways and Airports Division’s activities offer the clearest and most 
successful example of New Deal public works policy working in practice. The construction or 
improvement of more than 900 airports around the country, as well as programs like the air marking 
campaign in California, created the conditions for the possibility of the postwar commercial air 
transport boom. Though perhaps not the ideal way to make over America’s aviation infrastructure, 
WPA activities demonstrate that administrators consistently worked to encourage projects with the 
maximum value for localities and the nation. Far from promoting a make-work program, the WPA 
worked closely with the Bureau of Air Commerce and local communities to encourage construction 
projects that would have a lasting value for American aeronautics.  
                                            





These public works projects must stand at the center of any discussion of aeronautical 
development during the 1930s. Franklin Roosevelt’s promotion of public works as a source of 
employment and an avenue through which to encourage infrastructure improvements found great 
success with American aviation. The activities of these New Deal agencies also set a precedent for 
federal work on airports—a fact not lost on the President. In no small part due to the effectiveness of 
public works airport construction projects, the Civil Aeronautics Act removed the legal barriers 
preventing federal work on airfields and set the stage for greater governmental responsibility in the 
postwar period. Along with his establishment of the Federal Aviation Commission and his consistent 
drive to shape the Civil Aeronautics Act, the President’s creation of the CWA, PWA, and WPA 
offers the clearest evidence of Roosevelt’s efforts to promote the development of American aviation. 
Though they failed to bring the United States out of the Depression, the actions of these public 
works agencies created the foundation of the modern American air transport network—the airways 





Chapter 6—Conclusion  
 
Almost three-quarters of a century have passed since the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics 
Act. In that time American commercial aviation has continued to develop—entering the jet age, 
flirting with supersonic aircraft, and embracing the hub-based system created by deregulation. In that 
time Americans’ collective relationship with commercial flying has undergone a fundamental 
change, in the process shattering the consensus created by Herbert Hoover and his allies that held 
sway for more than half a century. In recent years flying has become banal, a necessary evil, 
something to be endured in the quest to reach a destination more quickly. Americans bemoan high 
fares, checked-baggage fees, the lack of in-flight meals, seemingly incomprehensible routing, small 
seats, and delays. At the airport, passengers must tolerate ticket lines and security checkpoints, have 
their liquids and gels organized in containers of three ounces or less, clearly presented in a plastic 
bag for inspection. To pass through security everyone must remove his or her shoes, keys, cell 
phones, belts, jackets and anything else containing metal. Passengers live in fear of the bag check, 
standing forlornly to the side of the security line, hoping to be released while a stranger examines 
personal items. Arriving on time seems a minor miracle, particularly if the baggage does too.488 
These prevailing conditions stand in sharp contrast to Americans’ continued love affair with 
aviation. Perhaps because our contemporary experiences lack glamour, daring, and romance, we are 
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drawn even more strongly to aspects of aeronautics highlighting those characteristics. The 
bookshelves at Borders, Barnes and Noble, and Books-A-Million abound with aviation-related 
material, from glossy photo books of aircraft to memoirs of fighter aces and record-setting pilots. 
Hollywood continues to churn out movies focused on various aspects of flying. The Memphis Belle 
(1990), Air Force One (1997), The Aviator (2004), and Flyboys (2006) represent only a few of the 
most recent films in this genre.489 Die-cast airplanes, plastic and wood models, and remote control 
aircraft take center stage in toy and hobby shops around the country, and air shows continue to draw 
large crowds for both contemporary and historic demonstrations. In New York’s Hudson River 
Valley the Old Rhinebeck Aerodrome has created a living museum. The Aerodrome embodies the 
authentic atmosphere of a 1920’s airfield, with a grass field, hangars, tools, workshops, and, of 
course, the largest collection of airworthy vintage aircraft in the country. Every summer the field 
plays host to air shows, drawing tens of thousands from across the country.  
Tellingly, the interwar period forms a focal point of Americans’ fascination with aeronautics. 
From the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum’s “Golden Age of Flight” exhibit to the 
recently released film Amelia (2009), which offers a romanticized view of Amelia Earhart’s life and 
aerial exploits, this era continues to captivate. The reasons are not hard to pinpoint. These years 
encompassed perhaps the most glamorous and dynamic period in American aviation history. Rapid 
technological advances created the conditions for the possibility of flying higher, farther, and faster 
than ever before. For the first time aircraft could cross oceans, reach dizzying speeds, and claw their 
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way into the stratosphere. Simultaneously, the period gave rise to some of the most accomplished 
and charismatic figures in American aviation history. Charles Lindbergh stands apart from his peers, 
but others like Amelia Earhart, Wiley Post, Roscoe Turner, Jacqueline Cochran, and Howard Hughes 
became household names as they continually pushed the boundaries of what humans and the 
machines they created could accomplish. Contemporary American passions for flying further 
highlighted these men’s and women’s efforts, as aviation dominated media coverage and events like 
the National Air Races drew hundreds of thousands of spectators from across the country.  
Most representations of the interwar period offer interested parties an easily comprehensible, 
progressive narrative. In these views America and Americans are triumphant, recovering from the 
embarrassment created by the nation’s failed effort to field an Air Service during World War I to 
lead the world in aeronautical development and personal accomplishment.490  American ingenuity 
and technological expertise quickly combined to produce aircraft that were the envy of the world. 
Aerial heroes from the period seem to embody core American values—hard work, perseverance, 
triumphing over seemingly impossible odds. Their exploits exemplified Americans’ desires for 
danger, glamour, and adventure. It was an era when a boy from small-town Minnesota could rise 
from obscurity by designing his own aircraft with the help of a little-known aircraft manufacturer 
working out of a glorified shed in San Diego and securing funding from a group of little-known St. 
Louis businessmen to become the first person to fly across the Atlantic by himself—in the process 
beating out millionaires, European national heroes, and all of the detractors who christened him the 
“flying fool” before his departure.  
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Within this broader narrative, the federal government’s crucial role in promoting aeronautical 
development has faded into the background. Though governmental efforts to implement legislation, 
build infrastructure, and regulate American aeronautics lack the glamour of air racing or trans-
oceanic flights, those efforts played a vital role in supporting American aviation’s continued growth. 
Most Americans, however, remain unaware of the ongoing efforts from policymakers like Herbert 
Hoover, William MacCracken, Walter Brown, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Hopkins to support the 
expansion of a nascent industry that they perceived to be essential to America’s future.  
Largely overlooked by the American public, this topic has received similarly scant attention 
from historians. Political and economic historians addressing the interwar period either ignore 
federal aviation policy or damn it with faint praise. Seminal works like Joan Hoff Wilson’s Herbert 
Hoover: Forgotten Progressive, William Leuchtenburg’s FDR and the New Deal and Ellis Hawley’s 
The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly devote scant attention to these men’s actions vis-à-vis 
aviation, and, in the case of Hawley, go so far as to discredit Roosevelt’s engagement with 
aeronautics. Monographs that do directly address air transport and federal aviation policy—most 
notably those from Robert van der Linden and Nick Kommons—offer incomplete analyses that fail 
to adequately account for the continuity and significance of federal efforts under both Republican 
and Democratic Administrations, an oversight that also extends to the work of scholars such as 
Elizabeth Bailey, David Lee, and Richard Vietor.491  
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This work represents an attempt to offer a comprehensive analysis of federal aviation policy 
from the early 1920s until the eve of World War II. During that time federal policymakers, led by 
Herbert Hoover, created and implemented a remarkably coherent federal aviation policy that created 
the conditions for the possibility of aviation’s growth into a mainstream transportation technology. 
Crafted at a time when aviation was still in its infancy, that policy represented an extraordinarily 
forward-thinking analysis of aeronautics’ potential for development. So prescient was that vision, in 
fact, that it remained virtually unchanged for the next two decades—through Republican and 
Democratic administrations, through the Great Depression, and through the incredible technological 
progress aviation experienced during those years. The continuity of federal actions speaks to 
Hoover’s foresight, but also to the importance that policymakers placed on promoting aeronautical 
growth. By the end of the 1930s federal efforts had created the physical and regulatory foundations 
of the modern American air transport system, in the process helping to refashion American cultural 
attitudes about flying.  
 
 The origins of American federal aviation policy emerged from the chaotic period immediately 
following the First World War. Wartime mobilization resulted in the military training thousands of 
pilots and building tens of thousands of aircraft, virtually all of which were quickly removed from 
government service after the cessation of hostilities. Those pilots and aircraft subsequently formed 
the core of the barnstorming movement, a uniquely American development that introduced millions 
of Americans to aviation for the first time. The same era witnessed the rise of early commercial 
carriers, though these ventures almost uniformly failed to achieve solvency. Even during these early 
years, Americans demonstrated a fascination with aviation. Thousands turned out around the country 






for air shows, and untold more paid for rides with barnstormers as the latter traveled through their 
communities. Americans’ enthusiasm for flying, however, remained an enthusiasm for the 
spectacle—and the danger—associated with flight.    
 Herbert Hoover’s initial drive to create a focused and coherent federal aviation policy grew out 
of his desire to organize that chaos and mold aviation into a viable commercial proposition. Hoover 
had great foresight in this endeavor, looking forward to a time when aviation would form a vital part 
of the American transportation network. His associationalist economic philosophy provided a ready 
model through which to support the development of a nascent industry, and Hoover worked 
diligently during his tenure as Commerce Secretary to support aeronautical development. In that 
effort, Hoover relied on allies like William MacCracken and Harry New, men who shared Hoover’s 
faith in aviation’s potential, and who had the knowledge and the ability to shape federal policy.  
 Hoover’s vision revolved around regulation, infrastructure, safety, and promotion. Hoover 
relied heavily on existing models—most specifically, the federal government’s engagement with 
shipping—but realized that aviation’s nascent status mandated a unique policy framework. 
Specifically, he recognized that airlines needed federal financial support in order to reach 
maturation. That overarching necessity led Hoover and his allies to create a fiscal model predicated 
on airlines receiving revenue from the U.S. Post Office for carrying mail. In choosing this course, 
Hoover walked a narrow path between a truly free market on the one hand and nationalization—the 
model embraced by virtually every European nation at the time—on the other. Simultaneously, 
Hoover pushed for the creation of safety and licensing regulations to help bring aviation into the 
commercial mainstream and address widespread concerns about flying’s perceived danger and 
recklessness. Presciently, Hoover realized that while a majority of Americans enthusiastically 





potential to undermine commercial success. As such, Hoover hoped to create a regulatory framework 
that would highlight aviation’s safety, stability, and utility while working to minimize flying’s more 
dangerous aspects.  
Hoover’s ally, William MacCracken, brought that desire to fruition through his authorship of 
the 1926 Air Commerce Act. After its passage, the federal government received broad new powers 
to license pilots and airframe manufacturers, implement safety regulations, support infrastructure 
creation, and oversee commercial development. Along with the passage of the 1925 Contract 
Airmail Act, the 1926 Bill created the conditions for the possibility of successful commercial 
operations. These pieces of legislation reflected the ongoing work of federal policymakers, but 
ultimately represented the beginning, rather than the end, of federal engagement with American 
commercial aeronautics.  
During Hoover’s term as President he continued to foster aviation’s growth. Hoover kept up an 
ongoing correspondence with prominent airline executives and other central figures in American 
aeronautics, and continued to utilize his associational philosophy to support the evolution of federal 
policy. Hoover also appointed Walter F. Brown as Postmaster General, a decision that was to have a 
profound effect on governmental engagement with commercial flying. Brown enthusiastically 
embraced Hoover’s vision, and worked to shape federal airmail legislation to support the 
development of passenger—rather than exclusively mail—service. His efforts culminated in 
Congress passing the 1930 McNary-Watres Act, which expanded the Postmaster’s authority to use 
airmail contracts to promote commercial development. Brown interpreted his new powers broadly, 
supporting the expansion of so-called pioneer operators at the expense of newer, smaller carriers, and 
using a series of operators’ conferences to rationalize the national airmail map. Though Brown acted 





of those airlines cut out of Brown’s vision. These carriers ultimately allied themselves with 
Congressional Democrats in an effort to overturn Brown’s policies. 
That opposition coalesced after Democrats’ success in the 1932 elections. Led by Alabama 
Senator Hugo Black, Democrats created a special committee to investigate supposed fraud and 
collusion with regard to airmail contracts. The Committee hearings drew significant media attention, 
resulted in Brown being largely discredited, and led to the passage of a new 1934 airmail bill 
sponsored by Black himself.  
Significantly, however, the Black Committee hearings and the new legislation did not result in 
an abandonment of Hoover’s vision. Black appears to have been motivated by a desire to assure the 
continued commercial success of American commercial aviation, a fact that informed the legislation 
created under his direction. Though the airmail scandal of 1934 did cause significant turmoil—most 
significantly after President Franklin Roosevelt and his Postmaster General, James Farley, cancelled 
all private airmail contracts and ordered the Army to fly the mail—at its end, federal policy remained 
fundamentally unaltered. Black and his allies supported Post Office airmail subsidies, eschewed 
nationalization, and demonstrated their willingness to utilize the power of the federal government to 
support aeronautical development.  
Under the direction of Franklin Roosevelt, federal aviation policy continued to demonstrate 
remarkable continuity. Though the President’s actions vis-à-vis the airmail scandal—most 
significantly his focus on labor issues and his push for open, competitive bidding—displayed some 
differences with Hoover’s vision, Roosevelt’s overall treatment of aviation policy differed little from 
that of his predecessor. Roosevelt worked to reestablish private airmail contracts in the wake of the 
disastrous Army experiment, created the Federal Aviation Commission to oversee a comprehensive 





Aeronautics Act. Through all of these actions Roosevelt never looked to nationalize America’s 
airlines, and remained focused on using federal power to foster commercial development through 
infrastructure creation, promoting safe operations, and regulating routes to support rational growth.  
The President’s key role in shaping the seminal 1938 legislation offers the preeminent example 
of his fundamental agreement with Hoover’s vision. That legislation created a new independent 
agency to regulate aviation, broadening federal powers and signaling the government’s ongoing 
commitment to promoting aeronautical development. Its passage codified Hoover’s initial vision for 
American commercial aviation and established a regulatory paradigm that would endure for the next 
40 years.  
Simultaneously, Roosevelt oversaw a significant expansion of federal power vis-à-vis aviation. 
Through his creation of federal public works agencies the President oversaw the disbursement of 
hundreds of millions of dollars on aviation-related infrastructure projects around the country. In so 
doing, Roosevelt eschewed the limitations of Hoover’s dock concept and displayed a willingness to 
radically expand the government’s ability to support aviation’s growth. The creation and/or 
expansion of almost 1,000 airports around the country stands as a testament to the enduring 
contribution those agencies brought to American aeronautics. 
The coherence and continuity of federal aviation policy during the interwar period is truly 
remarkable. Hoover’s initial vision emerged at a time when aviation was a glorified sideshow, 
lacking any firm commercial foundations. That vision’s perseverance through the Great Depression 
and the transition from Republican to Democratic leadership indicates its dynamism, but also 
showcases policymakers’ continuing commitment to making aviation a central aspect of American 
life. It remains one of the preeminent examples of the government successfully fostering the growth 





The essential continuity of federal policy, moreover, suggests the need to reevaluate prevailing 
assumptions about the relationship between Hoover’s Associationalism and FDR’s New Deal. At 
least with regard to aviation, both administrations exhibited a fundamental agreement regarding the 
core aspects of federal policy—subsidization, regulation, safety, infrastructure creation, and 
promotion. Both associationalists and New Dealers, it seems, deemed aviation’s continued 
development important enough to warrant federal assistance. Additionally, both groups saw airmail 
subsidies as a way to walk a tightrope between the destructive potential of a truly free market and the 
specter of nationalization. This basic agreement highlights important aspects of continuity between 
these two economic models while once again emphasizing Americans’ overwhelming focus on 
aeronautical development.  
Hoover and Roosevelt’s policies, however, were not identical, and their differences also hold 
insight for scholars of the interwar period. Hoover’s focus on utilizing existing regulatory 
structures—epitomized in his adherence to the dock concept—exposes the limitations of his 
associationalist vision. Though Hoover oversaw a remarkable expansion of federal power vis-à-vis 
aviation, that expansion occurred within an existing policy framework. Roosevelt, however, quickly 
demonstrated that the New Deal knew no such limits. Most significantly, his embrace of public 
works signaled Roosevelt’s commitment to radically expanding the federal government’s 
responsibility for the industry. The President’s support for the Civil Aeronautics Act furthered this 
trend, breaking away from existing bureaucratic structures and establishing aviation as an industry 
worthy of an independent government agency.  
It is doubtful, however, that any of Hoover or Roosevelt’s policies could have been sustained 
without the widespread American enthusiasm for flying. Though early in the period Americans 





throughout the era they displayed a passionate interest in flying. That passion, it appears, created an 
environment conducive to the development of federal policy. Though most obvious in Americans’ 
attendance at air races and embrace of aerial heroes like Charles Lindbergh and Amelia Earhart, 
Americans’ interest in flying helped to keep aviation at the forefront of citizens’ consciousness for 
the duration of the period. Federal policy, moreover, seemed to have played an important role in 
altering Americans’ perceptions of flying by making aviation safer and more ubiquitous. Clearly, 
Americans embraced all things aeronautical in the years before World War II—a key contextual 
factor in any discussion of federal policy.  
 
In the decades since 1938, American commercial aviation has come to play an even more 
important role in American life. Its dynamic growth, moreover, speaks powerfully to the success of 
the policy framework created in the 1920s and ‘30s. The postwar boom, rise of jet aircraft, and 
commercial flying’s ever-increasing centrality to Americans’ lives in the decades following World 
War II serve as concrete reminders of that success. Ironically, however, the upheaval affecting the air 
transport industry in the wake of deregulation offers perhaps the most compelling evidence for the 
wisdom of policies crafted during the interwar period. In recent years, the changes wrought by 
deregulation have combined with concerns about terrorism and an increasing focus on environmental 
issues to profoundly alter our collective relationship with commercial flying. Today, the majority of 
Americans take flying for granted except when their flights are delayed or their luggage lost. Though 





also demonstrates the extent to which the vision crafted by those early policymakers has been 
realized.492 
Commercial flying began a period of exponential growth with America’s entrance into World 
War II. Though the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act had created the regulatory foundation that would 
guide commercial operations until the late 1970s, at the time of its passage America was still mired 
in the Depression and flying remained the province of the well-to-do. The war swept aside all of 
those limits, and by 1945 created a profoundly different context ripe for airline expansion. 
World War II helped promote commercial growth through pilot training, infrastructure 
creation, airframe manufacturing, and economic development. Building on the legislative victory of 
the Civil Aeronautics Act, in 1939 Roosevelt inaugurated the Civilian Pilot Training Program 
(CPTP). The CPTP authorized the federal government to finance 72 hours of classroom instruction 
and between 35 and 50 hours of flight instruction for prospective pilots. Initially centered on eleven 
colleges and universities around the country, the program soon expanded to include 1,132 
educational institutions and 1,460 flight schools nationally.493 By 1944 the program had turned out 
an estimated 400,000 graduates.494 These pilots formed the backbone of the Army Air Force pilot 
pool during the war, offering the military an easily accessible and generally well-trained pool of 
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flyers from a civilian source and freeing up military resources for advanced training and other 
functions. The CPTP was a great success during wartime, but ultimately had at least as significant an 
effect on commercial flying. Like the flight training many barnstormers received as a result of World 
War I mobilization, the CPTP created a large band of well-qualified pilots who would eventually fill 
out airline ranks in the postwar years.  
The war also supported continuing infrastructure creation. Wartime needs prompted the 
construction of a new wave of airfields, above and beyond those already created by New Deal public 
works. Many of these were built under the auspices of the WPA as a continuation of the pre-war 
program. Between 1939 and 1943, in fact, the agency expended upwards of three billion dollars to 
construct airfields for military use. The Army Corps of Engineers also contributed to the process, 
building over 500 new fields through the Developing of Landing Areas for National Defense 
(DLAND) program. After the war’s conclusion, the federal government turned about half of the 
WPA and DLAND fields over to civilian control, creating hundreds of new opportunities for 
localities to gain access to the national air transport network.495 
Additionally, commercial aviation benefitted directly from wartime conditions. As historian 
Carl Solberg writes, “when at last the United States went to war, all the airlines went to war” as well. 
Following formal U.S. intervention, the military took control of 200 of the nation’s 360 commercial 
airliners, contracting them to fly specific missions for military purposes. By pre-existing agreement, 
under this arrangement airlines kept their private identity and profit-making function, but served 
military ends. General Henry “Hap” Arnold formalized this state of affairs by creating the Military 
                                            





Air Transport Command, which for the duration of the war operated national and international air 
routes and oversaw the ferrying of men and equipment overseas.496 
Newer, larger aircraft also came into service during the war, accelerating a process that began 
in the late 1930s. In the years before the conflict, Douglas, Lockheed, and Boeing had all begun 
development of larger, four-engined commercial airliners. These planes—most notably the Douglas 
DC-4 and the Lockheed Constellation—entered service shortly after the war began. Immediately 
pressed into military service, wartime necessity mandated the rapid development and manufacture of 
these aircraft that, for the first time, could cross the country nonstop and even span oceans. As a 
result, production accelerated dramatically, filling the coffers of manufacturers and bringing 
thousands of new aircraft into service.  
Aeronautical technology leaped ahead during wartime as well. Huge military budgets allowed 
manufacturers to invest in new and unproven technologies at government expense. The rapid 
development of military aircraft resulted in concomitant gains for their civilian counterparts. Engine 
turbochargers and turbo-superchargers came into widespread use, manufacturers perfected cabin 
pressurization, and aircraft came to fly higher, faster, and farther than ever before. Airframe and 
engine manufacturers thus entered the postwar era well positioned to develop the next generation of 
passenger aircraft.497  
Collectively, these conditions prepared American commercial aviation for dramatic gains in the 
immediate postwar era. As a result of wartime conditions, the country had hundreds of new airports, 
thousands of qualified pilots, and scores of war-surplus aircraft ready to serve the needs of the 
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traveling public. Additionally, the military’s decision to appropriate airlines’ fleets into government 
service provided a constant stream of revenue during the wartime years and ensured that the vast 
majority of flights were full. In 1944, for instance, over 90% of seats were filled on domestic routes, 
a significantly higher percentage than in the years before the war.498 Simultaneously, airframe and 
engine manufacturers ended the war with coffers bursting from wartime contracts and new 
technologies ready to be put to use in the next generation of airliners. Finally, the war pulled the 
United States out of the Depression, ushering in a new era of prosperity that opened the possibility of 
air travel to untold numbers of Americans.  
During the postwar years, American airlines experienced tremendous growth. Passenger 
traffic—which had begun to trend upwards in the period immediately before the war—grew 
exponentially, from 6.7 million in 1945 to 12.5 million a year later.499 In fact, between 1943 and 
1950, passenger numbers for the scheduled domestic airlines grew more than six fold.500 Much of 
this growth reflected the conditions created by the war, but they also highlighted changing economic 
realities. Bucking the postwar inflationary trend, the average price of a ticket fell by one-third 
between 1940 and 1946. That fact, coupled with postwar prosperity, meant that airlines could, for the 
first time, compete directly against the railroads. Whereas Pullman service had accounted for more 
than six times the passenger miles of airlines in 1941, that advantage had shrunk by half five years 
later.501 By 1951, America’s railroads found themselves relegated to second place. In that year, 
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airline passenger-miles surpassed those for railroads for the first time, a gap that would widen 
markedly in subsequent years.502  
Commercial growth occurred under the watchful eye of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). 
The CAB oversaw route allocation on all interstate airline travel, monitored ticket prices and airmail 
subsidies, and approved all new routes and air carriers. In this sense that body embraced the pre-
Civil Aeronautics Act duties of the Post Office, Interstate Commerce Commission, and Bureau of 
Air Commerce, in the process further consolidating federal control over commercial development. 
Under CAB direction, the postwar years witnessed the steady expansion of airline service across the 
country, largely at the hands of the pre-war “big four” airlines—United, American, TWA, and 
Eastern. Though some new carriers like Delta did experience growth during this era, for the most 
part the CAB stifled attempts to upset its carefully crafted system.503 
Significant changes also came to the passenger experience during the era. Wartime 
technological development and profitability sponsored the creation of a new generation of aircraft 
that dramatically changed air travel. Representing the pinnacle of piston-engined airline 
development, aircraft like the Douglas DC-7 and Lockheed Super Constellation introduced 
passengers to pressurized cockpits, allowing aircraft to fly above low-level turbulence and minimize 
discomfort during ascents and descents. These same aircraft also allowed for longer-range operation 
at higher speeds, for the first time permitting nonstop transcontinental operations in both directions 
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and ushering in the age of nonstop trans-Atlantic service.504 Simultaneously, these planes’ operating 
efficiency built upon the profitability of the DC-3 and unquestionably made passenger service a 
lucrative undertaking. These aircraft represented such dramatic advances that aviation historian 
R.E.G. Davies claims that the “years after 1945 were an era of complete American dominance in the 
supply of civil transport aircraft.”505 
International service also witnessed dramatic change in the years following the war. Pan 
American, which before the war had been the “chosen instrument” of the U.S. overseas, lost its 
monopoly on international routes. Carriers like TWA now began to compete for the lucrative 
transatlantic run, and other airlines inaugurated service across the Pacific and to Central and South 
America. At the same time, the U.S. also entered into agreements governing international air travel. 
Most notably, the U.S. joined the International Air Transport Association (IATA), which functioned 
as a kind of CAB-writ-large in the international arena. The IATA oversaw safety standards, 
coordinated schedules for international routes, and served as a rate-fixing organization to limit 
competition.506 Like the CAB, the IATA functioned to promote structured, orderly growth, doing so 
with great success in the postwar years.507  
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Ironically, though the years following World War II in many ways represented the pinnacle of 
U.S. airline operations, the period also saw commercial aviation cede its technological edge to the 
military. Wartime research and development—much of it funded by the government—paved the way 
for the creation of what President Dwight Eisenhower termed the “military industrial complex.” In 
the context of rising Cold War tensions and high military budgets, the postwar years underwrote a 
dynamic period of aeronautical development at government behest. Military test pilots like Chuck 
Yeager became the era’s aerial heroes, replacing figures like Charles Lindbergh, Amelia Earhart and 
Roscoe Turner. The Air Force’s test center at what would become Edwards Air Force Base in 
California developed into the focal point of advances, from the breaking of the sound barrier to the 
origins of the space program. Military development of new technologies like jet engines, rocketry, 
guided missiles, and flight at sustained supersonic speeds far surpassed the advances of civilian 
aircraft. However, many of the same companies that built airliners also held military contracts and, 
as a result, newly developed technologies eventually trickled down into the civilian sector.508  
More than anything else, the postwar period reflected the continuing strength and vitality of 
Hoover’s vision for American aviation. Though technology advanced and passenger traffic grew 
dramatically, the foundational policies crafted by Hoover and his allies in the early 1920s remained 
more than adequate to the task of guiding the sustained growth of American air transport. The Civil 
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) oversaw a federal regulatory apparatus that remained true to 
Hoover’s initial desire to promote safety, oversight, and infrastructure creation.509 In fact, the CAA’s 
expanding role in supporting the implementation of radio navigation aids and instrument landing 
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systems during the period highlights the continued relevance of that vision. Simultaneously, CAB 
oversight of rates and routes proved foundational to the continued development of rational, 
structured growth—largely confirming the efficacy of Hoover and Brown’s actions during the late 
1920s and early 1930s. Indeed, the extent to which these foundational policies remained relevant to a 
rapidly evolving commercial industry is astounding. Not until the late 1970s did the government 
move away from the vision, a decision that would ultimately have profoundly damaging 
consequences for American commercial aviation.510  
The seeds of that change began to emerge with the introduction of jet aircraft in the late 1950s. 
The launch of new jet airliners like the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8 began a period of rapid 
technological development that ultimately proved harmful for the airlines. Commercial jets burst 
onto the scene in 1949 when the British first flew their Comet—though that aircraft ultimately 
proved to be a disaster for the British air transport industry.511 U.S. manufacturers followed suit, with 
the Boeing and Douglas aircraft achieving their first flights in 1957 and 1958, respectively. These 
new aircraft achieved significantly higher speeds than their piston-engined counterparts, could fly 
even higher—thus avoiding turbulence—and were much quieter and vibrated less than propeller-
driven aircraft. Jets were also glamorous, and passengers soon demonstrated a marked enthusiasm 
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for the new airliners. Pan American Airways formally opened the jet age for U.S. airlines in 1955 
with an order for 20 Boeing 707s, and the other large U.S. carriers soon followed suit.512   
Airlines’ embrace of the new jet aircraft, however, had adverse effects on their bottom lines. 
Jets entered service before the older piston-engined aircraft had reached the end of their useful lives. 
In the words of R.E.G. Davies, this resulted in a situation where “manufacturers designed, 
developed, and went into production with new types at a rate which . . . was faster than the 
depreciation period over which airlines were accustomed to paying for the aircraft.” In other words, 
airlines were purchasing new jet aircraft before they had paid off the previous generation of planes, 
planes that were still new enough to provide valuable—and profitable—service. This situation, 
according to Davies, was unique to aviation, sharply distinguishing it from other transportation 
forms in which technological development never progressed more quickly than commercial growth 
could support.513 As a result, by the early 1960s airlines struggled to secure the newest aircraft while 
simultaneously paying off their older counterparts—a situation that placed the carriers in 
increasingly precarious financial straits.514  
The introduction of jets also had profound implications for other aspects of America’s air 
transport network. As C. E. Woolman, President of Delta Airlines, noted in 1956, “we are buying 
airplanes that haven’t been fully designed, with millions of dollars we don’t have . . . we are going to 
operate them off airports that are too small, in an air traffic control system that is too slow, and we 
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must fill them with more passengers than we have ever carried before.”515 America’s airports and air 
traffic control system soon struggled to keep pace with the rapid development of newer, larger, faster 
aircraft.  
At the dawn of the jet age only fourteen U.S. airports could support the new aircraft, meaning 
that, at least initially, airlines were sharply limited in the routes on which they could utilize jets.516 
Additionally, increasing passenger numbers quickly overwhelmed the ticketing and boarding 
systems in airports of the period. Chicago showed the way into the future with the opening of 
O’Hare Airport in 1955,517 but for decades, airlines and passengers alike struggled with outdated 
ticketing, boarding, and luggage-handling operations.  
These advances also forced the government to address serious shortcomings in its regulatory 
apparatus. A 1950 reorganization of the Commerce Department moved the CAA—formerly 
overseen directly by the Commerce Secretary—to the office of an undersecretary, relegating the 
agency to a subservient status. During Dwight Eisenhower’s Presidency the agency also witnessed 
budget cuts as part of the President’s efforts to curb spending. These circumstances resulted in the 
CAA being less and less able to effectively regulate an industry experiencing tremendous growth. 
This situation was forcefully brought home in June of 1956 when two airliners collided in mid air 
over the Grand Canyon in Arizona. In the wake of the disaster the CAA received a new influx of 
federal dollars, and under the leadership of a new director, James Pyle, moved aggressively to 
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modernize its operations. The Agency increasingly embraced a radar-based air traffic control system, 
clarified flight rules, and took an increasingly active role in establishing positive control over the 
nation’s airways. Though much work remained to be done, by 1958 the CAA was well on the way to 
creating a federal regulatory apparatus fit for the jet age. In that year the Federal Aviation Act moved 
the CAA’s function to a new, independent regulatory body, the Federal Aviation Agency. The new 
agency embraced a broader mandate that transferred control of air safety regulation from the CAB to 
the FAA and also encompassed control over a joint civil-military system of air navigation and air 
traffic control.518 
The introduction of jet aircraft also suggested the next logical step for commercial aviation: 
supersonic travel. American efforts to construct a supersonic transport (SST) represented the apogee 
of federal engagement with commercial aviation, but also exposed a growing opposition to federal 
oversight that would eventually lead to deregulation. The process began in 1961, when President 
John F. Kennedy authorized the FAA to undertake a series of feasibility studies to determine the 
viability of constructing a supersonic airliner. Kennedy’s actions represented a reaction to both 
European and Russian intentions to construct such an aircraft, but also created a newly activist role 
for the FAA. At the President’s behest, the FAA would oversee the development of an American 
SST, for the first time placing a federal agency in charge of the development of a commercial 
aircraft. Additionally, from the beginning, federal officials recognized that the government would 
have to heavily subsidize the construction of such an aircraft. Initially, Kennedy stated that the 
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government would carry up to 75 percent of the development cost, a figure that would rise to over 90 
percent in subsequent years. This willingness to pay for the research and development of the SST 
again signaled a new expansion of federal power into the commercial sector.519  
In 1967, Boeing won the government contract to begin construction of the new SST, with the 
intention of completing an initial prototype no later than 1973. Almost immediately, however, the 
project met with significant and sustained public criticism. Initially, this focused on the SST’s 
production of a sonic boom along its flight path.520 As early as 1970 the FAA responded with an 
order restricting supersonic operations to overwater routes. This limited the SST’s appeal, making it 
unlikely that such an aircraft would find use for transcontinental service. Simultaneously, the project 
began to draw fire from environmental groups concerned that exhaust gasses from the high-altitude 
flights would harm the ozone layer.521 By 1971 criticism had reached a level sufficient for Congress 
to vote down additional appropriations for the project, effectively signaling the end of the American 
SST program.522  
The end of America’s effort to create a supersonic airliner in many ways signaled the end of an 
era. From the mid 1920s until the early 1970s, America had led the world in aeronautical 
development. From the early airmail network to the DC-3 to the postwar aviation boom, American 
aircraft manufacturers and airlines had remained at the forefront of technological and commercial 
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progress. Much of that fact, it seems, stemmed from Americans’ enthusiasm for flying. Whether 
attending the National Air Races in the 1930s or rushing to get tickets on new jetliners, Americans’ 
passion for aeronautics played a crucial role in promoting the continued growth of American air 
transport. By the early 1970s, however, it appeared that the consensus no longer applied to airline 
travel. A 1971 public opinion poll demonstrated that 85 percent of Americans opposed the continued 
development of an SST—an opinion that did not necessarily apply to all commercial flying, but an 
attitude that suggests Americans’ changing relationship with aeronautics.523 No longer, it seems, did 
Americans prioritize technological development over environmental concerns. This changing 
relationship with aviation doomed the SST project, but also presaged a changing political consensus 
regarding federal engagement with commercial flying.  
These changing attitudes found their ultimate manifestation in the Airline Deregulation Act of 
1978. The Act represented a shattering of the consensus that had driven the growth of American 
commercial aviation for the preceding 53 years. Ironically, the push for deregulation was led by 
small airlines that did not share in the bounty CAB oversight offered to large carriers. As they had in 
1932, these carriers allied themselves with Congressional Democrats who argued that the 
government had an obligation to support commercial competition. These forces were opposed by 
large, well-established airlines perfectly happy with a status quo that had brought them stable and 
profitable operations for more than half a century. Led by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-
Massachusetts) and President Jimmy Carter, the proponents of deregulation ultimately won the day, 
supported by an American public who believed that the end of federal regulation would bring new 
lower fares. By the end of 1981 domestic airlines would have total freedom in choosing their 
                                            





routes—a freedom that would extend to ticket pricing a year later. By 1984 the CAB would fade out 
of existence.524 
The Airline Deregulation Act formally closed the book on Herbert Hoover’s vision for 
American air commerce. The bill markedly liberalized the playing field for airlines, in the process 
removing the government’s ability to shape commercial growth by naming routes and setting rates. 
Though federal officials did maintain their responsibilities over air traffic control, navigational aids, 
licensing, and safety through the activities of the FAA and NTSB, 1978 signaled the end of a 
consensus that had guided U.S. airlines to world dominance. In many ways, the end of that 
consensus represented an admission that commercial aviation had reached a new level of maturity. 
Flying was now central to Americans’ existence—an integral part of America’s transportation 
network. In 1980 almost 300 million passengers flew Americas airways, a far cry from the tiny 
numbers of the pre World War II era.525 Simultaneously, however, it remained clear that airlines 
continued to be fragile economic operations. Federal subsidies and the structure imposed by the 
CAB had for the most part hidden that fact, but ever-climbing aircraft costs and rising energy prices 
suggested that American commercial aviation remained on shifting financial sands.  
In the wake of deregulation, those factors pushed airlines towards their contemporary 
organizational forms. A series of mergers and acquisitions rocked the industry as many carriers 
found themselves unable to compete in the newly liberalized economic climate. Shockingly, Pan 
Am, for over half a century the most glamorous and dynamic airline in the world, fell victim to the 
prevailing conditions, shuttering operations in 1991. Surviving operations increasingly moved to 
embrace the “hub-and-spoke” system that limited costs and maximized aircraft utilization. Airlines 
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also offered travelers an increasing number of discount fares as they struggled to compete against 
their rivals. As a result of these changes, passenger numbers continued to grow, but many airlines 
found themselves in increasingly dire financial straits. The fragility of the contemporary industry 
profoundly reflects these conditions, as airlines struggle to avoid bankruptcy amid high energy costs, 
continuing worries about carbon emissions, and security concerns.526 
Americans’ relationship with commercial flying has also witnessed a significant shift. No 
longer do we thrill at the thought of taking to the skies. The hub-and-spoke system creates frustrating 
flight routings, and delays at major hubs often wreak havoc on the entire system. In the wake of the 
events of September 11, 2001—which, in many ways, represented only the most recent of a string of 
hijackings that trace their origins to the late 1960s—security concerns form an increasingly 
prominent facet of airline travel. Checkpoints, screening, bag checks, and worries about safety in the 
skies define the experience for many passengers. Flying has become something to be endured; no 
longer do we view commercial flying as glamorous and exciting. That fact certainly reflects 
commercial aviation’s centrality to modern American life, but also highlights the difference between 
contemporary attitudes and those of the preceding three-quarters of a century. Today Americans 
complain about airport noise, protest over airline carbon emissions, and express outrage over 
security hassles, where their forbears thrilled at the opening of a new local airport.527  
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Ironically, our contemporary frustrations with aviation serve to emphasize the prescient nature 
of Herbert Hoover’s initial vision for American aeronautics. At the same time, however, they 
highlight how far we have come from those early days. Perhaps because of aviation’s ambivalent 
place in the lives of contemporary Americans, interest in aviation—most significantly in the “golden 
age” between the world wars—remains significant. The Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and 
Space Museum offers the clearest evidence of Americans’ continued love affair with flying. In 2009, 
more than seven million visited the museum on the national mall, and over a million more 
frequented the museum’s annex near Dulles Airport.528 In fact, since it opened in 1976 the Air and 
Space Museum has consistently vied for the honor of hosting more visitors than any other 
Smithsonian institution. Contemporary visitors can experience galleries devoted to World War I, 
World War II, the “Pioneers of Flight” and the “Golden Age of Flight,” as well as an exhibition 
focused on commercial air transport entitled “America by Air.” The museum holds Charles 
Lindbergh’s Spirit of St. Louis, the X-1 in which Chuck Yeager broke the sound barrier in 1947, a 
Douglas World Cruiser from the first around-the-world flight, and the X-15, the fastest aircraft ever 
to fly, in addition to myriad other treasures. Americans’ fascination with these aircraft highlight the 
enduring passion this country has for flying and its continued interest in the history of aeronautics. 
Both the “Golden Age of Flight” and “America by Air” exhibits focus on the years between the 
world wars, and each speaks powerfully to Americans’ collective narrative of that era. Both present 
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visitors with overwhelmingly progressive visions of American aviation and highlight the nation’s 
leading role in interwar aeronautics. They emphasize technological development, commercial 
growth, and pilots’ bravery, daring, and heroism while narrating flying’s seemingly inevitable rise to 
national and world prominence. In doing so, however, these depictions oversimplify interwar 
aviation by ignoring many of the ambiguous aspects of aviation’s growth and overlooking the 
complexities associated with commercial flying’s political and economic history.  
Opened in 1982, the “Golden Age of Flight” exhibit presents the clearest evidence of the Air 
and Space Museum’s adoption of a celebratory narrative. Focused on air racing, record-setting 
flights, military aviation, private flying, and technology, the exhibit codifies the interwar period’s 
triumphal legacy. The exhibit’s introductory panel explains that the period “is a rather loosely 
defined period that in its broadest sense includes the years between the World Wars . . . The ‘most 
golden’ years of the period were from shortly after Lindbergh’s flight in 1927 through 1939.” 
Reading further, visitors learn that the “Golden Age is considered ‘golden’ because of the many 
advances in aviation technology, the many record flights, and the intense interest of the public in 
aviation.”529  
The Smithsonian’s explicit embrace of the term “golden age” highlights the museum’s focus 
on presenting an overwhelmingly positive narrative. In fact, the exhibit functions to explicitly 
emphasize the glamour and heroism of the era. The introductory panel continues by explaining that 
the “golden age” was “a time when an individual, with little or no capital, could suddenly propel 
himself into the forefront of the field. Heroes were made overnight; companies boomed and busted 
in the course of a season. The names of the air race and aerobatic pilots, the explorers and 
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adventurers were household words, and their exploits were constantly in headlines and newsreels.”530 
These are not new images, but their prevalence in the Air and Space Museum speaks to the 
universality of this narrative.  
In their exhibit proposal, Air and Space Museum staff clearly acknowledged the prevalence of 
that narrative. Lamenting the fact that “today it is difficult to learn who won the Reno Unlimited Air 
Race531 or even that it took place unless there was a major accident during the event,” scriptors 
harked longingly back to the days when “the winners of the Thompson and Bendix races532 were 
front page news.” As such, they presented the “Golden Age of Flight” exhibit as a way to educate the 
public about the many “classic and important aircraft produced during that period,” and the many 
pilots who “established reputations that endure to this day.”533 
Significantly, the “Golden Age of Flight” exhibit ignores aviation’s at-times contentious 
political history, and fails to address Americans’ widespread concerns over safety during the period. 
While its focus on air racing, record-setting flights, and the personal heroism of many interwar pilots 
does accurately reflect the widespread excitement Americans expressed about flying during the 
era—and contemporary Americans’ desires to learn about the most exciting and triumphal aspects of 
this dynamic period—the exhibit does patrons a disservice by failing to account for the complexities 
inherent in the history of the period. Most obviously, the exhibit makes no mention of Americans’ 
widespread worries about aviation’s safety, and speaks sparingly of the significant number of aerial 
                                            
530 Ibid.  
531 The modern descendant of the closed-course races begun in the 1920s.  
532 The Thompson was the highlight of the national air races; an unlimited closed-course 
race designed to provide spectators with a thrilling show as planes flew laps around 
pylons close to the ground. The Bendix was a cross-country race.  
533 Concept Script, “Airplanes of the Golden Age,” co-scripted by Claudia Oakes and 
Donald Lopez, January 20, 1982, Box 1, Accession 07-141, Smithsonian Institution 





pioneers who met their deaths as a direct result of their efforts to fly higher, farther, and faster than 
ever before. As such, the “Golden Age of Flight” offers an incomplete and in many ways misleading 
portrait of the era, and consequently misses the opportunity to educate visitors about the complex 
nature of interwar aviation. 
The more recent “America By Air” exhibit falls victim to many of the same limitations. 
Opened in November of 2007, the new exhibit represents an effort to educate the public about the 
origins and development of American commercial aviation. “America By Air” offers patrons a 
thematic overview of commercial flying from its origins before the First World War to the present 
day. Organized around three central threads—the federal government’s efforts to shape the industry, 
the effects of technological development, and the passenger experience—the exhibit purports to 
provide a comprehensive treatment of aviation’s commercial development. The exhibit retreats from 
the explicitly congratulatory context that defined the earlier exhibition, and instead displays a 
broadly progressive narrative emphasizing the federal government’s guiding hand in technological 
and commercial development. Curators break up the history of commercial aviation into several 
temporal sections that pair informational panels describing narrative history with thematic 
presentations focused on biographies of pilots and regulators, technological advances, and interesting 
visual representations. Two sections—the “Early Years of Air Transportation” and “Airline 
Expansion and Innovation”—focus on the interwar period. The former details the years from World 
War I until 1926, while the later describes the period from 1927 to the beginning of World War II.  
“The Early Years of Air Transportation” details the origins of the American airmail network, 
from the beginnings of the Army’s fledgling service to the private takeover in the years following the 
passage of the Kelly Act. Throughout, its narrative is driven by a focus on the government’s active 





airplanes to move the mail in order to help establish a national air transportation system,”534 and that 
the Post Office and Commerce Department “worked together to develop better navigation 
technologies.”535 By the summer of 1927, the exhibit explains, federal efforts had created “an 
effective commercial airline system . . . providing reliable air mail service” and continuing “to shape 
the new industry by regulating airways, guiding aviation’s growth, and promoting safety and 
technology.”536 
The “Early Years of Air Transportation” section also speaks directly to the legislative 
foundation for that commercial network. A small panel showcasing the pen Calvin Coolidge used to 
sign the 1925 Kelly Act describes that bill, focusing on the commercial gains it engendered by 
allowing the Post Office to contract with private carriers to transport the mail. The panel also offers a 
succinct summary of the 1926 Air Commerce Act, again emphasizing the federal government’s 
guiding hand.537 Additionally, curators offer brief biographies of prominent governmental figures 
such as Paul Henderson, Second Assistant Postmaster General during the early years of airmail 
service, Clyde Kelly, champion of the 1925 Contract Airmail Act that came to bear his name, and 
William MacCracken, Jr., the primary author of the Air Commerce Act and the first Assistant 
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Secretary of Commerce for Aeronautics. Brief sketches, these panels proffer a concise outline of 
each man’s accomplishments, and give patrons context for the exhibit’s broader narrative.   
The exhibit section, however, fails to engage several prominent issues related to this period in 
commercial aviation’s development. Most notably, the exhibit overlooks Herbert Hoover’s 
foundational role in creating and promoting American federal aviation policy. In addition, curators 
accept Post Office and Commerce Department actions as a given, failing to explain that informal 
Post Office subsidies actually represented one of a number of possible federal strategies for dealing 
with air transport. No mention, for example, is made of European countries’ move to nationalize 
major carriers—a viable and successful method of state-sponsored economic development. Finally 
the exhibit section does not place aviation’s commercial growth in the larger context of American 
transportation policy. The script does not mention aviation’s relative position vis-à-vis railroads or 
shipping; this fact simplifies the exhibit’s narrative and again emphasizes the progressive nature of 
aeronautical development, but fails to provide visitors with a comprehensive overview of relevant 
issues. 
Like the preceding section, curators organize “Airline Expansion and Innovation” around a 
progressive chronological narrative. Again emphasizing the government’s role in promoting 
commercial growth, curators highlight the “solid infrastructure” that “took shape under government 
guidance” as “regulatory reforms reshaped the industry.”538 The section opens by highlighting the 
supposed need to reform the late 1920s airmail system. “While airlines often prospered flying the 
mail,” the script relates, “the system had problems.” Specifically, “the Post Office’s bidding process 
for air routes resulted in an unfair payment system, and short-term contracts discouraged airlines 
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from investing in long-term development.” The solution lay in “larger, multi-engine aircraft,” that 
had the capability to carry passengers as well as cargo. Unfortunately, “such airplanes were too 
costly to operate. Reform was needed for the airline system to grow.”539  
According to the exhibit script, the impetus for reform came almost exclusively from 
Postmaster General Walter F. Brown. Referring to Brown as a “visionary,” curators paint Brown as 
“the most important architect of the nation’s passenger airline industry.” He “helped draft legislation 
[the 1930 McNary-Watres Act] to reform the way airlines were paid, streamline the nation’s air 
routes, and encourage airline growth and innovation.” In so doing, Brown “made subsidies for 
airlines more fair” by changing the basis of payment from a system based on weight to one based on 
space, and “provided economic incentives to encourage airlines to carry passengers.”540  
By casting Brown as a visionary reformer, “America By Air” presents a narrowly defined, and 
in some ways one-sided, perspective on a contentious period in commercial aviation history. Though 
curators’ characterization of Brown coheres with the exhibit’s focus on offering patrons a 
progressive vision of governmental engagement with commercial aeronautics, doing so implicitly 
ties that narrative to a particular definition of that vision. Specifically, Brown’s pride of place signals 
curators’ tacit acknowledgement that Brown’s progressive Republican vision for American aviation 
represented the correct developmental path.    
That perspective, moreover, has immediate consequences for the remainder of the “Airline 
Expansion and Innovation” section. Subsequent panels refer dismissively to Brown’s “Spoils 
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Conferences” and the airmail “Scandal” of 1934. Describing the 1930 conferences, visitors read that 
“to ensure the survival of well-run passenger airlines,” the Postmaster “encouraged them to merge 
with air mail lines—a move that saved many airlines from extinction during the Depression.” The 
panel goes on to relate that Brown “forced the mergers in the interest of efficiency and excluded 
small, marginal carriers.”541 The exhibit characterizes the 1934 uproar over supposed corruption and 
collusion as “unfounded,” and relates that President Roosevelt cancelled airmail contracts in 
response to “political pressure” rather than from any genuine desire to reform the industry.542  
These depictions suggest that Roosevelt and Congressional Democrats bore responsibility for 
attempting to destroy Brown’s “visionary” reforms out of a partisan desire to discredit Brown, rather 
than any legitimate concern over airmail policy. While historians can debate the relative merits of 
Brown’s policies, the museum’s one-sided depiction of this contentious period in commercial 
aviation’s development oversimplifies the issue and unfairly villainizes Brown’s opponents. 
Certainly, Walter Brown played a crucial role in promoting the development of commercial air 
transport in the United States. Visitors leave “America by Air,” however, in the mistaken belief that 
Franklin Roosevelt’s only contribution to commercial aeronautics lay in a selfish desire to score 
political points to the detriment of American aeronautics.  
Significantly, this means that “America By Air” fails to address Roosevelt’s role in creating the 
Federal Aviation Commission, his support for the 1938 Civil Aeronautics Act, or his promotion of 
public works spending on airways and airports. The omission of these facts results in a coherent and 
easily digestible narrative of Progressive Republican support for aviation, but does not do justice to 
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the complexities inherent in the development of federal policy. Though not as egregiously as the 
“Golden Age of Flight,” “America By Air” maintains the museum’s focus on offering visitors a 
dumbed-down treatment of American aviation, a treatment that overlooks or dismisses potentially 
troublesome or ambiguous aspects of aeronautical development and highlights a story defined by 
commercial progress and technological innovation. As such, these exhibits emphasize the ongoing 
need for a comprehensive analysis of this seminal period in aeronautical development. 
 
Its shortcomings notwithstanding, the Air and Space Museum’s treatment of the interwar 
period highlights Americans’ continued interest in the era. Air travel’s ambivalent place in 
contemporary Americans’ lives, it seems, has only furthered the attractiveness of a period of 
dynamic growth, individual heroism, and commercial success. In our excitement, however, we 
should not lose sight of the complex and often contentious nature of aeronautical development 
during the era. The years between the world wars fostered the creation of our modern air transport 
system. A result of the work of a visionary band of advocates, commercial aviation grew from 
humble beginnings to span the country, oceans, and eventually the world. That growth occurred 
largely as a result of focused federal actions. From the crafting and passage of the 1926 Air 
Commerce Act to the activities of the WPA’s Airways and Airports Division, federal officials and 
federal dollars underwrote a coherent program of aeronautical development. Without that federal 
engagement, our modern transportation infrastructure would undoubtedly look far different. A 
largely untold story, the evolution of federal aviation policy remains foundational to understanding 
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